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ABSTRACT

In this thesis I explore the strategies and tactics of the anti-nuclear movement in the
Japanese capital Tokyo after the Fukushima nuclear disaster of March 2011. A little
over a year later the anti-nuclear movement had grown to become the largest social
movement in the archipelago in more than half a century. The compound effects of
the earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011 and the nuclear accident at Fukushima
intensified existing dissatisfaction not only with the nuclear industry but with the
decaying institutions of Japan’s capitalist developmental state. In this thesis I use
autonomist Marxist perspectives to situate the disaster against the backdrop of the
breakdown of capitalist developmentalism and the transition to a post-industrial
society. The image of the smouldering nuclear reactors in Fukushima reminded
Tokyo residents of the way urban life in the developmental state had come to depend
on the exploitation of the rural periphery for resources such as the cheap electricity
generated in the nuclear power plants. This thesis is distinctive in its focus on the
role of urban space in the anti-nuclear protest movement in Japan after Fukushima. I
draw on the field of critical urban studies to examine the nature of contentious
politics in a post-industrial society through the lens of the anti-nuclear movement in
Tokyo. In five detailed case studies, I describe the way anti-nuclear activists staged
their opposition to nuclear power in the streets of the metropolis. Activists held
carnivalesque street protests to express their emotional responses to the nuclear
disaster; developed an infrastructure of activist spaces to support their protests;
strengthened their relationships with one another; and experimented with new forms
of democratic politics. These interventions transformed the order of public space in
the city and reclaimed it as a place where citizens could participate in politics. The
protests in 2011 and 2012 took place in the context of global uprisings such as
Occupy Wall Street and the Arab Spring. I place the anti-nuclear movement in
Tokyo within this context. I argue that the diverse tactical interventions staged by
anti-nuclear activists in Tokyo suggest a wider strategic vision of the city as a space
for creative self-expression, sustainable livelihoods, strong communities and
grassroots democracy.
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NOTES ON JAPANESE NAMES AND TERMINOLOGY

Japanese names appear in this thesis with the family name first and given name
second as is typical in Japan. Exceptions to this occur when a Japanese author’s
English work is being cited or when a Japanese author has been published widely in
English. Japanese terms are Romanised according to the revised Hepburn system. All
Japanese terms appear in italics except for the names of organisations and places.
Translations from the Japanese are my own, unless otherwise specified. I have done
my utmost to ensure the accuracy of the translations and sought advice from
supervisors and Japanese native speakers where I was unsure. Any remaining errors
of translation or transliteration are my responsibility.

INTRODUCTION

At 14:46 on 11 March 2011 a magnitude 9 earthquake struck 90 kilometres off the
north-east coast of Japan. Forty minutes later, an enormous tsunami triggered by the
quake made landfall in the Tōhoku region of north-east Japan.1 The earthquake and
tsunami caused extensive damage to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant,
leading to a major nuclear accident.2 This complex series of overlapping disasters has
come to be known as ‘3.11’. It prompted an outpouring of anti-nuclear sentiment
across the Japanese archipelago and around the world. By 29 June 2012 an estimated
200,000 people were protesting outside the prime minister’s official residence in
Tokyo.3 This was the largest street demonstration to take place in the archipelago in
more than fifty years. As Japan’s political, economic and cultural capital, Tokyo was
at the centre of the new wave of anti-nuclear activism. This thesis describes and
analyses the strategy and tactics of the anti-nuclear movement in the metropolis after
3.11.
Sociologist Oguma Eiji has argued that a widespread fear of radioactive
contamination after 3.11 does not sufficiently explain the growth of the anti-nuclear
movement. He suggests that the movement grew so rapidly and so widely because
the costly and bureaucratic nuclear power industry came to symbolise the broader
failures of ‘Japanese-style industrialising society’ (Nihon gata kōgyōka shakai).4
Japan’s rapid industrialisation in the post-Second World War period (referred to

1 This account of the disaster is drawn from Tom Gill, Brigitte Steger, and David H. Slater, ‘The 3.11
Disasters’, in Japan Copes with Calamity: Ethnographies of the Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Disasters of March
2011 (Bern: Peter Lang, 2013), 3–7.
2 The accident was eventually rated as a Level 7 incident on the International Atomic Energy Agency’s
International Nuclear Event Scale. This is the highest possible rating on the scale and only the second
nuclear accident in history to be given this rating. The only other nuclear accident to have been given a
Level 7 rating was the 1986 Chernobyl disaster in the Soviet Ukraine.

The attendance figures given for demonstrations in this thesis are taken from a list compiled by political
scientist Kinoshita Chigaya unless otherwise stated. See Kinoshita Chigaya, ‘2011 nen ikō no hangenpatsu
demo risuto [List of Anti-nuclear Demonstrations Held Since 2011]’, in Genpatsu o tomeru hitobito: 3.11 kara
kantaei mae made [People Who Stop Nuclear Power Plants: From 3.11 to the Prime Minister’s Residence], ed. Oguma
Eiji (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 2013), Appendix 1 – 38.
3

4

Oguma Eiji, Shakai o kaeru ni wa [To Change Society] (Kōdansha, 2012), 55.

1

hereafter as ‘the post-war’),5 was based on the expansion of manufacturing industry.
While strong economic growth facilitated a rapid increase in living standards for the
majority of people, by the early 1990s the Japanese economy had run out of steam.
Having recorded average annual growth of 10 per cent during the height of the postwar boom in the 1960s, growth rates slumped in the 1990s to an average of 1 per
cent per annum.6 The proportion of the labour force employed in manufacturing
peaked in 1992. Then, in 1994, the service sector surpassed manufacturing as the
largest employer. 7 This transformation reflected a broader global shift in the
industrialised world from manufacturing to service sector-led economies. This
transformation has been described in terms of a transition from an ‘industrial’ to a
‘post-industrial’ or ‘information’ society. 8 In this thesis I situate the growth of the
anti-nuclear movement in Japan after 3.11 in this context.
The process of post-industrialisation has led to an increase in insecure, casual, parttime and temporary forms of work.9 Young workers in Japan who do not have access
to stable, full-time work are commonly referred to as ‘furiitā’ (usually anglicised as
‘freeters’). The term was coined in the late 1980s by the recruitment magazine
Furomu A in advertisements for casual part-time employment. By prefixing the
In Japanese historiography, the post-Second World War period is generally regarded as a definite
historical period designated as ‘sengo’ (‘post-war’). While the term has been criticised for its seemingly
limitless elasticity it remains in general use and I adopt it here. For a critical perspective on the notion of
the ‘post-war’ see Harry Harootunian’s essays, ‘Japan’s Long Postwar: The Trick of Memory and the Ruse
of History’, The South Atlantic Quarterly 99, no 4 (2000): 715–739; ‘The Execution of Tosaka Jun and Other
Tales: Historical Amnesia, Memory, and the Question of Japan’s “Postwar”’, in Ruptured Histories: War,
Memory, and the Post-Cold War in Asia, ed. Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter (Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 2007), 150–171.
5

6

Arthur J. Alexander, The Arc of Japan’s Economic Development (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008).

7

Oguma, Shakai o kaeru ni wa, 15.

8 This is the designation favoured by Oguma in Shakai o kaeru ni wa and I adopt it throughout this thesis.
The notion of a post-industrial society took on growing importance of knowledge as a source of profit
prompted sociologists as diverse as Daniel Bell in the United States and Alain Touraine in France to
propose the ‘post-industrial society’ thesis as early as the 1960s and 1970s. Daniel Bell, The Coming of PostIndustrial Society: A Venture in Social Forecasting (London: Heinemann, 1974); Alain Touraine, The PostIndustrial Society (London: Wildwood House, 1974). The concept overlaps with more recent work on the
‘information society’. See for example, Manuel Castells, ‘Flows, Networks, Identities: A Critical Theory of
the Informational Society’, in Critical Information in the New Information Age (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield,
1999). For a consideration of the ‘information society’ thesis in the Japanese context see Tessa MorrisSuzuki, Beyond Computopia: Information, Automation, and Democracy in Japan (London: Kegan Paul, 1988).

As Vosko points out, most of the advanced economies within the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have experienced an increase in at least one form of non-standard
employment since the 1970s. See Leah F. Vosko, Temporary Work: The Gendered Rise of a Precarious
Employment Relationship (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 28.
9

2

German loan word ‘arubaitā’ (part-timer)10 with the English word ‘free’ Furomu A
promoted the idea of a ‘free part-timer’. This casual relationship to work appealed to
many young people during the boom years of the 1980s and it soon became an
everyday term to describe a new type of casual employment.11 After the economic
crisis of the 1990s, however, the number of freeters increase dramatically and the
positive associations of personal autonomy associated with the word gave way to
new anxieties about the lack of security which casual work entails. In response to the
crisis, new forms of ‘freeter activism’ emerged in Tokyo and other urban centres.12
After 3.11, many freeter activists played a leading role in the anti-nuclear
movement.13 In this thesis, I explain how the strategies and tactics of freeter activism
in the 1990s and 2000s were taken up in the anti-nuclear movement.
The growing number of freeters in Japan is an example of the global tendency
towards an increasingly precarious employment relationship. A recent report by the
International Labour Organization found that, worldwide, just one in four workers is
employed on a permanent contract. 14 Gill and Pratt define as ‘precarious
employment’, ‘all forms of insecure, contingent, flexible work—from illegalized,
casualised

and

temporary

employment,

to

homeworking,

piecework

and

freelancing’.15 Precarious working conditions tend to produce an ‘interminable lack
of certainty’ and a condition of ‘being unable to predict one’s fate or [have] some
degree of stability on which to construct a life’.16 This instability is encapsulated in

10 Arubaitaa (part-time worker) and arubaito (part-time job) are derived from the German word Arbeit
(work). The word arubaito, sometimes shortened to baito, refers to the kinds of part-time and seasonal
work performed mainly by university students needing pocket money.
11 Kosugi Reiko, Escape from Work: Freelancing Work and the Challenge to Corporate Japan
(Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2008), 1.
12 Carl Cassegård, Youth Movements, Trauma and Alternative Space in Contemporary Japan (Leiden
Boston: Global Oriental, 2014).

Akihiro Ogawa, ‘Young Precariat at the Forefront: Anti-Nuclear Rallies in Post-Fukushima Japan’, InterAsia Cultural Studies 14, no 2 (March 2013): 317–326.
13

Katie Allen, ‘Most of the World’s Workers Have Insecure Jobs, ILO Report Reveals’, The Guardian,
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/may/19/most-of-the-worlds-workers-have-insecure-jobsilo-report-reveals.
14

Rosalind Gill and Andy Pratt, ‘In the Social Factory?: Immaterial Labour, Precariousness and Cultural
Work’, Theory, Culture and Society 25, no 7–8 (2008): 3.
15

Brett Neilson and Ned Rossiter, ‘From Precarity to Precariousness and Back Again’, Fibreculture no 5
(2005),
http://five.fibreculturejournal.org/fcj-022-from-precarity-to-precariousness-and-back-againlabour-life-and-unstable-networks/.
16

3

the term ‘precarity’ which has been coined to describe the general condition of
insecurity attendant on precarious work.17 Some activists and scholars have proposed
that the precarity of working life in the post-industrial economy has produced a new
‘precarious proletariat’ they term the ‘precariat’. 18 In Japan, these notions of
precarity and the precariat have been adopted by activists who are concerned with
issues of homelessness, poverty, unemployment and insecure work.19
As an activist with a long-term interest in the issues of precarity and postindustrialisation, I approach the anti-nuclear movement in Japan as an engaged
intellectual. I adopt a theoretical approach which is based in the heterodox Marxist
current critical theorist David Eden refers to as the ‘perspective of autonomy’.20
Autonomist thinkers such as Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have developed
influential perspectives on the transformations associated with capitalist globalisation
and the internationalisation of class struggle in post-industrial societies.21 As I will
discuss further in Chapter One, autonomist perspectives have informed a number of
activists and scholars who are involved in the precarity and anti-nuclear movements
in Japan. Autonomist ideas have been interrogated by Marxist scholars as part of a
revival of Marxist social thought in the post-industrial context. Although activists
and social theorists in Asia have shown significant interest in these ideas,
autonomists writing in English have largely neglected contemporary social
movements in East Asia. This is a particularly glaring omission as the development
of movements in East Asia has not been separate from the global trends which
autonomists have theorised in other parts of the world. In this thesis I address this

17

Gill and Pratt, ‘In the Social Factory?: Immaterial Labour, Precariousness and Cultural Work’, 3

18

Guy Standing, The Precariat: The New Dangerous Class (Bloomsbury Academic, 2011).

19 See, for example, Amamiya Karin, Hangeki karuchā: purekariāto no yutaka na sekai [Cultural
Counterattack: The Rich World of the Precariat] (Tokyo: Kadokawa gakugei shuppan, 2010).
20 For general overviews of autonomist Marxist thought see Nick Dyer-Witheford, Cyber-Marx: Cycles and
Circuits of Struggle in High-Technology Capitalism (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1999); Harry Cleaver,
Reading Capital Politically (Edinburgh: AK Press, 2000); David Eden, Autonomy: Capitalism, Class and Politics
(Ashgate Pub Co, 2012). For an historical study of the workerist and autonomist currents in Italian
Marxist thought in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s which gave rise to contemporary autonomism see Steve
Wright, Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism (London: Pluto, 2002).

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000); Multitude:
War and Democracy in the Age of Empire (New York: Penguin Books, 2004); Commonwealth (Cambridge, MA:
Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 2009).
21

4

gap in the literature through a close examination of the anti-nuclear movement in
Japan.
In 2011, while anti-nuclear activists took to the streets of Tokyo, protests were
erupting in cities across the globe. Commencing with the Arab Spring in North
Africa in late 2010, the uprisings spread across Europe and North America, from
Cairo’s Tahrir Square to the Plaza del Sol in Madrid to New York’s Zuccotti Park.22
While each of these protests arose within a specific local context, Hardt and Negri
point out that they articulated a series of common desires for grassroots democracy
and against the increasingly precarious conditions of life in post-industrial
societies.23 Recognising the powerful impact of these social movements on world
politics, Time magazine took the unusual step of naming ‘The Protester’ as its 2011
‘person of the year’.24 Yet Time and the Anglophone media have tended to neglect
the important role played by social movements in East Asia in the global uprising of
2011. In the Anglophone academic literature, too, studies of the anti-nuclear
movement in Japan have tended to neglect the commonalities between the antinuclear movement and these global events.25 Activists and thinkers in Japan, on the
other hand, have identified these commonalities.26 In this thesis I address this gap in
the Anglophone literature by situating the anti-nuclear movement in Tokyo within
the globalised culture of precarity activism.
22 Ernesto Castañeda, ‘The Indignados of Spain: A Precedent to Occupy Wall Street’, Social Movement
Studies 11, no 3–4 (1 August 2012): 309–319; Alesio Lunghi and Seth Wheeler, Occupy Everything: Reflections
on Why It’s Kicking Off Everywhere (Wivenhoe: Minor Compositions, 2012), internal-pdf://Lunghi &
Wheeler OccupyEverything 2012-0084283136/Lunghi & Wheeler OccupyEverything 2012.pdf; ‘From
Arab Spring to Global Revolution’, The Guardian, 5 February 2013, accessed 6 February 2013,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/feb/05/arab-spring-global-revolution.

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, ‘Arabs Are Democracy’s New Pioneers’, Guardian.co.uk, 2011,
London,
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/feb/24/arabs-democracy-latin-america;
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Declaration (Argo-Navis, 2012).
23

Kurt Andersen, ‘Person of the Year 2011: The Protester’, Time, 14 December 2011,
http://content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2101745_2102132,00.html.
24

Koichi Hasegawa, ‘Facing Nuclear Risks: Lessons from the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster’, International
Journal of Japanese Sociology 21, no 1 (2012): 84–91; Daniel P. Aldrich, ‘Post-Crisis Japanese Nuclear Policy:
From Top-Down Directives to Bottom-Up Activism’, AsiaPacific Issues no 103 (January 2012): 1–11.
There are exceptions to this, see for example Vera Mackie and Susumu Yamaizumi, ‘Introduction’, in
Japan and the High Treason Incident, ed. Masako Gavin and Ben Middleton (Oxon: Routledge, 2013), 1–14.
25

Ikuo Gonoi, ‘Demo’ to wa nani ka: henbō suru chokusetsu minshushugi [What is a ‘Demo’? The
Metamorphosis of Direct Democracy] (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan, 2012); Oguma Eiji, ed., Genpatsu o
tomeru hitobito: 3.11 kara kantei mae made [People Who Stop Nuclear Power Plants: From 3.11 to the
Prime Minister’s Residence] (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 2013).
26
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From the 1960s, there has been a growing appreciation among both activists and
social theorists of the importance of urban space as a site of class struggle. Where the
factory was posited by Marxist-Leninists in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries as the primary locus of class struggle, the globally connected social
movements of the late 1960s often took place not in factories but on university
campuses and in the streets of large cities. Marxist sociologist Henri Lefebvre,
inspired by the revolutionary events in Paris in May 1968, wrote extensively about
the revolutionary potential of urban space.27 His work led to a new wave of Marxist
urban theory which was perhaps best represented in the work of his student Manuel
Castells.28 Sociologist Machimura Takashi was one of the first scholars to introduce
this new Marxist urbanism to Japan in the 1980s.29 Neil Brenner, in defining the
discipline of critical urban theory, notes that social theory today must acknowledge
our integration into an ever more tightly woven global urban fabric.30 As the political,
economic and cultural capital of Japan, Tokyo became the centre of the anti-nuclear
movement after 3.11. In this thesis I draw on insights from Marxist urban theory to
situate the anti-nuclear movement within urban space.
The social struggles of the 1960s prompted social theorists not only to decentre
understandings of revolutionary social change from the factory to the city but also to
rethink the temporality of revolution. In nineteenth and early twentieth century
Marxist and socialist movements, revolution was often conceptualised as a discrete
event located sometime in the future. This was a goal towards which activists should
aspire, often at the expense of their present needs and desires. Rosi Braidotti

27 Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991); Henri
Lefebvre, Critique of Everyday Life, trans. John Moore, vol. 1 (London: Verso, 1991); Henri Lefebvre,
Writings on Cities, trans. Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers,
1996).
28 Manuel Castells, City, Class and Power, Sociology, Politics and Cities (London: Macmillan, 1978); Manuel
Castells, The City and the Grassroots: A Cross-Cultural Theory of Urban Social Movements (London: E. Arnold,
1983). Castells later rejected his earlier Marxism but arguably the perspectives he developed in his Marxist
urbanism influenced the development of his later ideas of the ‘networked society’.
29 Machimura Takashi, ‘Toshi shakaiundō ni okeru kōzō to shutai: shakai undō no romanchishizumu o
koete [Structure and Subjectivity in Urban Social Movements: Beyond the Romanticism of Social
Movements]’, Shisō [Thought] no 737 (1985): 158.
30 Neil Brenner, ‘What Is Critical Urban Theory?’, City: Analysis of Urban Trends, Culture, Theory, Policy,
Action 13, no 2–3 (2009): 198–207.
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describes how the rejection of the separation of means and ends in the politics of
1968 gave rise to a ‘politics of radical immanence’.31 For Negri, immanence implies
a rejection of transcendent notions of past, present and future. It is only in the living
present that we can make the future through our action. The experiences of 1968
helped to popularise the idea that the time for revolution is now.32 This is a politics
which emphasises ‘the embodied and embedded nature of the subject, which results
in unlimited confidence in lived experience’. The politics of radical immanence is
expressed through a focus on the ‘politics of everyday life’ and the revolutionary
potentiality inherent in the present moment.33
The politics of radical immanence involves a notion of revolution rooted in the lived
experience of struggle. This creates a ‘prefigurative’ politics in which activism seeks
to transform the lived experience of daily life with an emphasis on playfulness and
self-expression rather than a stoic march towards a possible future revolutionary
rupture. The politics of prefiguration seems particularly pertinent in the precarious
times inhabited by freeter activists in Tokyo. Without the ability to plan for the future,
many freeters concentrate instead on deriving satisfaction and meaning from their
contemporary reality. I draw on these notions of immanence and prefiguration
throughout this thesis in order to explain the strategies and tactics of the anti-nuclear
movement.
Critical to the development of this new politics was the feminist notion that ‘the
personal is the political’.34 This slogan highlighted the importance of individual
action and experience in the development of revolutionary praxis. It is based on the
understanding that everyday life is always already permeated by hierarchies of
gender, race and class. Everyday life is thus seen as the site of limitless possibilities
for resistance and rebellion. The slogan also signalled a growing understanding

Rosi Braidotti, ‘The Politics of Radical Immanence: May 1968 as an Event’, New Formations 65 (2008):
24–25.
31

32

Antonio Negri, Time for Revolution, trans. Matteo Mandarini (London: Continuum, 2003), 228–229.

33 I have explored this idea in depth in, Alexander Brown, ‘Precarious Times: The Revolutionary
Potentiality of the Present’, in Movements in Time: Revolution, Social Justice and Times of Change, eds. Cecile
Lawrence and Natalie Churn (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012), 175–186.
34

Ibid., 25.
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among activists and social theorists of the importance of the emotional or affective
dimensions of political protest. While commentators disagree about the extent to
which the anti-nuclear movement in Japan after 3.11 has impacted energy policy,35 in
this thesis I discuss the way anti-nuclear protest is rooted in the everyday lives of
participants and in their relationship to space and time. Drawing on the politics of
radical immanence I seek to understand how they enabled participants to express
their affective responses to 3.11 and perform their utopian desires for a nuclear-free
world.
My training in cultural history has made me particularly attentive to the way the past
is woven into the contemporary anti-nuclear movement. Activists in Tokyo often
conceived of their strategies and tactics as constituting a break from past modes of
activism. I examine how their understandings of the past, while not always
historically accurate, serve as an important reference point for articulating their
politics today. Anti-nuclear activists make use of the history of activism in Japan and
elsewhere to claim to a precedent for their own actions. Throughout this thesis I
discuss the way the past lived in the contemporary movement through intellectual
debate, film, protest tactics, images and songs.

A Contemporary ‘Workers’ Inquiry’
The roots of contemporary autonomism lie in the 1950s when a number of left-wing
intellectuals associated with the Italian ‘workerist’ current questioned the official
Marxism of the Italian Socialist and Communist parties. Their critique is particularly
relevant to this thesis because they approached class struggles in relation to broader
changes in the organisation of work. Raniero Panzieri, for example, was a member of
the Italian Socialist Party who felt that ‘the growing moderation of the left parties
and unions sprang first and foremost from their indifference to the changes wrought
upon the working class by post-war economic development’.36 Drawing on an
original proposal by Marx, the workerists called on left intellectuals to conduct
David Arase, for example, claims that the impact of 3.11 on energy policy has been relatively weak
whereas Daniel Aldrich argues that anti-nuclear protest has had a significant impact on nuclear policy.
David M. Arase, ‘The Impact of 3/11 on Japan’, East Asia 29, no 4 (1 December 2012): 313–336; Aldrich,
‘Post-Crisis Japanese Nuclear Policy.’
35

36

Wright, Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism, 20–21.
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‘workers’ inquiries’ to find out how workers were responding to new technological
developments in the factories.37 They melded new methods coming out of American
industrial sociology with a revolutionary notion of intellectual engagement and
carried out interviews with workers while also engaging in struggles on the factory
floor.38 The workerist Romano Alquati, who studied class struggles in the FIAT and
Olivetti factories in the early 1960s, began to recognise the important role played by
working class culture by ‘placing an increasing emphasis upon the coherence that the
transmission and filtering of memory between successive generations of workers lent
to the immediate experience of production’.39
The workerists’ attempt to reframe traditional Marxist concepts and frameworks
exemplifies a broader trend in the international communist movement from the late
1950s. The British historian E. P. Thompson, too, challenged Marxist-Leninist idea
of class in his studies of the development of the working class in England. He
rejected notions of class as a structure or category and described instead how class is
made, through ‘an active process, which owes as much to agency as to conditioning.’
For Thompson, class was ‘an historical phenomenon, unifying a number of disparate
and seemingly unconnected events, both in the raw material of experience and in
consciousness.’40 For the workerist and autonomist currents of the Italian left, the
purpose of a workers’ inquiry was to develop a communist strategy based on the
practices and circumstances of the contemporary working class. Intellectuals
associated with the perspective of autonomy today have extended the notion of a
‘workers’ inquiry’ to their investigations of the globally connected social movements
such as the Mexican Zapatista uprising of the 1990s and recent social struggles in
Argentina.41 Like the workerists, they have sought to develop strategies and tactics
37 For Marx’s original essay see, Karl Marx, ‘A Workers’ Inquiry’, La Revue Socialiste, 1880,
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1880/04/20.htm.
38 Wright, Storming Heaven: Class Composition and Struggle in Italian Autonomist Marxism, 22–29, 49–
58.
39

Ibid., 79.

40

E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Victor Gollancz, 1963), 9.

41 The autonomist Marxist collective Midnight Notes produced one of the first such studies in their book
on the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, Mexico. See Midnight Notes Collective, Auroras of the Zapatistas: Local
and Global Struggles of the Fourth World War (Brooklyn, NY: Autonomedia, 2001). Colectivo Situaciones
have looked at the protests in Argentina. See Colectivo Situaciones, 19 & 20: Notes for a New Social
Protagonism (Wivenhoe: Minor Compositions, 2011).
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for the struggle against capitalism by investigating the practices of contemporary
social movements.

42

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue that, while

contemporary struggles are increasingly heterogeneous, they nevertheless produce
common ideas, symbols and practices. They suggest that the post-industrial
proletariat is best conceived not as a ‘working class’ but rather as ‘multitude’ made
up of ‘singularities that act in common’.43 The utility of the concept lies in the refusal
to reduce singular social subjects to a unitary whole and its attempt to produce a
common basis for political action.44 Yet, as Dyer-Witheford points out, multitude
remains a highly theoretical concept which needs to be investigated through research
into contemporary political struggles.45 In order to carry out such an investigation it
is necessary to adopt a method which is ‘oriented toward the creation of new forms
of collective organization, direct action, and anti-capitalist forms of life, a project
grounded in inquiry into the ever-changing ‘composition’ of labour’.46
Sociologist Alain Touraine examined the anti-nuclear movement in France in the
1970s because he recognised the way the movement had challenged the political and
economic structures of a society which was going through post-industrialisation.47
Anti-nuclear movements in the United State also had an important influence on the
development of contemporary autonomism.48 As the largest social movement to

Nick Southall, for example, has show how how the autonomist Marxism of Michael Hardt and Antonio
Negri is dependent upon their understanding of contemporary social struggles. See Nick Southall, ‘A
Multitude of Possibilities: The Strategic Vision of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’ (doctoral
dissertation, University of Wollongong, 2010).
42

43

Hardt and Negri, Multitude, 105.

44

Ibid., 99-102.

45 Nick Dyer-Witheford, ‘For a Compositional Analysis of the Multitude’, in Subverting the Present, Imagining
the Future (Brooklyn: Autonomedia, 2008), 258–260.
46 Enda Brophy, ‘The Organizations of Immaterial Labour: Knowledge Worker Resistance in PostFordism’ (Queen’s University (Canada), 2008), 58.

Alain Touraine, Anti-Nuclear Protest: The Opposition to Nuclear Energy in France (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1983).
47

The first publications to appear under the name of the Midnight Notes Collective, a loose grouping of
autonomist activists and intellectuals, were two issues of the irregularly published Midnight Notes journal on
the anti-nuclear movement in the United States in the late 1970s. See Midnight Notes, nos 1–2, accessed 20
August 2012, http://www.midnightnotes.org/mnpublic.html. For an analysis of the politics of Midnight
Notes see Eden, Autonomy, 125–191. Manuel Yang has written a reflective essay on Midnight Notes antinuclear work from the point of view of the post-3.11 situation. See, Manuel Yang, ‘“Kimyō na shōri” kara,
“katasutorōfu” no eien kakumei made [From “Strange Victories” to “Catastrophe”’s Permanent
Revolution]’, Gendai shisō [Contemporary Thought] 39, no 7 (1 May 2011): 134–146.
48
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sweep Japan in more than half a century, the contemporary anti-nuclear movement
seems uniquely suitable for understanding how people challenge contemporary forms
of capitalist and state power. By providing a focus for many of the frustrations and
anxieties which people in Tokyo feel today, the movement has taken on the contours
of a broader anti-systemic struggle which challenges the structures of political and
economic power which have dominated Japan throughout the post-war period.
Oguma Eiji, reflecting on the movement in 2011 and 2012 suggests that
people cried out ‘No Restarts’ as they were angry at what appeared to be a complete
lack of an attitude of remorse on the part of the government, the bureaucracy or the
electric power companies and the procedural decision to carry out restarts as if
nothing had changed. In a sense, ‘No Restarts’ was an expression of the feeling of
being unable to trust the government as it currently stands, of not wanting to be used
at will by the electric power companies or the nuclear industry.49

In this thesis, I follow the approach of contemporary autonomist thinkers by seeking
to derive insights for left strategy by examining the practices of a contemporary
social movement. I approach the anti-nuclear movement in Japan after 3.11 by
asking,
what were the strategies and tactics freeter activists in Tokyo adopted during
their struggle against the nuclear industry?

Methods and Scope
I address this question through an analysis of the cultural practices of the anti-nuclear
movement. It is, of course, impossible to completely separate the field of culture
from the political, economic and social fields. As Thomas Reed points out, it is only
since the 1990s that social movement theorists have begun to pay close attention to
culture. As they have turned their attention to ‘culture’, however, sociologists have
struggled to define it.50 For the purposes of this thesis I understand movement culture
as a series of practices which include demonstration style, approaches to urban space,

49 Oguma, Genpatsu o tomeru hitobito, 238. See also Oguma Eiji, ‘Kinyō no yoru, kanteimae de’, Asahi
shimbun, 19 July 2012, Morning edition.
50 T. V. Reed, The Art of Protest: Culture and Activism from the Civil Rights Movement to the Streets of
Seattle (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005), 287, 290–300.
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media production, music, visual art, street theatre and intellectual debate. The
cultural turn in the sociology of social movements represents a significant correction
when compared with the focus on instrumentality found in sociological theories of
resource mobilisation and opportunity structure.51 It also reflects a turn to culture
within social movements themselves. There is an increasing focus on culture in
recent studies of freeter activism. In Japanese, Mōri Yoshitaka’s work on cultural
politics has attracted significant attention.52 In English, one of the first such studies
was Hayashi and McKnight’s53 important essay on the cultural politics of the antiIraq war movement in Japan. Anthropologist Anne Allison and sociologist Carl
Cassegård have subsequently published important monographs on contemporary
youth movements in Japan.54 This study extends the cultural sociology approach
adopted in these works to the post-3.11 situation in Tokyo.
In post-industrial societies, urban space can be a place of work and play, of
repression and resistance. One feature of the globalised social movements which
captivated the world’s attention in 2011 was their development of innovative protest
tactics which made use of parks, plazas and other key locations in major urban
centres. By occupying public squares and holding festive street demonstrations,
activists challenged the existing order of the street and re-created it as a theatre of
political participation, carnivalesque resistance and grassroots democracy. Freeters in
Tokyo encounter the structural changes attendant on post-industrialisation as it
affects their everyday lives as urban residents. When they resist these changes they
do so in concrete times and places. In this thesis I focus on the way anti-nuclear
activists have intervened in the production of urban space in Tokyo.

Steven M. Buechler, Understanding Social Movements: Theories from the Classical Era to the Present
(Boulder: Paradigm Publishers, 2011).
51

Mōri Yoshitaka, Bunka=seiji: gurōbarizēshonjidai no kūkan no hanran [Culture = Politics: The Revolt
of Space in the Age of Globalisation] (Tokyo: Getsuyōsha, 2003); Sutorīto no shisō: tenkanki to shite no
1990 nendai [Philosophy of the Streets: The 1990s as a Turning Point] (Tokyo: NHK Shuppan, 2009).
For an extract from Mōri’s Bunka=seiji in English see ‘Culture = Politics: The Emergence of New
Cultural Forms of Protest in the Age of Freeter’, Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 6, no 1 (2005): 17–29.
52

53 Sharon Hayashi and Anne McKnight, ‘Goodbye Kitty, Hello War: The Tactics of Spectacle and New
Youth Movements in Urban Japan’, Positions 13, no 1 (2005): 87–113.
54 Anne Allison, Precarious Japan (Durham: Duke University Press, 2013); Cassegård, Youth Movements,
Trauma and Alternative Space in Contemporary Japan.
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In order to analyse the way anti-nuclear activism has unfolded in urban space I
examine the specific spatial practices of the movement, primarily through the
description and analysis of protest events. Peter Eckersall, in his survey of urban art
and protest in the 1960s develops the idea that
social and cultural events are performative and have the capacity to mark moments
of disruption and broker the possibility of change. They interrupt, insert, invade and
have the potential to influence the daily application and maintenance of cultural
production and power.55

I draw on this approach in a series of detailed case studies of protests in Tokyo.
Eckersall analyses events as ‘scenes’ in a ‘performative cityscape’ so as to uncover
the way ‘embodied experiences connected to human desires, aspirations, and
sometimes, utopian ideas about transforming the world’. 56 I discuss the way
embodied protest enabled activists to express their desires for a nuclear power free
world and at times to suggest alternatives to the existing order of space in the city.
In addition, I analyse images and symbols which appeared at anti-nuclear protest
events and in the discourses and representations of urban space in anti-nuclear
literature. Andrew Gordon, in his study of Imperial democracy in pre-war Japan,
highlighted the ‘ways in which workers themselves envisioned the desirable future
and perceived themselves as members of a factory work force and as participants in
local and national communities’.57 Gordon emphasises the need for historians to give
voice to workers’ own perceptions of their struggles. He relied upon sources such as
speech transcripts and leaflets in which workers’ expressed their own thoughts and
feelings.58 Since the late twentieth century, these privately printed media have been
known in Japan as ‘minikomi’, a word derived from the English words ‘mini’ and
‘communications’. These minikomi can be contrasted with the mass media which are

55 Peter Eckersall, Performativity and Event in 1960s Japan: City, Body, Memory (Houndmills: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2013), 1. Yoshimi Shun’ya has also conducted analyses of popular culture in Tokyo which
consider the city as a ‘stage’. See Yoshimi Shunʾya, Toshi no doramaturugii  : Tōkyō sakariba no shakaishi
[Dramaturgy of the City: A Social History of Tokyo’s Entertainment Districts] (Tōkyō: Kōbundō, 1987).
56

Eckersall, Performativity and Event in 1960s Japan: City, Body, Memory, 3.

57 Andrew Gordon, Labor and Imperial Democracy in Prewar Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of
California Press, 1991), 3.
58

Ibid., 4.
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known as ‘masukomi’, a word which shares a similar derivation from the English
words ‘mass’ and ‘communications’. As my study focuses on a contemporary
movement I have had access to a great variety of texts produced by the actors
themselves. These include personal blogs produced by movement participants,
YouTube videos of demonstrations and speeches, fliers and zines (self-produced
miniature magazines). Zines are one of the more important media used in
contemporary youth sub-cultures and activist milieus and I use them as a source
throughout this thesis.59 These sources allow relatively direct access to the thoughts
and opinions of activists. Mackie has observed that ‘the construction of new
subjectivities in political movements is carried out through the use of metaphors
which have shared meanings in a particular cultural context, and the creation of
metaphors which attempt to transform those shared cultural meanings’.60 I trace these
metaphors through the written, visual and performative languages of the anti-nuclear
movement.

Chapter Outline
My portrait of the anti-nuclear movement is developed through five detailed case
studies of anti-nuclear protest culture. The use of a case study approach to examine
broader trends has many precedents in the history and sociology of Japanese social
movements.61 Each case study in this thesis focuses on the way the movement
unfolded within a particular form of urban space. In Chapter One I further explore
the theoretical perspectives of autonomist Marxism and critical urban theory which
underpin the analysis in this thesis. I also present the necessary background
information which connects the crisis of Japanese capitalism with the Fukushima
nuclear disaster. I discuss the emergence of the freeters as a social layer in
contemporary Tokyo and the increasing precarity of their lives and labours in
preparation for the detailed discussions of freeter activism which follow.
59 Mike Gunderloy, The World of Zines: A Guide to the Independent Magazine Revolution (New York,
N.Y: Penguin Books, 1992); Stephen Duncombe, Notes from Underground: Zines and the Politics of
Alternative Culture, The Haymarket Series (New York: Verso, 1997); Alison Piepmeier, Girl Zines:
Making Media, Doing Feminism (New York: New York University Press, 2009).
60 Vera Mackie, ‘Picturing Political Space in 1920s and 1930s Japan’, in Nation and Nationalism in Japan, ed.
Sandra Wilson (Abingdon: RoutledgeCurzon, 2009), 39
61 In history, for example, see Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar
Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001).. For a recent sociological approach, see
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In Chapter Two I focus on one of the first major demonstrations against nuclear
power, which took place in the Tokyo district of Kōenji in April 2011, one month
after 3.11. Kōenji is a youth sub-cultural hub located close to downtown Tokyo
which is known for its artistic and cultural life and entertainment venues. The district
is also home to an activist network known as Shirōto no Ran (Amateur Revolt)
whose creative and irreverent protest style has challenged the growing inequality
experienced by the urban poor in post-industrial Tokyo. In the wake of 3.11, a ‘mood
of self-restraint’ (jishū) prevailed in the capital. The festive demonstrations organised
by Shirōto no Ran helped to shift this mood, providing space for participants to
express a spectrum of affective responses to the disaster. I show how this group’s
critiques of precarious work and the inequities of neoliberal capitalism were
articulated with their anti-nuclear activism. This chapter cements my claim that the
anti-war and precarity movements which developed in Tokyo during the two ‘lost
decades’ formed the basis of the anti-nuclear movement after 3.11.
In Chapter Three I continue to explore the relevance of the precarity movement to
the anti-nuclear struggle. The bars and bookshops associated with an activist
community known as the ‘Nantoka Neighbourhood’ provided a place of refuge for
people trapped by the blackouts and the disruption of public transport caused by the
3.11 disaster. These places provided a space for anti-nuclear organising and for
cementing the ties between activists which sustain political action. I explore the
diverse print and electronic media which connected the physical spaces of the
Neighbourhood to a community of which members can feel a part. I show how the
development of self-managed spaces emerged in the context of the precarity
movement as activists sought refuge the interstices of a city from which they often
felt excluded. In turn, these spaces provided a kind of asylum in the uncertain context
of a radioactive city.
Chapter Four is an examination of two protests which took place in Shinjuku in June
and September of 2011. In both of these protests anti-nuclear activists staged
occupations of the space outside the eastern exit to Shinjuku station which they
renamed ‘No Nukes Plaza’. I show how activists utilised the notion of a hiroba
15

(plaza) to redefine public space as a place for democratic practice and debate. No
Nukes Plaza evoked the history of struggles for public space in Tokyo and these
struggles in turn raised questions about the limits of democratic participation. I
analyse the debates on democracy which occurred in and through the hiroba as it was
connected to a global network of squares and public places. Despite the desire of
organisers to create a hiroba open to anyone, the question of whether right-wing antinuclear activists could speak at the demonstration provoked a dispute over the limits
of the hiroba. Further limitations to the use of public space for grassroots protest
when the Tokyo Metropolitan Police arrested a number of participants in September
2011. Responding to these arrests, activists and intellectuals clarified their
understanding of the democratic potential of the hiroba. I conclude this chapter by
suggesting that, despite its limitations, No Nukes Plaza constituted an experimental
space for democratic decision-making.
In Chapter Five I move from the inner-city to Tokyo’s western Tama district where I
was privileged to spend 18 months as a research student affiliated to Hitotsubashi
University. The local demonstrations in Kunitachi had much in common with the
Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations discussed in Chapter Two. They exemplify the
way the movement spread across the metropolis over the course of 2011–2012. In
this chapter I focus on the role of music, film and performance in the anti-nuclear
movement in Kunitachi. These cultural forms served to transmit radical ideas by
enabling dialogue with the cultural legacy of past movements. Music and film
created a sense of the contemporary anti-nuclear movement’s location in history.
Activists’ use of street theatre and art objects served to create a sense of community
among participants.
Finally, in Chapter Six, I chart the rise of the Kantei Mae (in front of the prime
minister’s official residence) demonstrations in the government districts of
Nagatachō and Kasumigaseki. Beginning in March 2012, activists gathered outside
the Kantei every Friday evening from six until eight o’clock. to protest nuclear
power. The protests swelled to include tens and then hundreds of thousands of
participants in the summer of 2012. Located in the midst of the key institutions of the
Japanese state, they continue to pose an enduring challenge to its power. By
16

protesting outside the buildings which house the institutions of the government the
Kantei Mae protests highlighted two different visions of politics: one centred on the
formalised representative democratic structures of the state and the other on the
grassroots participatory democracy of the demonstrations. Yet, unlike the Genpatsu
Yamero protests I discuss in Chapter Two and Four their staging acknowledged the
continuing centrality of representative institutions to contemporary politics.
Organisers and participants acknowledged the necessity of engaging with the
existing institutions of state power to achieve their instrumental goals of the nuclear
power industry.
At the December 2012 general elections the Democratic Party of Japan, whose
government had overseen the response to the disaster for nearly two years, was swept
aside and the Liberal Democratic Party government led by Prime Minister Abe
Shinzō came to power. This election marked a major shift in the political landscape
in Japan and as such I have chosen to restrict my analysis of the anti-nuclear
movement to the period between March 2011 and the December 2012 election.
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CHAPTER ONE – FUKUSHIMA

A nuclear power plant has exploded. The deception and madness of
late capitalism rises to the surface and revolution begins.
Waizumi Akira, 201162

Figure 1 Hydrogen explosion in the No 3 reactor at the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant, March 2011.63

The compound earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster of March 2011 occurred in
the midst of a broader political, economic and social crisis. In the early 1990s, the
Waizumi Akira, ‘Shikarubeku genshiro to ketsubetsu suru tame ni [For a Timely Farewell to the Nuclear
Reactor]’, Shukusai [Festival], 11 June 2011.
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collapse of an asset-price bubble in stock and real estate markets triggered a period
of economic stagnation from which the Japanese economy has never fully recovered.
The ten years of stagnant economic growth which followed the collapse of the
bubble have come to be known as the ‘lost decade’.64 More recently, as the Japanese
economy remained mired in debt, deflation and stagnant growth, commentators have
begun to speak of a ‘lost twenty years’. The economic crisis of the 1990s coincided
with a growing political crisis. Since 1955 the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had
maintained hegemony within the National Diet, Japan’s bicameral legislature. The
party’s political hegemony became known as the ‘1955-system’.65 In April 1989,
however, LDP Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru (1924–2000) resigned following the
introduction of an unpopular consumption tax. His successor Uno Sōsuke (1922–
1998) lasted only a few months in office. In fixed-term upper house elections held in
July that year the LDP lost more than half of the seats which were up for election. As
only half the seats in the House of Councillors are vacated in fixed-term elections the
party managed to maintain a majority but retained only three of the 24 seats it had
previously held in single-member constituencies. Following this abysmal
performance Uno resigned to be replaced by the third prime minister that year, Kaifu
Toshiki. It was a sign of things to come.66
In 1993 the LDP lost control of the lower house signalling the beginning of the end
of the 1955-system. For the first time in nearly fifty years a non-LDP government
was elected in the form of a coalition led by Hosokawa Morihiro. Instability has
continued to affect the political system ever since. Japan had a total of nine Prime
Ministers between 1989 and 2001 as the LDP entered into a number of coalitions
with other parties.67 Tomiko Yoda has described how ‘the recession of Japan in the
1990s acquired an epochal status as it became increasingly identified with the

Mark Driscoll, ‘Debt and Denunciation in Post-Bubble Japan: On the Two Freeters’, Cultural Critique 65
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since the economic crisis of the early 1990s Zemināru nihon keizaigaku nyūmon [Seminar: An Introduction to the
Japanese Economy] (Tokyo: Nihon keizai shimbun shuppansha, 1999).
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breakdown of the 1955-system: the growth machine supported by the so-called “iron
triangle” (industry, bureaucracy, and single-party politics) as well as by the ethos of
harmony and formidable work ethic of a homogeneous and highly disciplined
population’.68 As J. Arthur Stockwin observes ‘the political economy of Japan has
experienced more extensive change since the early 1990s than at any period since the
American-led Occupation between 1945 and 1952’.69
Chalmers Johnson coined the term ‘capitalist developmental state’ to describe the
way elite networks which spanned both government and private sectors in Japan
favoured an industrial policy based on collaboration rather than competition. 70
Developmentalism produced high economic growth and delivered rising living
standards for the majority of people in Japan during the post-war period. The
political structures of the iron triangle and the developmentalist policies of
harnessing technical knowledge in the pursuit of economic growth were critical to
the development of Japan’s nuclear industry. As Low, Nakayama and Yoshioka
observe, the nuclear power industry exemplifies how ‘Japan’s rapid post-war
development was, more than anything else, due to the close collaboration between
organised business, government and the scientific establishment’.71
When the 3.11 disaster led to a major nuclear accident at Fukushima Daiichi, many
people pointed to the way the structures of the iron triangle had penetrated the
nuclear industry. Anti-nuclear activists described the network of relationships and
interests which unite the utility companies which operate nuclear power plants with
nuclear regulators, local and national politicians, the bureaucracy and those scientists
and academics who support nuclear power as the ‘nuclear village’.72 A 2012 report

68 Tomiko Yoda, ‘A Roadmap to Millennial Japan’, in Japan After Japan: Social and Cultural Life from the
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by the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission of the
National Diet of Japan found that the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear
power plant was ‘the result of collusion between the government, the regulators and
TEPCO, and the lack of governance by said parties’.73 The Commission’s report
confirmed the suspicions of anti-nuclear activists that the collusive nature of the
relationship between members of the nuclear village had undermined nuclear safety
standards.
While the proximate cause of the accident at Fukushima was a natural disaster,
behind this lay a series of political decisions which allowed the nuclear power plant
to be built in such a seismically unstable location. Right up until his resignation in
June 2012, Katsumata Tsunehiko, who was president of the Tokyo Electric Power
Company at the time of the 3.11 disaster, maintained that the size of the earthquake
and tsunami which triggered the accident at Fukushima Daiichi ‘was outside/beyond
what could have been anticipated’ (sōteigai). 74 As physicist Tsuchida Atsushi
explained to the progressive weekly Shūkan Kinyōbi (Weekly Friday), however,
in a country subject to frequent earthquakes like Japan, had the possibility of such
events been considered from the start, nuclear reactors would have cost too much to
build and they never would have been built. Therefore, TEPCO made vague
assumptions and claimed to be building reactors ‘safely’.75

Ogura Toshimaru suggests that it was the pursuit of profit, rather than a natural
disaster, was the real cause of the nuclear accident. ‘Without the greedy desire for
energy necessitated by a faith in economic growth and productivity there would
never have been such a disaster’, he argues.76 Feminist scholar Ulrike Wöhr points
out that the disaster not only prompted concerns about nuclear power technologies
but sparked new enquiries into the political and societal circumstances of Japan’s
73 National Diet of Japan, The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Investigation Commission (Tokyo,
2012), 16, Tokyo, http://warp.da.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/3856371/naiic.go.jp/en/report/.
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adopting and promoting this extremely risky business’. 77 Miyadai Shinji, a
sociologist and anti-nuclear activist, argues that the real challenge for the antinuclear movement is not ‘what to do with nuclear power’, but ‘what to do with a
society that cannot stop nuclear power’.78 For anti-capitalists like Waizumi Akira,
quoted in the epigraph to this chapter, by exposing the existing contradictions of
Japanese capitalism the disaster has the potential to provoke revolutionary change in
the political-economic structure of the archipelago.79
In this chapter I present the theoretical and historical background to the case studies
in Chapters Two through Six. I begin by outlining some of the theoretical ideas,
derived from the perspective of autonomy, which I refer to in this thesis. In the next
section I further develop my theoretical framework with ideas taken from the
discipline of critical urban studies. I then apply these perspectives to the contested
history of nuclear power in Japan. I describe how the construction of the Fukushima
Daiichi nuclear power plant reflected the politics of the capitalist developmental state
and how the decline of developmentalism led to the fragmentation of the nuclear
village. Finally I discus how the shift to a post-industrial economy has produced an
ever more precarious political, social and economic environment to which freeter
activists have tried to respond to both before and after 3.11.

The Perspective of Autonomy
Political philosopher Antonio Negri made his first visit to Japan in April 2013 to
participate in a symposium on ‘Multitude and Power: The World After 3.11’.80 He
spoke alongside leading Japanese scholars including feminist sociologist Ueno
Chizuko, political theorist Kang Sang-jung, philosopher Ichida Yoshihiko, and
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cultural sociologists Mōri Yoshitaka and Itō Mamoru. As Ueno explained in her
address to the symposium, the 2014 visit was only possible after extensive
negotiations between leading scholars and government officials.81 In 2008, Japanese
intellectuals had tried to organise a similar symposium in the lead up to the Group of
Eight (G8) summit which was to be held in Japan that year.82 The 2008 visit,
however, had been cancelled at the last minute when organisers had difficulty
obtaining an entry visa for Negri.83 Despite having received assurances that Negri
would not require any special visa to visit Japan, three days prior to the symposium
organisers were told that he would be required to apply for a visa due to past
convictions associated with the assassination of Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro by
Red Brigade terrorists in 1978. Negri was arrested in 1978 alongside 1500 leading
intellectuals and activists as part of a crackdown by the Italian state against political
dissidents. No connection was ever established between Negri and the Red Brigades.
Nevertheless, he spent seventeen years in prison for ‘crimes of association’ and many
years in exile in France.84
Antonio Negri is probably the best known intellectual within the ‘perspective of
autonomy’, otherwise known as autonomist Marxism. 85 The various streams of
‘autonomist’ thought have two principles in common. The first is the so-called
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‘Copernican inversion’ first proposed by Mario Tronti in 1964.86 In his critique of
the Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy of the large Italian Communist and Socialist parties
he argued that,
we too have worked with a concept that puts capitalist development first and
workers second. This is a mistake. And now we have to turn the problem on its head,
reverse the polarity, and start again from the beginning: and the beginning is the
class struggle of the working class.87

The Copernican inversion challenged revolutionary intellectuals to shift the primary
focus of their analysis from the mechanics of the capitalist system to labour’s
resistance to capitalist rule. This inversion of perspective led the autonomists to
develop the understanding that labour’s resistance to the imposition of the wage
drives the development of the capitalist mode of production.88 Marxists have always
been concerned with the relationship between the technical and political organisation
of work.89 Marx’s detailed analysis of the organisation of work in British factories
during the industrial revolution, for example, formed the basis for the radical critique
contained in his magnum opus, Capital.90 The autonomists returned to this method,
engaging in a theoretical and practical critique of the way production is organised in
contemporary class societies. The official position of the Italian Communist Party in
the 1950s was that economic growth and technological development were neutral. If
they could be brought under the political control of the working class then they could
be made to serve the interests of the working class. This was a common perspective
among Marxists in the twentieth century. Even Lenin argued that the revolution in
Russia could retain bourgeois technical experts and implement modern management
practices such as Taylorism without compromising the working class nature of the
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revolution.91 The autonomists argued against this position. They held that changes in
the organisation of production and the introduction of new technologies were
primarily motivated by the needs of capitalist managers to control the ever-present
revolt of workers against the conditions of their labour.
Negri’s original work in Italy in the 1960s and 1970s focused on the increasingly
important role of technology in the manufacturing industry of Northern Italy. The
autonomists came to recognise that not only the labour of ‘productive’ workers in the
factories but also that of students, the unemployed and housewives was exploited by
capital. Antonio Negri, who was at that time a leading theorist in the autonomia
movement, argued that the process of production now extended beyond the factory
walls to encompass processes of consumption, education, housework and even local
community life which were all channelled into the profit of the market. In this ‘social
factory’ the ‘social worker’ could encompass any of the diverse positions of
productive and reproductive labour. From this theoretical current arose movements
demanding ‘wages for students’, ‘wages for the unemployed’ and ‘wages for
housework’.92 As Itō Kimio explains it was for this reason that ‘the movement’, as
the revolutionary struggle in Italy in the 1970s was known, including its autonomia
current were able to think beyond the industrial working class, which had previously
been the principal agent of revolution in socialist theory, and embrace the agency and
power of youth, the unemployed, housewives and foreign workers.93
Negri was an important figure in the Italian far left in the 1960s and 1970s. He was
recognised in French intellectual life during his exile there in the 1980s and 1990s. It
was not until the publication of his collaborative work Empire94 with American
literary theorist Michael Hardt in 2000, however, that Negri’s thought became widely
known in Anglophone academic and radical circles. Empire was completed on the
eve of the Seattle protests against the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in
91 V. I. Lenin, On State Capitalism During the Transition to Socialism (Moscow: Progress Publishers,
1983).
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November 1999. These protests, which shut down the WTO Ministerial Meeting,
brought the nascent alter-globalisation movement to the attention of the world.95 The
alter-globalisation movement challenged the growing power of transnational
corporations in the post-Cold War world of the 1990s.96 Hardt and Negri’s Empire
attracted worldwide attention because ‘the widely debated theoretical synthesis that
Empire represents has been able to ‘tap into’ and give rational expression to the
optimism expressed in the new age of militancy that emerged in the mid-1990s’.97
The pair published two further monographs, Multitude in 2004, and Commonwealth
in 2009 where they further developed their theory that a new globally connected
social movement they called the ‘multitude’ had emerged during the transition to a
post-industrial society.98
Autonomist ideas began to be translated into Japanese and introduced to Japanese
readers in the 1990s. One of the earliest forums where discussion of autonomist
Marxism took place in Japan was the journal Gendai shisō (Contemporary Thought).
A special issue on ‘street culture’ which appeared in 1997 included extensive
discussion of autonomist ideas and practices. This was followed by an issue focusing
on Antonio Negri’s thought in 1998. 99 As the journal’s former editor Ikegami
Yoshihiko explains, Gendai shisō introduced many of the key thinkers of French
post-structuralism, such as Deleuze, Derrida and Foucault, into Japan.100 The journal
was founded by intellectuals who were critical of Marxism, which, by the end of the
twentieth century, had become stagnant. Its organised institutional base in the union
movement and the Japan Socialist and Japan Communist Parties was in serious
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decline. Among critical intellectuals post-modernism, as Ikegami explains, had its
intellectual origins in the contradictions that arose out of the period after 1973. These
included a general retreat from the Marxist social science which had characterised
the Japanese intelligentsia in the post-war period, the rise of postmodernism and a
more favourable attitude among intellectuals towards the transformative possibilities
capitalist power.101
Sociologist Mōri Yoshitaka, has written of how surprised he was to see a special
issue on underground political and cultural movements in a journal which had been
known as the flagship of postmodernism. 102 He cites editor Ikegami’s editorial
afterword to the special issue in which he reflects on the significance of the year
1995 in the development of a new wave of social and political activism and theory.
For Ikegami, the year 1995, with the Hanshin earthquake, the Aum sarin gas incident,
the rape of a 12-year-old schoolgirl in Okinawa by U.S. servicemen, the growth of
the homeless peoples movements and the concomitant rise of liberalism had all
revealed something about the changes going on in post-war Japan. In the midst of
these changes he recognised the emergence of new forms of urban activism which
appeared in multiple different places and were continually coming together,
dispersing, lining up and separating.103
The publication of Empire in 2000 attracted considerable interest in Japan. A
Japanese translation appeared a few years later104 and was the subject of debate in a
number of special issues in intellectual journals,105 the wider journal literature and
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several books.106 Their later works also attracted significant attention and their work
has continued to be debated by Marxists and political philosophers.107 Hardt and
Negri’s 2011 pamphlet Declaration, an essay on Occupy Wall Street, the Arab
Spring and the European anti-austerity movements, has also been translated into
Japanese.108 Negri’s visit to Japan in April 2013 was an indication of how seriously
the his ideas were being taken by scholars in the wake of the 3.11 disaster.
Hardt and Negri argue that the diffusion of capitalist production through global
networks means that ‘the relations of capitalist exploitation are expanding
everywhere, not limited to the factory but tending to occupy the entire social
terrain’. 109 Theirs is a ‘cyber-marxism’ 110 which draws on the theories of postindustrialisation and information capitalism outlined by writers such as Manuel
Castells.111 Precarious forms of work have become increasingly common in labour
markets in the advanced capitalist economies since the oil shock crisis of the
1970s.112 In 1973 the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) acted
to raise the price of oil significantly in an attempt to shore up their flagging profits
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caused by a general inflationary trend in the global economy and the depreciation of
the dollar. The oil shock had a major impact on the global economy, exacerbating the
existing recession and leading to a period of ‘stagflation’ – stagnant growth coupled
with high inflation. Unemployment in the OECD countries increased by 7 million in
1974–1975 and Gross National Product fell.113 The Gini coefficient, which measures
inequality across a society, increased between 1970 and 1980, indicating a growth in
inequality within Japanese society.114
In Japan, while precarious forms of work certainly existed throughout the post-war
period, it was only after the economic crisis of the early 1990s that precarity became
widely recognised as a social problem.115 Neilson and Rossiter have pointed out that
the relative employment security experienced by some workers in these advanced
capitalist countries was itself always an exception to the ‘precarious labour [that] is
the norm of capitalist production and reproduction’.116 Nevertheless, while precarity
may not be an entirely new phenomenon, the precarisation of work and life in the
post-industrial economies is accelerating.
Precarity has been a central question in recent global struggles such as the Arab
Spring117 and anti-austerity protests in Europe.118 As I will discuss below, the notion
of precarity became increasingly important to political activists in Japan during the
1990s and 2000s as a means of encapsulating the insecurity of life and work in the
post-industrial economy. The feminist collective Precarias a la Deriva have noted
how a generalised precarity ‘constitutes a daily experience of life, a juncture of
Herman Van der Wee, Prosperity and Upheaval: The World Economy 1945–1980 (Hammondsworth: Pelican
Books, 1987), 84–87.
113

114 Takashi Machimura, ‘Gendai nihon ni okeru kakusa no jūsōteki kōzō [Multiscalar Structure of
Inequality in Contemporary Japan]’, Hitotsubashi Bulletin of Social Sciences 6 (2009): 104.

Itō, ‘Sei purekario no kōrin: Itaria ni okeru purekariāto undō o megutte [The Advent of San Precario:
Concerning the Precarity Movement in Italy]’, 11; Julia Obinger, ‘Working on the Margins: Japan’s
Precariat and Working Poor’, Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies (2009),
http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/2009/Obinger.html.
115

116 Brett Neilson and Ned Rossiter, ‘Precarity as a Political Concept, Or, Fordism as Exception’, Theory,
Culture and Society 25 (2008): 58.
117 Lamis Andoni, ‘The Rebirth of Arab Activism’, Al Jazeera English, 31 December 2010, accessed 14 May
2015, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2010/12/20101231161958792947.html.
118 Matthew Jacobson, ‘Precarity and New Social Movements in Southern European Cities’ (Amsterdam,
2011), internal-pdf://Jacobson Precarity 2011-0957284864/Jacobson Precarity 2011.pdf.

29

material and symbolic conditions which determine an uncertainty with respect to the
sustained access to the resources essential to the full development of one’s life’.119
Anne Allison uses the notion of ‘social precarity’ to describe the more general
condition of precariousness which has come to pervade life beyond the workplace.120
As Tsianos and Papadapoulos explain,
precarity means exploiting the continuum of everyday life, not simply the workforce.
In this sense, precarity is a form of exploitation which operates primarily on the level
of time.121

Hardt and Negri draw on this temporal understanding of precarity when they note
that precarity ‘destroys the division between work time and non-work time, requiring
workers not to work all the time but to be constantly available for work’.122 With
capital accumulation no longer limited to the factory, much of our leisure time is
spent creating cultural and linguistic products which are in turn commodified and
sold back to us. Even spending time socialising with friends on social networking
sites may be exploited by marketers and made to produce a profit.123 Allison has
discussed this phenomenon in the context of Japan’s popular culture industries. She
notes how the very instability and fluidity of the precarious ‘life of youth at play, in
their imaginations and through the intimacies they form with others’ that is put to
work to produce cultural commodities.124
The growth of informational capitalism and the production of immaterial goods like
intellectual property rather than manufactured products has contributed to the
precarisation of work. In the information economy, the ‘social wealth accumulated is
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increasingly immaterial; it involves social relations, communication systems,
information, and affective networks’. Drawing on the work of Maurizio Lazzarato,
Hardt and Negri suggest that in the information society ‘immaterial labour’ is
becoming a hegemonic form of work. The growing service sector, for example,
requires that workers display greater communication skills.
Most services indeed are based on the continual exchange of information and
knowledge. Since the production of services results in no material and durable good,
we define the labor involved in this production as immaterial labor – that is, labour
that produces an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge,
or communication.125

Hardt and Negri make a distinction between two main categories of immaterial
labour. The most obvious form of immaterial labour is that found in computer and
communications industries such as symbolic analysis. 126 Affective labour is the
labour ‘of human contact and interaction’, which is prevalent in care industries and
entertainment for example. While this labour is indeed embodied labour it is
immaterial in their view, in the sense that ‘its products are intangible, a feeling of
ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, or passion’. 127 Their understanding of
affective labour draws heavily on the work of feminist theorists of so-called
‘women’s work’ such as caring labour and housework.128
For Lazzarato, immaterial labour is important because it is intrinsically social. It
relies for its performance on the interaction with others in networks and flows that do
not know the boundaries of the factory walls. Lazzarato explains how immaterial
labour is organised into a cycle of production by the capitalist when small productive
units, sometimes involving as few as one single self-employed worker, are brought
together for a limited period of time to complete a project. Such networks are ad hoc
and may not last any longer than the project for which they were formed. As a
consequence, the workers involved in immaterial labour have to rely on another set
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of ‘networks and flows’ in order to reproduce and enrich their productive capacities.
This is therefore a form of labour in which precariousness, hyper-exploitation,
mobility and hierarchy are typical.129 Finally, ‘it becomes increasingly difficult to
distinguish leisure time from work time. In a sense, life becomes inseparable from
work’.130
Immaterial labour is ‘not reducible to simple labour, to the accumulation of units of
measure’ because it relies on the social reproduction of a highly educated and
carefully socialised labouring subject. Autonomists have developed Marx’s notion of
the ‘general intellect’ to indicate how capitalist production increasingly relies on a
highly educated workforce and on the integration of technical knowledge into the
process of production.131 Education and innovation have become important sources
of capitalist value and have been integrated into capitalist production.132 Protests
carried out by students in Chile and London in 2011 over their precarious future
highlighted capital’s reliance on a highly educated workforce and its simultaneous
lack of willingness to pay for it through the welfare state. The precarity that students
experience as they struggle to pay for their education is becoming a permanent
condition. Once they graduate they will be expected to continually demonstrate their
‘work-readiness’ in order to gain access to a share of social wealth, whether through
wage-labour or from increasingly limited welfare provisions. Thus whether they are
working, studying or looking for work their time is always at least potentially subject
to the discipline of capitalist work.

129 Maurizio Lazzarato, ‘Immaterial Labor’, in Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1996), 137, http://www.generation-online.org/c/fcimmateriallabour3.htm.
Sociologist Sakai Takashi has written extensively on the autonomist movement in Italy and the notion of
immaterial labour. See Takashi Sakai, Jiyūron: Genzaisei No Keifugaku [On Freedom: A Genealogy of the Present]
(Seidosha, 2001).
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131 Karl Marx, Grundrisse: Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Penguin, 1973), 690–712,
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/. N. Dyer-Witheford, ‘Cyber-Negri:
General Intellect and Immaterial Labor’, in Resistance in Practice: The Philosophy of Antonio Negri (London:
Pluto Press, 2005): 136–162; Paulo Virno, ‘General Intellect’, Historical Materialism 15, no 3 (2007): 3–8.
132 For an account of the corporatisation of higher education see Andrew Whelan, Ruth Walker and
Christopher Moore, eds., Zombies in the Academy: Living Death in Higher Education (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2013). For an overview of some of the struggles against corporatiation in the sector see
The Edu-factory Collective, Toward a Global Autonomous University: Cognitive Labor, The Production of Knowledge,
and Exodus from the Education Factory (New York: Autonomedia, 2009).
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Negri suggests that in the precarious times of post-industrial capitalism, class
struggles will always be unfinished, incomplete and emergent. Japanese cultural
theorist Mōri Yoshitaka describes the strategic exploration of this revolutionary
potentiality of the present in recent Japanese social movements in which revolution is
not thought of as a point of time located in the future but as an ‘ever-present
possibility’ located in the present moment.133 Commenting on the politics of the antinuclear movement in Japan after Fukushima, Hirose Jun notes that the nuclear crisis
necessitates an indefinite and open-ended struggle rooted in the present because the
experience of the crisis is itself an ongoing part of daily life. He observes that the
nuclear crisis has no discrete ending. ‘It is not’, he explains, ‘that the nuclear
accident has taken place as a solution to metastability . . . but that it is taking place as
a duration of metastability itself’. For Hirose, the ongoing nature of the crisis
requires a conception of struggle that is similarly open-ended. He contrasts the notion
of an ongoing insurrection against one of revolution as a moment of rupture by
noting that,
the joy of revolution is discovered when it has taken place, while the joy of
insurrection exists when it is taking place. All the exhaustion in revolution is
requited by the joy of having shared problems, while in insurrection the exhaustion
of living problems is together with its joy.134

In the midst of the horror of the unfolding nuclear crisis in Japan a multiplicity of
social movements have emerged which seek to both end the nuclear industry itself
and to make life liveable in the contaminated zone. In the face of an uncertain future,
the focus of struggle shifts to the present and to the everyday. Recent autonomist and
anarchist thought emphasises an experimental and prefigurative politics. Movements
which adopt prefigurative strategies seek to realise their objectives here and now,
even if only temporarily. Anarchist ethnographer David Graeber explains that
‘prefigurative politics involves creating a vision of the sort of society you want to
have in miniature’ This approach to politics informed the Occupy Wall Street
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2012,

movement and had broad currency in the globally connected uprisings of 2011.135
For Negri, the significance of prefigurative strategies lies in multiple imperfect acts
of creation. ‘Prefiguration’, Negri argues, ‘is not in any sense utopia, it is concrete
activity’.136
Because precarious work has the potential to colonise all of the time of life Negri
argues that contemporary revolutionary movements must liberate time itself. Unlike
leisure time, which is the time left over after wage labour, ‘liberated time is not the
residue of exploited time, but is rather the force that breaks up and destroys all the
links of capitalist society’.137 Liberated time is time stolen from capitalist work, from
the production of surplus value. Nevertheless, it is still a productive time. ‘It is
productive rationality torn away and isolated from the command that analysed this
rationality and extorted it from the time of life’.138 The liberation of time involves the
collective activity of the proletariat directly producing other values. Carlsson and
Manning describe the do-it-yourself ethos of outlaw bicyclists, community gardeners
and pirate programmers as nowtopian. 139 These movements establish collective
projects that directly produce non-capitalist value. Nowtopian activists engage in
complex techno-scientific production based on common knowledges.140 Carlsson and
Manning argue that nowtopian practices ‘hold moments of a post-capitalist
society’.141 Rather than allowing their collective productive capacity to be spent
producing value for capital, community gardeners, for example, engage in forms of
work which ‘fully engage their capacities to create, to shape, to invent and to
cooperate without monetary incentive’.142
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The precarity of contemporary wage-relations means that workers have to develop
their autonomy from the wage by forging bonds with one another in order to
guarantee their survival. In contemporary forms of class struggle prefigurative
practices and experiments in direct democracy have become a popular means of
taking back control over people’s lives. These practices occur in the time in-between
increasingly fragmented experiences of wage-labour. They take place in the
interstices of globally connected urban space. In the next section I turn from the
precarity of time to that of space by drawing on critical urban theory.

Critical Urban Theory
In Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri draw on some of the new work in geography to
argue that for the precarious labourers of immaterial production the city rather than
the factory has become the place of work. The city, they note, ‘is not just a built
environment consisting of buildings and streets and subways and parks and waste
systems and communication cables but also a living dynamic of cultural practice,
intellectual circuits, affective networks, and social institutions’.143 They suggest that
‘the metropolis is to the multitude what the factory was to the industrial working
class’144 and that urban life has therefore become the principal site of contestation in
contemporary capitalism. Informational capitalism and the hegemony of immaterial
labour mean, however, that work becomes increasingly precarious. As global
corporations have developed ever-more geographically diffused networks of
production workers are thrown into competition with workers from other parts of the
world. The powerful role of finance and trade-related services mean that particular
cities, like New York, London and Tokyo control production over vast global
networks. ‘The decline and evacuation of industrial cities’, argue Hardt and Negri,
‘has corresponded to the rise of global cities, or really cities of control’.145 Such
geographical hierarchies no longer necessarily respect national borders either,
creating multiple hierarchies both between and within national and regional areas.146
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Hardt and Negri draw here on a long history of Marxist analysis of the spatial
dimensions of capital accumulation and class struggle.147 Marxist philosopher and
sociologist Henri Lefebvre is among the best known Marxist theorist to call attention
to the city as a place where the abstract mechanisms of capitalism and class struggle
described by Marx take on concrete form. Lefebvre’s interest in the urban is part of
his methodological ‘critique of everyday life’. Lefebvre attributes the origins of this
method to Marx who, in Capital, examines the most mundane of daily transactions,
the exchange of commodities which we all engage in on a daily basis, to demonstrate
the dialectical totality of social life.148
Reflecting on the political contestation of space in Paris 1968, Marxist philosopher
and sociologist Henri Lefebvre argued that ‘(social) space is a (social) product’.149
Linking the social production of space to Marx’s understanding that each society has
a dominant ‘mode of production’, Lefebvre proposed that ‘every society—and hence
every mode of production … produces its own space’.150 Harvey Molotoch explains
how, for Lefebvre, the production of space involved ‘an interlinkage of geographic
form, built environment, symbolic meanings, and routines of life’. 151 Lefebvre
considered the social production of space in terms of three interlocking conceptual
apparatuses. Spatial practices, which ‘embrace the production and reproduction and
the particular locations and spatial sets characteristic of each social formation’.
Representations of space, which encompass the knowledge, signs and codes about
the way space is produced within the relations of production and finally
representational spaces, which relate to the ‘complex symbolisms’ embodied in
particular spaces which are ‘sometimes coded and sometimes not’ and are ‘linked to
the clandestine or underground side of social life, as also to art’.152
147 Andy Merrifield traces the development of the notion of space through more than a century of Marxist
writings from Marx and Engels’ work on the cities of 19th century Britain to the more recent work of
Marxist geographer David Harvey in Metromarxism: A Marxist Tale of the City (New York and London:
Routledge, 2002).
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Lefebvre’s work inspired a new wave of Marxist urbanism, most critically the work
of his student Manuel Castells.153 Sociologist Machimura Takashi was one of the
first to introduce Castells’ Marxist urbanism to Japan through two articles in the
Iwanami publishing house’s flagship intellectual journal Shisō (Thought). 154
Machimura drew on the new Marxist urbanism to explain that while social
movements in modern capitalist societies have been represented through a genealogy
of collective subjects including class (kaikyū), mass (taishū) and people (minzoku) it
has become difficult to comprehend contemporary social movements in the advanced
capitalist countries simply by extending this genealogy. For Machimura, ongoing
questions in sociology about the relative importance of social structure and
subjective agency within social movements can be better answered through an
examination of the urban, through which the complex inter-relationship between
structure and agency in social change comes to light.155
Marxist urbanism is a normative project which has an investment in the possibility of
changing modern cities so that they respond to the needs of urban residents rather
than transnational capitalist forces. Lefebvre’s call for the ‘right to the city’,156
continues to be echoed today by Marxist urbanists such as geographer David
Harvey.157 Peter Marcuse suggests that the purpose of the contemporary discipline of
critical urban theory is ‘implementing the demand for a Right to the City’.158 Yet the
Right to the City is not a claim on the existing city. It is a ‘right to a future city’

153 Castells, City, Class and Power; Castells, The City and the Grassroots. Castells later rejected his early Marxism
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where ‘the hierarchical distinction between the city and the country has
disappeared’.159
In both activist and academic literatures urban space has become an increasingly
important conceptual device for thinking about social movements. Carl Cassegård’s
recent work, for example, has highlighted the importance of urban space in the
practice of recent social movements in Japan.160 Mark Pendleton and Vera Mackie’s
recent collection, too, examines Tokyo from the point of view of cultural and
emotional geography.161 These studies are part of a broader trend which is also
present in Japanese language scholarship. Pendleton,162 for example, draws on Mōri
Yoshitaka’s work on the role of space in activist cultures in Japan since the 1990s.163
Notable among Japanese language writers who pay attention to space in their work
on contemporary activist politics is New York-based writer Sabu Kohso. His
Atarashii anakizumu no keifugaku (Genealogy of the New Anarchism) traces the
genealogies of space in anarchist thought over the past two centuries.164
The contemporary anti-nuclear movement in Tokyo arose in response to a disaster
which occurred more than 200 kilometres from the metropolis in a small rural
municipality in Fukushima prefecture. Yet the metropolis was quickly identified as
being at risk of radioactive contamination of the air, water and food. The strategies
and tactics employed by the movement responded to the urban context in which
activists lived. In this thesis I utilise the conceptual tools of Marxist urbanism and the
perspective of autonomy to consider the way the anti-nuclear movement in Tokyo
159
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unfolded in the everyday production and contestation of urban space. In the next two
sections I apply some of these insights to the history of nuclear power in post-war
Japan.

Fukushima and the Capitalist Developmental State
Chalmers Johnson argued that in a late industrialising state like Japan, ‘the state itself
led the industrialisation drive, that is, it took on developmental functions’.165 The
state took responsibility for organising and directing economic growth rather than
leaving it to the free market. As Japan emerged from the chaos of war, capitalist
developmentalism took shape in the form of a tripartite structure. This structure,
known as the ‘iron triangle’ had three main pillars: a powerful economic bureaucracy,
the Liberal Democratic Party and a captive private sector. Johnson’s understanding
of the Japanese developmental state was developed through his detailed study of the
powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)166 which played a
leading role in forming the industrial policies which produced Japan’s post-war
economic boom. By examining the way MITI officials penetrated both the political
leadership in the Diet and the business world Chalmers recognised the collusive
mechanisms via which elite networks managed Japanese capitalism to ensure the
highest possible rates of economic growth.
MITI guided the expansion of Japanese industry using a variety of indirect strategies.
Ministerial bureaucrats let private industry know what the government’s objectives
were and rewarded those firms which complied with its directives. The close
relationship between private industry and the bureaucracy was institutionalised in the
practice of amakudari (‘descent from heaven’) whereby retired bureaucrats typically
‘descend’ upon retirement within the Ministry into senior roles in the private
companies for which they formerly held responsibility as regulators. This practice
helped ensure a smooth path for the reception of Ministry direction in private
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industry.167 The economic bureaucracy also extended its influence into politics as
former bureaucrats entered the National Diet. Former economic bureaucrats such as
Kishi Nobusuke (1896–1987); former vice minister in MITI’s predecessor the
Ministry of Munitions), Ikeda Hayato (1899–1965; former vice-minister of finance)
and Satō Eisaku (1901–1975; former vice-minister of transportation) were elected to
the Diet in 1949 along with 42 other former bureaucrats. They became powerful
figures in the Liberal Democratic Party, formed through the union of the
conservative Liberal and Democrat parties in 1952. The three served as prime
minister in succession between 1957 and 1972 during which time they dominated
Japanese politics.168
Many people benefited from Japan’s rapid economic development after the war.
Living standards improved and the rate of poverty fell, although the benefits of
economic development were not distributed evenly across the country. The pursuit of
a developmentalist strategy by ruling elites resulted in the centralisation of power
and control and a highly polarised form of development. While urban centres and
manufacturing districts prospered, the regions struggled to attract investment. The
lure of jobs and opportunities in the cities led to rural to urban migration on a
massive scale. Whereas half of all jobs in 1950 were in the rural industries of fishing,
forestry and farming, by 1975 this sector had plummeted to just 15 per cent of the
economy.169 In the Hamadōri region of eastern Fukushima Prefecture, where the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant was built in the 1960s, the agricultural land
was poor and residents frequently had to travel outside the region in search of
employment during the winter months when work in the fields came to a natural
pause.
The history of the Hamadōri region provides a microcosm of the broader history of
energy and industrialisation in modern Japan. The region’s relationship with the
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Tokyo similarly reflects the unequal distribution of power in modern Japan. The
region was already an important energy supply region during the Meiji period.170 In
an island nation relatively poor in indigenous energy resources, the securing of a
stable supply of energy to fuel economic growth was always a key concern for
Japan’s

leading

industrialists,

politicians

and

bureaucrats.

Japan’s

early

industrialisation was heavily dependent on energy derived from coal. Between 1875
and 1919 coal production in Japan increased from 0.6 to 21.3 million metric tonnes.
In 1877, when the Meiji regime was well established, coal exports to the capital
began in earnest. In 1883, Tokyo industrialist Shibusawa Eiichi (1840–1931), known
as the ‘father of Japanese capitalism’, established the Jōban Coal Company. In 1897
The completion of the Jōban railway line in 1897 connected the coalfields with
markets in Tokyo.171
Production in the Jōban fields increased rapidly during the early twentieth century as
coal became the the primary energy source fuelling Japanese heavy industry in the
first half of the twentieth century. In the second half of the 1950s, however, the socalled ‘energy revolution’ and a reduction in the price of oil from the Middle East
saw the proportion of oil in the total Japanese energy supply increase from 20.5 per
cent in 1955 to 77.6 per cent by 1973. The proportion of coal declined from 49.2 per
cent to 15.4 per cent over the same period.172 As imported oil from the Middle East
began to replace coal as the primary fossil fuel source for Japan’s economic boom,
the fortunes of the Jōban coalfields declined. Production finally ceased in 1976.173
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When plans to build the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant were first being
made in the 1950s and 1960s, the nuclear reactor became a site of struggle between
the contradictory interests of central power and local community struggles. Local
leaders competed with other regional leaders and used their influence in the central
government to try and secure access to the opportunities for economic development
which the nuclear industry seemed to offer. They were ultimately successful in
securing the plant for the region and the first reactor at the Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear power plant commenced operation in March 1971. Between 1974 and 1979 a
further five reactors were built at the plant to supply electricity to the Tokyo Electric
Power Company’s metropolitan service area. With the plant came money, jobs and
economic opportunities which the people of the Hamadōri region had not previously
experienced.
Japan’s nuclear energy programme had its origins in wartime when a number of
unsuccessful research projects were initiated to produce an atomic bomb. 174
Following Japan’s defeat and occupation by the Allies in 1945, the office of the
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) imposed a complete ban on all
nuclear research. In September 1951, the Japanese government and the majority of
the Allied powers signed the Peace Treaty of San Francisco which came into force in
April 1952 formally bringing the occupation to an end. The text of the treaty did not
include an explicit ban on atomic research and Japan’s nuclear energy research
programme re-commenced.175 In 1953 U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower (1890–
1969) presented his plan for ‘Atoms for Peace’ to the United Nations General
Assembly. This speech set the stage for international cooperation in atomic energy
and the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Atoms for
Peace speech followed on from the successful nuclear tests carried out by the Soviet
Union in 1949 and 1953. Prior to Atoms for Peace, the U.S. had implemented a
global nuclear regime which aimed to suppress potential completion on nuclear
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energy research from West Germany and Japan. After Eisenhower’s speech, however,
America’s allies were encouraged and supported to pursue nuclear energy research
under an international framework which the U.S. could control. The policy was
intended to ensure that countries with an interest in nuclear energy research would
not fall under the influence of the Soviets or pose a threat to U.S. hegemony by
developing their own independent nuclear weapons programme. The new policy
would also permit American capital, including companies like General Electric and
Westinghouse, to export these large-scale technologies as they had with hydroelectric
power generation.176 Sociologist Kainuma Hiroshi explains how ‘Atoms for Peace’
created a dichotomous framework in which the military use of nuclear power was
characterised as shadowy, barbaric and inhuman while the ‘peaceful use’ was
recognised as light, civilised and humanitarian.177
Japanese officials rushed to take advantage of the technology transfers available
under the Atoms for Peace initiative to build the country’s first nuclear reactor.
Conservative politician Nakasone Yasuhiro (later prime minister from 1982–1987)
spearheaded the push for Japan to develop a civilian nuclear power programme.
Nakasone had worked in the Navy bureaucracy during the war and possessed a
strong interest in nuclear weapons and nuclear energy. He corresponded with U.S.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (1888–1959) as early as 1951, seeking
permission for Japan to pursue atomic energy research. In 1954, following the Atoms
for Peace speech, Nakasone sought and received approval from the Diet for ¥250
million to be appropriated from the budget for science and technology. ¥235 million
of this was to be invested in the construction of Japan’s first nuclear reactor.178 In
1955, Japanese officials including Nakasone attended the UN Conference on the
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva. On his return Nakasone became chair of
the new Joint Diet Atomic Energy Committee which included members of both the
governing and opposition parties. ‘Atoms for Peace’ served to unite all the major
factions within the Diet behind nuclear power development. In December 1955 the
Basic Atomic Energy Law, a legal framework for civilian nuclear power, passed
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through the Diet.179 In November that year a U.S.-Japan Atomic Energy Agreement
was signed in Washington prompting widespread interest in the technology among
Japanese industrialists.180
As Oguma has observed, the building of Japan’s nuclear reactor fleet coincided
almost exactly with the dominance of the manufacturing industry in the Japanese
economy. Japan’s first commercial nuclear reactor commenced operation at Tōkai
Mura in 1966. This was one year after manufacturing had topped primary industry
for the first time as the largest sector in terms of employment. There was steady
growth in the number of nuclear reactors built throughout this period. Since 1997,
however, no new nuclear power plants have been completed.181 The nuclear plants,
which provided cheap base load power to support the manufacturing industry but
required enormous investment to build, were a potent symbol of the high energy
consumption, heavy-industrial society which Japan developed during the period of
rapid economic growth.182
After the oil shock crisis the Japanese government tried to shift the Japanese
economy away from heavy industry towards ‘knowledge-intensive’ industries so as
to construct an ‘information society’.

183

The Japanese government began

experimenting with neoliberal economic policies an attempt to stabilise economic
growth in the face of the global ‘stagflation’ crisis which followed the oil shocks.
Neoliberal economic theory posits that deregulating capital and labour markets will
boost economic growth. 184 The Japanese government began to deregulate its
domestic capital markets which allowed Japanese corporations to free themselves
from their dependence on the banking sector and raise capital by issuing stocks and
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bonds. This process, known as ‘financial engineering’ (‘zaiteku’), later became
standard practice in Europe and America.185 The government incurred large fiscal
deficits in the 1970s which forced it to relax interest rate controls to make
government debt more attractive to financial institutions. Japanese companies began
to seek finance in overseas capital markets where finance was available more
cheaply. A yen market was established in Europe which was not bound by Japanese
government regulation. This encouraged liberalisation of controls in Japan. Japan
also joined the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development in 1964. Membership of these organisations required
that member countries relax restrictions on international current account transactions.
The collapse of the fixed exchange rate system in the 1970s and 1980s opened up
international capital markets and generated new risks and opportunities for Japanese
companies.
In the 1980s most large Japanese firms were able to rid themselves of bank debt and
accumulate surpluses of money capital. Firms also made more extensive use of direct
finance in both domestic and foreign capital markets to raise money capital by
issuing shares, bonds and other securities. The loss of the reliable large firms as
customers led Japanese banks to explore new sources of profit by lending to small
and medium sized firms, real estate agents and construction companies. Following
the Plaza Accord of 1985, which re-valued the yen against the U.S. dollar to improve
the balance of trade between the two countries, interest rates were reduced which in
turn stimulated domestic demand. These reforms enabled Japan to become a major
centre in the growing financial sector, further accelerating post-industrialisation.
Japanese firms had already begun sending their manufacturing operations offshore in
the wake of the oil shock crisis and a growing citizen-based anti-pollution movement
in the 1970s. The Plaza Accords accelerated this tendency and encouraged Japanese
firms to develop new sources of profit in the financial services sector.
The surplus money capital in many Japanese firms was deployed in foreign direct
investment and domestic speculation. Many large firms, banks and other financial
185 Driscoll, ‘Debt and Denunciation in Post-Bubble Japan: On the Two Freeters’, 168. Alexander, The
Arc of Japan’s Economic Development, 100–101.
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institutions engaged in real estate and stock market speculation in Tokyo. Between
1986 and 1990, this speculation led to a bubble of overvalued property and
unsecured loans in Japanese real estate and capital markets. The subsequent domestic
economic boom seemed to validate the neoliberal policies. This speculative bubble
collapsed, however, at the beginning of the 1990s, producing a total loss in asset
values of 1000 trillion yen by the mid-1990s, 2.4 times Japan’s gross domestic
product (GDP). This loss exceeded even that during the U.S. crisis of 1929 in which
the U.S. economy had suffered losses of 1.9 times GDP.186
The effects of the economic crisis were even felt in the highly regulated nuclear
power industry. Neoliberals criticised the electric power industry and argued for the
liberalisation of electric power markets. They blamed the government-guaranteed
monopolies enjoyed by the utilities for inflating electricity prices. The electric power
utilities began to feel the effects of neoliberal policies following the victory of the
Hosokawa government in 1993. In 1995, the first legislative attacks on the electric
power monopolies took place with the passage of the Electricity Business Act (Denki
jigyō hō). Further liberalisation was stymied, however, when opponents successfully
marshalled fears about maintaining ‘energy security’ so as to maintain the existing
monopolies. Kainuma Hiroshi points out that while liberalisation was limited in
practice, the debate on liberalisation and concomitant debates on the future of plans
to pursue a complete nuclear fuel cycle opened up divisions within the ‘nuclear
village’ – both in the economic bureaucracy and within TEPCO, the leading electric
power utility.187
As I discussed in the Introduction, the concept of the ‘nuclear village’ is used by
critics to characterise the web of collusive relationships that link nuclear power
advocates in government, private industry, academia and the media. As Jeff Kingston
explains, the nuclear village is ‘without boundaries or residence cards, an imagined
collective bound by solidarity over promoting nuclear energy’.188 One mechanism
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via which the village is organised internally, however, is through the energy and
nuclear power ‘tribes’ within the LDP. Under the 1955-system, the LDP operated in
the Diet through a system of ‘policy tribes’ (zoku). These ‘policy tribes’ were made
up of Diet members who maintained strong interests in particular policy areas. The
energy and nuclear power ‘tribes’ were under the influence of the Electricity Industry
Association, the Japanese Business Federation (Keidanren) and the regional electric
power companies. As the 1955-system broke down and existing patterns of elite cooperation were disrupted by the 2001 Government Reform and Prime Minister
Koizumi Jun’ichirō’s neoliberal reform policies, the structures of the nuclear village
were also affected.189
In the context of a breakdown in the political leadership of the nuclear industry,
Fukushima Governor Satō Eisaku, who had been a loyal supporter of the nuclear
village when he became governor in 1988, began to challenge the assertions coming
from the nuclear village that nuclear power was safe. Following an incident at the
Fukushima Daini nuclear power plant in 1989, Satō publicly expressed his
dissatisfaction with the way the prefectural and municipal governments were
informed about the incident only after it had been reported to TEPCO and MITI
headquarters in Tokyo.190 In 2001, Satō announced a complete freeze on the building
of any new nuclear power plants in the prefecture. This dramatic decision followed a
series of accidents and cover-ups, post prominently the September 1999 accident at
the Tōkaimura nuclear power plant in Ibaraki Prefecture in which two power plant
workers died.191 Kainuma argues that the decision reflected the conservative Satō’s
disillusionment with central government leadership in the nuclear power industry in
the wake of the uncertainties and conflicts which were emerging with the rise of
neoliberalism.192 While the conservative Satō began to question the consequences of
neoliberalism in the electric power industry, a much broader struggle was opening up
as neoliberal labour market reforms compromised the ideology of Japan’s post-war
‘middle class’ society.
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Precarious Times in Post-industrial Tokyo
As Japan, like the other advanced economies, has transitioned from an industrial
economy centred on manufacturing to a post-industrial one centred on service
industries, structural changes in the labour market have produced widespread social
displacement. Neoliberal reforms introduced under LDP Prime Minister Suzuki
Zenkō during the 1980s facilitated the growth of irregular work in an attempt to
reduce labour costs. Neoliberal policies also opened Japanese industries up to greater
internationalisation and facilitated the entry of foreign multinationals into the
domestic economy.193 In the 1970s and 1980s, however, the growing precarisation of
the labour force continued to be masked by divisions of labour on the basis of gender
and age. The number of women and younger and older workers in irregular
employment accelerated but enough male household heads continued to enjoy the
benefits of the lifetime employment system for the myth of middle class
homogeneity to remain intact. Following the collapse of the bubble economy in the
early 1990s, financial shocks in 1997 and 2008 and a consequent reduction in
spending on financial assistance and public works, even male, regular employees in
large companies began to be laid off. Since 1997, wages in Japan have declined by
approximately 15 per cent while between 1995 and 2011 the number of people on
welfare has more than doubled.194
As sociologist Genda Yūji explains, the unemployment rate in Japan remained very
low compared with other developed countries even as the rest of the world suffered
stagflation and high unemployment in the wake of the oil shocks. Following the
collapse of the asset-price bubble in the early 1990s, however, it has increased
steadily. Youth were particularly badly affected by the economic downturn.
Unemployment among those aged 20–24 reached 12.8 per cent in 2003. Among the
25–29 and 30–34 age brackets it reached 7.1 per cent and 5.8 per cent respectively in
2002. In the 1990s, many firms stopped hiring new high school and university
graduates so as to protect the jobs of their existing workforce. This, Genda explains,
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was one of the key drivers behind the rise in youth unemployment.195 The problem is
worse than these figures suggest. Unemployment statistics only capture unemployed
people who are actively looking for work. Those classified as Not in Employment,
Education or Training (NEET), on the other hand, appear in labour market statistics
as ‘not in the labour force’. This category was previously reserved primarily for fulltime housewives, students and the elderly but it has increased since the bursting of
the bubble. This suggests that a growing number of young and unmarried people who
are not in employment are no longer actively looking for work.196
Neoliberal policies shifted the burden of Japan’s fiscal crisis onto the shoulders of
workers and the poor. Real wage growth ground to a halt as productivity increases
and the ‘rationalisation’ of wage costs occurred in most workplaces. A 3 per cent
consumption tax which was introduced 1989 was increased to 5 per cent in 1997.
Reforms to the welfare system meant that individuals were forced to contribute more
to the costs of their medical care, from an initial 10 per cent contribution to 30 per
cent by 2003. At the same time, corporate tax rates were reduced from 42 per cent to
30 per cent and the highest marginal tax rate decreased from 75 per cent to 37 per
cent. Changes in inheritance taxes benefited the accumulation of wealth by the
already wealthy.197
Further labour market reforms implemented in the 1990s were the result of a political
strategy instituted at the highest levels of Japanese capital. The Japan Business
Federation’s 1995 plan ‘Japanese-style Management for the New Era’ formalised an
emerging neoliberal consensus. The plan encouraged companies to develop a small
core of regular employees supplemented by a flexible labour force of contract and
part-time employees. As companies began to adopt this strategy, the number of fulltime jobs declined rapidly.198 The 2007 Employment Status Survey conducted by the
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communication showed that the percentage of men
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in irregular employment as a proportion of all those in employment more than
doubled from 9.1 per cent in 1987 to 19.9 per cent in 2007 while the number of
women also increased significantly from 37.1 per cent to 55.2 per cent over the same
period. Since 2002, more than half of all women in employment have been doing
some form of irregular work. The same figures show that the increase in irregular
employment over the same period has been greatest among people aged under 35.199
Another trend which became apparent is that men in their late twenties tended to
move out of casual employment and into full-time regular employment while women
moved in the opposite direction. Although people aged under-25 make up the
majority of freeters there is also a trend towards an increase in casual work among
young men aged 25-34. Only 4.3 per cent of young men were casually employed in
2006 but this was an increase of more than one hundred per cent when compared
with the rate of 2 per cent until the mid-1990s. The rate has been increasing
steadily.200
While speculators made a fortune in real estate and financial markets during the
1980s, the quality of life for urban residents declined significantly. A land price
bubble developed in Tokyo which was fuelled by real estate speculation, the lifting
of legal restrictions on planning and construction and political backing for the use of
urban land for corporate investment. The ideology of ‘internationalisation’
(kokusaika) ushered in major changes in the organisation of urban space in Japan.
Property price inflation spread throughout Tokyo and to Japan’s other major cities.201
As part of the ‘internationalisation’ strategies of both national and metropolitan
governments, Tokyo was presented not primarily as a city in which people lived and
worked but as an asset which could be advertised in international markets and
exploited as a resource. 202 Machimura considers ‘internationalisation’ to be an
ideological strategy which was pursued by national and local governments, large-
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scale urban development corporations and the ruling conservatives.203 It served to
strengthen the incorporation of Tokyo’s urban spaces into the global circuits of
capital accumulation at the same time as it obscured the social problems in the
capital produced by speculation and redevelopment.204
While corporate profits and state tax revenues boomed in the 1980s, urban
restructuring under the ideology of ‘internationalisation’ resulted in worsening living
conditions in the capital.205 By 1990, a typical 57-square metre apartment in the 23
ward area206 cost 12 times the average annual salary. Even those families who could
afford to buy homes had to do so further and further from the city centre resulting in
longer commutes (to an average of 70 minutes) and overcrowded trains (200-per cent
plus congestion during peak times). The burgeoning satellite towns generally failed
to generate local jobs which could retain residents, necessitating long daily
commutes for suburban residents into the city for work.207 Paul Waley observes that
‘corporate intervention in the city was so massive in the 1980s that it came to
resemble a grotesque parody of the traditional vision of the city as locale of bustle
and prosperity.’208 Tokyo was becoming not a city for living but a site of capital
accumulation in which young unemployed and underemployed workers struggle to
find a place. Out of the conflicts over the integration of urban space into the circuits
of capital accumulation emerged movements which were precursors to the antinuclear movement emerged to contest the corporate ‘internationalisation’ of their
city.
As I discussed in the Introduction, young workers who remain in a series of irregular
jobs without ever making the transition to full-time work are known in Japan as
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‘freeter’ (furiitā).209 During the 1980s, the term freeter evoked the image of ‘a young
person boldly choosing to struggle in some form of casual employment while they
worked toward some goal’, something which was incompatible with full-time work.
The collapse of the bubble economy and the growth of irregular work, however, have
produced a series of different cultural understandings of this kind of work.
Understandings of who and what ‘freeters’ actually are vary. The term may refer to
someone who prefers not to work at all or, conversely, to someone who wants to find
a full-time job but is unable to do so and works part-time out of necessity. It may
refer to people who sustain themselves with part-time work while trying to establish
an artistic or creative career. School teachers use the term to describe graduating
students who are unsure as to their plans for further education or employment.
Labour sociologist Kosugi Reiko explains that these meanings all tend to signify ‘a
new departure from a way of life that has been the norm in Japan since the end of the
war in 1945’.210
While the term freeter tends to be applied to young people in irregular employment,
there is growing debate in the media, the academy and among social welfare
providers that poverty, even amongst those who are working full-time hours, is
increasing at all levels of Japanese society. A 2006 NHK documentary series on the
working poor revealed that increasing numbers of people in Japan are struggling to
meet their daily needs.211 Anti-poverty activist Yuasa Makoto has been a key figure
much to bring the problems of the working poor into the spotlight through his writing
and advocacy and his involvement in the social welfare organisation centre Moyai
which provide support to those struggling on the margins of the Japanese labour
market.212
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Sociologist Genda Yūji explains that many young people today experience a
‘nagging sense of job insecurity’ which reflects more than the obvious uncertainties
associated with the risk of mass unemployment stemming from the post-bubble
economic malaise, the decline in the labour force, globalisation and international
competition, and technological change. This second sense of uncertainty is more
ambiguous. It is often expressed through a series of concerns about widening
economic disparities. These concerns are often discussed in Japan in terms of the
development of a kakusa shakai (gap society), an issue which has sparked a
significant commentary.213 Empirically, Genda argues, evidence of a growing ‘gap’
is weak. Nevertheless, he readily admits that, ‘what undoubtedly is spreading
through society as a whole is a nagging sense of insecurity about it’. ‘Many people’,
he observes, ‘feel a vague uneasiness about the future of employment and more
specifically about their own work opportunities’.214
The flexibilisation and precarisation of work has given birth to the unravelling of
established forms of politics and the rise in swing voters and abstention. As the way
people work has become more flexible and the patterns of work more varied there
has been a decline in the unionisation rate and in the organisational structures of
regional society. Neighbourhood associations, shopkeepers associations, agricultural
cooperatives and unions which used to form a fixed support base for particular
political parties have lost members and become less reliable in terms of their support
for a particular party.215 In their place, however, have developed new forms of what
sociologist Carl Cassegård refers to as ‘freeter activism’.216 Freeter activism emerged
as early as the 1980s when various ‘new cultural movements’ emerged on university
campuses and in counter-cultural districts like Harajuku in downtown Tokyo.217
While the bursting of the bubble in the 1990s often serves as a trope for narratives of
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a Japan in decline, for many writers, thinkers and activists the end of the ‘bubble’
also opened up more space for different forms of resistance which had been closed
down during the mania of consumption in the bubble years.218 In the following five
case studies I describe the development of freeter activism and the way it has been
articulated with anti-nuclear demands after 3.11.

Summary
In this chapter I have outlined the key theoretical and historical background which
underpins my argument in this thesis. From the perspective of autonomy, the
changing form of class struggles are inseparable from transformations in the
organisation of work. In the precarious times of post-industrial capitalism, urban
space has become a site of capital accumulation. As will be discussed further below,
it has also therefore become a site of class struggle. The nuclear power industry in
Japan was developed during the era of LDP dominance known as the ‘1955-system’.
While many elements of the 1955-system remain in place, the introduction of
neoliberal economic policy and the shift to a post-industrial society have undermined
industries such as the electric power industry which were heavily regulated during
much of the post-war. These policies have also thrown more and more workers into
increasingly precarious forms of work. I turn now to the first case study where I
discuss the way freeter activists used urban space to challenge the nuclear power
industry after 3.11 In this chapter and throughout the rest of this thesis I draw on the
ideas developed above to analyse the strategy and tactics of the anti-nuclear
movement in Tokyo after 3.11.
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CHAPTER TWO – GENPATSU YAMERO!

Festival! Festival!
Make Some Noise! Make Some Noise!
Matsumoto Hajime219

Figure 2 Poster advertising April 2011 Genpatsu Yamero demonstration in
Kōenji.220
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On 10 April 2011, one month after the 3.11 disaster, thousands of people took to the
streets of Kōenji in Tokyo’s Suginami ward to call for an end to nuclear power.
Organisers had expected that a thousand people might turn out for the demonstration.
By the two o’clock starting time, however, 3,000–4,000 people had already gathered
in the small park near Kōenji station which was to serve as a marshalling ground. By
the end of the march, organisers estimated that 15,000 people had taken part. This
was an unprecedented number of people for a demonstration in Kōenji and one of the
largest demonstrations to take place anywhere in Tokyo for many years. It took
nearly two hours from the time the first demonstrators began marching until the final
group were able to set out from the crowded park.221 Journalist Itaka Yasuhiko
described the scene.
It was just like a rock festival or an Edo period peasant rebellion. A generator was
mounted on a pickup truck at the front of the demonstration. It wove its way through
the Kōenji area accompanied by the sound of loud rock bands and performance
groups. Participants were mainly young people in their 20s and 30s who said ‘this is
my first demonstration’. The demonstrators carried home-made placards which said
‘Stop the Reactors’ or ‘Save Fukushima’ or wore colourful homemade costumes.
They vented their grievances and their anger.222

The celebratory atmosphere which Itaka describes here is documented in two videos
embedded on the webpage of the April demonstration.223 The videos show thousands
of people marching through the streets. Some of the participants dance along to
music broadcast from the back of numerous trucks laden with speakers, turntables
and DJ equipment. Others wear colourful costumes while others are clad in more
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sombre garb, wearing face masks to protect themselves from inhaling radioactive
fallout.
The demonstration was organised by members and friends of Shirōto no Ran
(Amateur Revolt), a loose network of freeter activists which was established in the
Kōenji area in 2005 to protest against poverty and inequality in the city through acts
of carnivalesque rebellion. They promoted the April 2011 event as the ‘Super Huge
Anti-nuclear Rock Festival Demo’ (chō kyodai hangenpatsu rokku fesu demo) on
social media.224 The festive atmosphere of the demonstration seems at odds, however,
with the sober realities of 3.11: thousands killed in the tsunami, whole villages
destroyed, nuclear meltdown and radioactive contamination spewing from the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. Some people criticised the Genpatsu
Yamero demonstrations for creating a festive atmosphere in the midst of so much
suffering. Activist Hoshino Megumi, who participated in the April demonstration
dressed as a clown, describes how she was confronted by an evacuee from
Fukushima during the march who criticised her for ‘having fun without thinking
about us’.225
The participation of so many thousands of people in the April demonstration
suggests, however, that the carnivalesque tactics of Shirōto no Ran possessed a wide
appeal, at least for Tokyo residents. The April protest spurred a series of similar
events. Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations were held in different parts of Tokyo in
May, June, August and September of 2011 and again in July 2012. Throughout 2011
the Genpatsu Yamero protests attracted a similar number of participants who
expressed their opposition to nuclear power through the festive demonstrations.
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In this chapter I describe and analyse the carnivalesque politics of the April
demonstration. I begin by describing the ‘atmosphere of restraint’ which pervaded
Tokyo after the compound disaster. This atmosphere limited the ability of Tokyo
residents to express their emotional reactions to the disaster. I explain how, in this
context, a festive style of demonstration gave voice to the diverse emotions which
many residents felt in the wake of the disaster and produced a feeling of liberation
and emotional release. Next I explain the origins of the ‘sound demonstration’ style
in the movement against the U.S.-led ‘war on terror’ in the early 2000s. Sound
demonstrations draw on notions of the reclamation of urban space which derive from
both Japanese protest traditions and the global social movement culture of the 1990s
and 2000s. I show how the reclamation of space was an important part of the April
Genpatsu Yamero demonstration, further developing the idea of the protest as a
space of liberation. I then explain the origins of Shirōto no Ran and their
development of festive protest as a means of protesting against poverty and social
exclusion in post-industrial Tokyo. The group had a keen sense of history, which was
reflected in their deliberate evocation of tropes from the peasant rebellions (ikki) of
mediaeval and early modern Japan. I explain the anti-consumerist politics of Shirōto
no Ran and how activists continued to articulate these politics developed after 3.11
into a broader critique of the political and economic structures which bought cheap
electricity into the city to fuel consumer capitalism. Finally I consider how the
politics of festive noise create spaces for joyful communion.

A Breath of Fresh Air
In the wake of the tremendous loss of human life in Tōhoku due to the 3.11 disaster
an atmosphere of sadness and mourning pervaded Tokyo. Many people also
experienced feelings of fear and anxiety due to the unfolding situation at the
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.226 Major aftershocks continued to rock the
city for months after the 11 March earthquake only reinforcing the sense of
uncertainty about the future. Matsumoto Hajime, a member of Shirōto no Ran and a
key organiser of the April protest, described his feeling that an oppressive ‘mood of
self-restraint’ (jishuku mūdo) had developed in the wake of the disaster. This ‘mood
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of self-restraint’ was, he felt, serving to restrict freedom of expression. 227 In
promoting the April Genpatsu Yamero demonstration in his column in the online
publication Magazine 9, Matsumoto urged his readers to ‘smash this horrible mood
of self-restraint and head into the streets’.228
For some activists, the mood of ‘self-restraint’ was eerily reminiscent of the enforced
‘self-restraint’ surrounding the death of Emperor Hirohito in January 1989. During
the former emperor’s illness in late 1988 and for some time after his actual death in
January 1989 local village festivals, end of year parties and other social events were
cancelled. Commercial advertisements and television broadcasts were also dropped
or altered as a sign of ‘self-restraint’. For critics, however, this was not ‘self-restraint’
(jishuku) but ‘imposed restraint’ (tashuku). 229 Freeter activist Sono Ryōta wrote
about his fear that calls in the media and from political leaders for the Japanese
nation to come together and work hard to respond to the disaster might serve to
conceal the responsibility of those in power for causing the disaster in the first
place. 230 In the days and weeks after 3.11 the mainstream Japanese media
downplayed the danger of radiation leakage and reported the situation at the plant as
stable.231 Social media users, too, found themselves subject to criticism for their
supposed lack of ‘self-restraint’ during online debates about the disaster.232
One of the first public figures to break this silence was popular rock and roll
musician Saitō Kazuyoshi. Saitō appeared on video sharing site YouTube on 7 April
2011 playing a new song called ‘It was always a lie’ (Zutto uso datta) which he had
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written in response to the Fukushima disaster.233 In the song, Saitō accused the
government and the nuclear industry of deliberately deceiving the public about the
dangers of nuclear power. In an interview with Imai Tomoko for Music Magazine the
artist explained that he produced the song not only to express his anger at those he
held responsible for the disaster but because ‘it felt wrong that even though everyone
was surely angry, there was an atmosphere in which you couldn't speak out’.234
When 15,000 people turned out for the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration in Kōenji, it
became clear that Saitō’s song had tapped into the feelings of the crowd. Some of the
participants even sang ‘It was always a lie’ as they marched.235 The song, Imai
commented, had brought a ‘breath of fresh air’ that helped dispel this mood of selfrestraint and open up a space in which to talk openly about the nuclear disaster.236
Rapper Arai Rumi (stage name ‘Rumi’), who performed at the April demonstration
in Kōenji, was also troubled by the silence in Tokyo in the wake of the Fukushima
disaster. Rumi was on tour in London when the earthquake and tsunami struck on 11
March. There she watched the massive anti-nuclear demonstrations which took place
in Germany on 26 March on television in her hotel.237 Upon returning to Japan, Rumi
expected to find people openly expressing their anger toward the government.
Instead she found that the ‘mood of self-restraint’ was also prevalent in the music
scene. Many concerts had been cancelled and the clubs in Shibuya where she usually
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uso datta [Saitō Kazuyoshi It was always a lie]’, 7 April 2011, https://youtu.be/FZ2-vE6PqAg.
233

234 Imai Tomoko and Saitō Kazuyoshi, ‘Saitō Kazuyoshi rongu intabyū: shinsaku “45 STONES” kansei ni
itaru 3.11 ikō no kokoro o kataru [Long Interview with Saitō Kazuyoshi: Baring his Chest About
Fukushima and the Making of the New Album “45 STONES”]’, Music Magazine, 1 November 2011, 34.
235

Gonoi, ‘Demo’ to wa nani ka, 193.

236 Imai and Saitō, ‘Saitō Kazuyoshi rongu intabyū’, 32; Gonoi, ‘Demo’ to wa nani ka, 190. Tamura Takanori
describes how the Saitō’s song affected one Twitter user, motivating her to join her first ever
demonstration in ‘The Internet and Personal Narratives in the Post-Disaster Anti-Nuclear Movement’,
The Asia-Pacific Journal 13, no 6.4 (16 February 2015), http://japanfocus.org/-Takanori-Tamura/4280.
237 David
S. Morris, ‘Rap Artist Rumi Stokes Nuke Fires’, Japan Times Online, 2011,
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/fm20110616a1.html. The date for the German demonstration was
fixed prior to the Fukushima disaster. In the wake of 3.11, however, German activists made reference to
Fukushima as part of their protest. See ‘Thousands Protest against Germany’s Nuclear Plants’, BBC News
Europe, 2011, accessed 18 May 2015, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-12724981.

60

performed were closed. 238 Rumi was troubled by the contradiction between the
image of rebelliousness which is part of the hip hop, club and hard-core music scenes
where she regularly performs and their silence in the face of the disaster. ‘Why were
people who had been angry when everything was calm and peaceful not angry now?’
she pondered. When she was invited to perform at the April Genpatsu Yamero
demonstration she decided to take part in her first ever political demonstration.239
Sociologist Mōri Yoshitaka, who attended the April Genpatsu Yamero demonstration,
explains how the festive demonstration helped to create a ‘feeling of liberation’
among participants. After weeks of ‘self-restraint’ and anxiety about the radiation
released by the Fukushima disaster people were able to gather in large numbers with
others who shared their concerns. Mōri felt that the sense of relief which this
engendered explains why the April demonstration had such a festive and enjoyable
atmosphere despite the seriousness of the issue which had provoked it.240 In a
contribution to an anti-nuclear zine, ‘nacca’, a participant in the April demonstration,
described her consciousness of the pervading atmosphere of ‘self-restraint’ after the
disaster and the emotional release she felt while attending the demonstration.
At school, university or work, all these everyday places, there weren’t many
opportunities for you to express candidly the intense thoughts you were having. If
you are trying to read the vibes (kūki o yomu) when there is this pressure from some
huge power, if it becomes common sense that you have to watch out for what other
people might be thinking then it is easy to start saying things which you are not even
sure are your own words. … The Genpatsu Yamero Demo of 10 April blew a breath
of fresh air through that atmosphere.241

nacca refers here to the stress of trying to ‘read the vibes’ (kūki o yomu) in the midst
of the mood of self-restraint. The phrase ‘kūki o yomu’ refers to the practice of
checking for non-verbal cues in social situations so as to avoid disrupting group
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harmony and conform to expected group behaviour.242 Shoko Yoneyama has written
of how the ability to ‘read the air’ became extremely important in the 1990s. A
pattern of bullying behaviour, which was particularly common in high schools at that
time, involved labelling peers as ‘K.Y.’, meaning ‘unable to read the vibes’ (kūki o
yomenai), as a means of social exclusion. Rumi performed her song ‘A.K.Y.’, which
is a critique of ‘K.Y.’ bullying, at the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration. In ‘A.K.Y.’,
Rumi sings that she is not unable to ‘read the vibes’ (kūki o yomenai) but deliberately
chooses ‘not to read the vibes’ (aete kūki yomimasen). The song celebrates
individuality and rejects the idea that conformity is somehow desirable. For nacca,
Rumi’s performance of her song ‘A.K.Y.’ at the April demonstration was
particularly powerful because it spoke to the issues raised in the quotation above.243
The song legitimises speaking out and having one’s own opinion even in the face of
a ‘mood of self-restraint’.
Like the pressure to ‘read the vibes’, the notion of ‘self-restraint’ is a cultural
practice of self-censorship in a conformist society. Essentialist accounts of Japanese
society, known as ‘nihonjinron’ (theories of Japanese-ness), often claim that the high
degree of conformity found in Japan is an intrinsic cultural trait. Sociologist Shibuya
Nozomu, on the other hand, discusses group conformity as one of the middle class
values which were encouraged during the post-war period as part of the culture of
industriousness and self-discipline essential to Japan’s rapid economic growth.244 In
the 1990s, as the cracks in ‘Japanese-style industrial society’ were deepening,
Yoneyama describes how ‘reading the vibes’ became a means of enforcing group
discipline with tragic results in terms of bullying leading to suicide. Rumi attended
school during this period. The attempts to shore up Japanese capitalism through the
imposition of neoliberalism required ever greater forms of violence, often quite
subtle. Kainuma Hiroshi writes that in the villages in which nuclear power plants are
sited in Fukushima prefecture and elsewhere people learn not to speak about the
potential pitfalls of the technology. Kainuma is keen to point out that this is a unique
Shoko Yoneyama, ‘The Era of Bullying: Japan Under Neoliberalism’, The Asia-Pacific Journal 1, no 3.9
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feature of host communities on the Japanese periphery and reflects the unequal
position in which they are placed with regard to the centre.245
Rumi’s ‘A.K.Y.’ is a cover of the song ‘U.Y.C.’ by fellow rapper and sometime
collaborator SHINGO★nishinari. In ‘U.Y.C.’ Shingo pointed out the hypocrisy of
politicians who ‘say one thing and do the other’.246 Rumi quotes from Shingo’s
original song to criticise the myth of nuclear safety. ‘What they’re saying and what
they’re doing, they ain’t the same. What's this about safety’? While the April
demonstration was Rumi’s first experience of participating in a street protest, the
song ‘A.K.Y.’ attests to the fact that she has always been concerned with the freedom
to speak one’s mind. As a child Rumi became conscious that in school and in the
wider world there were ‘things one could not say’. Through hip-hop, however, she
discovered a place where expressing one’s opinion was not only permitted but even
celebrated.247 Skilfully weaving her performance from the repertoires of rap music
and popular culture, Rumi linked the problem of KY bullying with the broader social
phenomenon of being unable to speak out on social issues due to an inhibiting ‘mood
of self-restraint’.248
For nacca, whose writing I quoted above, as well as Matsumoto and Rumi the April
demonstration was important precisely because it enabled them to express thoughts
and feelings about nuclear power which they had felt unable to express due to the
prevailing ‘mood of self-restraint’. Before joining the demonstration, Rumi had
considered ‘whether what was important now was for us to be angry or whether to go
to the disaster-affected areas in Tōhoku and volunteer or to make music for charity
and cheer up the victims’. Rumi eventually went on to do all of these things. In April
2011, however, she decided to join the demonstration because she felt that ‘it would
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be good if more people came out and really let out their anger’.249 She identified her
own need for emotional release with that of others and considered this to be
sufficient motivation to join a political demonstration.
Sociologist James Jasper observed in 1998 that social movement theorists had not
paid enough attention to the role of the emotions in collective action.250 He ascribes
this in part to an overemphasis on notions of rationality and the presumption that
rationality and emotion are incompatible. Shirōto no Ran issued a call for people to
attend the 10 April demonstration which they circulated online in the lead up to the
demonstration. The text avoided any overly theoretical analysis of 3.11, using simple,
emotive words such as ‘dangerous’ and ‘frightening’ to describe the nuclear disaster.
While nuclear power was supposed to have been ‘safe’ and ‘ecological’, they
continued, the technology had in fact led to a serious incident involving the release of
radioactive fallout. The contamination threatened to make food from the district
unsafe and was hindering the rescue effort after the tsunami.251 As Jasper points out,
political activism becomes powerful when it gives political form to often vague
anxieties and fears.252 The call to attend the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration named
common fears and anxieties about radiation and posited the demonstration as a way
of responding to these feelings and joining with others who shared them. Precarity
activist and writer Amamiya Karin described the feeling of relief she felt when
reading this call to demonstrate. She felt stupefied by the enormity of the earthquake
and tsunami with their ever increasing death tolls. She was overwhelmed by the
conflicting information about the nuclear disaster in the media and online. The more
she read the more confused she became. Amamiya described how, when she read the
call to demonstrate on 10 April, she could agree with the slogans ‘dangerous!’ and
‘frightening’ and was eager to join the demonstration.253
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Affective protest can lay claim to a space for the expression of emotions, particularly
negative emotions, which may not be socially acceptable.254 Mōri and nacca both
describe how the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration of April 2011 produced a feeling
of liberation which contrasted with the oppressive mood of ‘self-restraint’ which
prevailed in the aftermath of the disaster. For many participants the chance to gather
with like-minded people in the atmosphere of fear and uncertainty was reason
enough to demonstrate. While participants may have shared common concerns about
nuclear power in the wake of 3.11, they were not necessarily unified through a
shared ideology or group membership. In the next section I examine the sound
demonstration form of protest which was adopted at the April demonstration. I
discuss the way music and dance enable participants to express their opposition to
nuclear power while preserving their individual autonomy.

Dance to Demonstration
Music, as Eyerman and Jamison observe, is a powerful medium for expressing the
affective dimensions of protest politics.255 Musicians like Rumi played an important
role in April’s ‘Rock Festival Demonstration’ and at subsequent Genpatsu Yamero
events. As a multitude of bodies gathered in the small park in Kōenji which served as
a marshalling area for the 10 April demonstration, contemporary chindon-ya256 group
Cicala-Mvta (pronounced jintaramūta) serenaded the crowd with their instrumental
rendition of Chilean communist singer-songwriter Víctor Jara’s 1971 song El
derecho de vivir en paz (The right to live in peace).257 Genpatsu Yamero organiser
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Matsumoto Hajime describes how Cicvala-Mvta’s performance roused the
demonstrators ‘whether they were ready for it or not’, describing the way the
rhythms of this classic protest song ‘moved’ the crowd emotionally and physically.
As participants inched out of the park and onto the road to begin the march, however,
Cicvala-Mvta’s rhythms became just one refrain in a cacophony of festive noise. The
demonstration was divided up into ‘blocs’ as it made its way through the street. Each
of these blocs was led by a ‘sound truck’ fitted out with a public address system
which played a different genre of music. Rumi performed as part of the ‘Dance Bloc’
which also included a number of DJs and reggae artist Rankin Taxi. The ‘Live Bloc’
incorporated punk rock bands and Cicala-Mvta. The ‘Silver Bloc’ was an impromptu
marching band in which anyone was free to participate. Adding to the sounds of the
demonstration were those made by participants themselves with their chants, cries,
songs and instruments.
This style of protest where music is played from the back of trucks is known as a
‘sound demonstration’. It is a tactic which emerged in Tokyo in 2003 out of the
meeting of artists and musicians in the movement against the Iraq war.258 The first
sound demonstration in Tokyo took place on 10 May 2003 in the fashionable
shopping and entertainment precinct of Shibuya.259 The ‘Street Rave Against War’,
as the demonstration was called, was the first in a series of five anti-war sound
demonstrations held between May 2003 and February 2004 in Shibuya. The
demonstrations combined the music of the underground dance party scene with the
radical politics of street protests. They were organised by a loose association of
people including musicians, designers, writers, critics, freeters, university lecturers
and students who came together in the first-half of 2003 under the name ‘Against
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Street Control’.260 As the name of the group indicates, the activists were concerned
not only by the war in Iraq but by increased repression at home.
The prevalence of freeters and workers in creative industries reflected the postindustrialisation of Japanese society. During the financial crisis of the 1990s the
promise of a full-time job in a good company began to appear more and more out of
reach, even for university graduates. Many youths began to abandon the prescriptive
ideal of the middle class life course which led from school to university and into the
corporate labour market.261 They tried to find alternative paths through life by taking
off on world trips and working holidays 262 or by studying abroad. 263 DJ Seino
Eiichi’s book Rave Traveller264 was representative of the experience of many young
people who chose to travel the world and seek new experiences. The 1990s also
witnessed a flourishing of the rave subculture in the mountains surrounding the
metropolis and in Tokyo’s Yoyogi Park.265 Seino was also a pioneer in the rave scene
which emerged in Tokyo’s Yoyogi Park in the 1990s. He first went to the park in
Christmas of 1996 to play CDs on a stereo system with friends. Other users of the
park spontaneously joined in and started dancing. As these experiments were
repeated, more and more music booths began to crop up in the park.266 The sound
demonstrations drew on the music and culture of these rave parties. Seino was one
musician who became active in the anti-war movement where he performed at the
260 ECD et al., ‘Tōkyō saundo demo kaigi’, in Oto no chikara: ‘sutoriito’ senkyo hen [The Power of Sound: The
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sound demonstrations.267 Many of the musicians who took part in the anti-war sound
demonstrations, including Japanese rap pioneer ECD and techno musician DJ Mayuri
also took part in the Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations of 2011.
The sound demonstrations were part of a much broader movement against the U.S.led war on terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.268 On 21 March 2003 a large umbrella
organisation called World Peace Now organised a 50,000-strong demonstration to
protest the invasion of Iraq by U.S. and British forces which had commenced the
previous day. The vibrancy of the peace movement was in part a reflection of the
rejuvenation of civil society in the 1990s. The Great Hanshin Earthquake, which
struck the western Japanese port city of Kobe in 1995, acted as a catalyst for this
renaissance.269 The earthquake killed more than 6,000 people and caused extensive
damage to infrastructure in Kobe. Local government in the affected areas was,
however, ill-prepared for the disaster. More than 1.3 million volunteers and many
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) went to the city to assist in
reconstruction.270 Many of the NGOs formed in the 1990s later played a role in the
anti-war movement.
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earthquake had an effect on musical culture, too. The folk music group Soul Flower
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affected by the disaster.272 Soul Flower Mononoke Summit and the related band Soul
Flower Union273 then became active in the anti-war movement. The chindon-ya
group Cicala-Mvta, who performed at the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration, is
primarily made up of members of Soul Flower Mononoke Summit.
Emerging internet technologies, particularly the Bulletin Board Service network
facilitated volunteer activities after the Hanshin earthquake and helped to forge
connections between volunteers and disaster victims. 274 These technological
developments facilitated the kinds of horizontal organising which was so important
to the way activists responded to the war on terror not only in Japan but around the
world. 275 Hayashi and McKnight have highlighted how the anti-war sound
demonstrations exploited these new communications technologies. Participants used
their mobile phones to alert friends about what was happening or to take photographs
of the demonstration which were then circulated via the internet.276 After the 3.11
disaster new internet technologies like social media joined these existing tools as a
means of co-ordinating grassroots response to the disaster277 including volunteering
in Tōhoku and organising anti-nuclear demonstrations.278
One of the most important tactical developments in the anti-war sound
demonstrations was their emphasis on the affective dimension of protest. Oda
Masanori, who was involved in the Genpatsu Yamero protests as part of the Silver
Bloc marching band, was one of the original organisers of the sound demonstrations

Yoshiji Awatani, ‘Media Space and “Users”: A Study in Media and People’s Practice After the Great
Hanshin-Ajiwa Earthquake’, Keio Communication Review no 32 (n.d.): 79–80.
272

See, for example, the group’s 2004 anti-war release Soul Flower Union, All Quiet on the Far Eastern Front,
CD (BM-tunes, 2004).
273

Awatani, ‘Media Space and “Users”: A Study in Media and People’s Practice After the Great HanshinAjiwa Earthquake’, 80–83.
274

275 Michiba, Senryō to heiwa: ‘sen go’ to iu keiken [Occupation and Peace: The Experience of the ‘Postwar’], 625.
276 Hayashi and McKnight, ‘Goodbye Kitty, Hello War’, 94–96. See also Tim Clark, ‘Online Anti-War
Activism
Gains
Momentum
in
Japan’,
Japan
Media
Review
(3
April
2003),
http://209.200.80.136/japan/internet/1049353263.php.
277 David H. Slater, Keiko Nishimura, and Love Kindstrand, ‘Social Media, Information and Political
Activism in Japan’s 3.11 Crisis’, The Asia-Pacific Journal 10, no 24.1 (2012), http://japanfocus.org/Nishimura-Keiko/3762?rand=1350712554&type=print&print=1.
278

Gonoi, ‘Demo’ to wa nani ka, 15–16; Tamura, ‘The Internet and Personal Narratives.’

69

against the Iraq war. Writing about his involvement in the anti-war movement he
insisted that what brought people into the streets for the aforementioned World Peace
Now demonstration of 21 March 2003 was a visceral reaction to the prospect of war.
…the people who gathered in Shiba Park and demonstrated along the road from
Tokyo Tower didn’t go there seeking to carry out a clear political action. Before that
came the feeling ‘for today at least I can’t remain at home, this is no time to sit in
front of the television or the computer. At any rate I can't just stand here, it’s no
good just continuing quietly as we are, if we don't make some noise there will be
further trouble’. It was with this feeling of being at one’s wits end, of being unable
to bear this suffocating feeling that people dashed outside.279

Jasper observes that ‘collective rites remind participants [in social movements] of
their basic moral commitments, stir up strong emotions, and reinforce a sense of
solidarity with the group, a “we-ness”’.280 For Jasper, singing and dancing are a
means of generating a collective identity. They are ‘the one moment when a large
group can attain a certain coordination and unity, can silence the small groups talking
among themselves, can concentrate the attention of all’. Participants in the sound
demonstrations, however, felt that this style of demonstration was important because
it could facilitate the expression of difference. One such participant was Mizukoshi
Maki who described how she valued the sound demonstrations precisely because
they were ‘a place where different people could express their various feelings and
thoughts’.281 Far from silencing the small groups in the way Jasper suggests, the
sound demonstrations created space for difference within a collective act of protest.
Mizukoshi admits that the lack of a central message ‘may have made [the
demonstrations] weaker’. She insists, however, that ‘it was precisely for that reason
that I was able to be there’. She only felt able to join in the affective experience of
the demonstrations because she did not have to subscribe to a central slogan or idea.

Oda Masanori and Irukomonzu, ‘Bokura no sumu kono sekai de wa demo ni deru riyū ga ari inu wa
hoeru ga demo wa susumu [In This World in Which We Live There is Reason to Demonstrate. The Dogs
Howl But the Demonstration Continues]’, Jōkyō dai san ki [Situation Third Series] 4, no 9 (October 2003):
210. The title of this article is a play on the popular song by Shibuya-kei musician Ozawa Kenji, ‘Bokura
ga sumu kono sekai dewa tabi ni deru riyū ga aru’ (In This World in Which We Live There is Reason to
Go Away).
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The cacophony of festive noise at sound demonstrations creates an atmosphere which
embraces all the participants. It does not demand a unified mode of participation in
the way that formal chanting, for example, might. Music writer Isobe Ryō, who was
also a participant in the anti-war sound demonstrations, was quite ambivalent about
the political slogans and chants which could be heard at the anti-war protests.
Although I personally can agree with all of them, I really can’t get into the chanting
and I haven’t taken part in any of it. More than all that, it’s the dancing that I really
get into. It’s true, though, that sometimes I can’t shake the feeling that I’m being
exploited (sakushu) by all these slogans and chants.282

These doubts were offset, however, by the freedom to dance in one’s own style.
Laughing and drinking beer while dancing along? The sound-demo is the place
where even that kind of irreverent (katte na) behaviour is OK. More than that, isn’t it
OK if some people just dance their socks off, even if they can’t agree with the
slogans? Ultimately, dancing in the streets is itself a political act. Whatever the
slogan, this is the politics that is emphasised in the sound-demo. If someone can
agree with that, then I think they are one of us (nakama).283

Reflecting on the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration of April 2011, music critic Hirai
Gen described how he ‘wandered here and there’ through the festive space rather
than ‘marching in the ranks’.284 This quotation suggests that the atmosphere of the
‘rock festival’ demonstration was quite different from Jasper’s notion of music as a
way of harmonising the voices of protest. Hirai celebrated the way the Genpatsu
Yamero demonstration preserved a space for difference. Shirōto no Ran activist and
music critic Futatsugi Shin, too, felt that the demonstration had enabled ‘all sorts of
different people to feel at ease to call out ‘stop nuclear power’ in their own way’.285
Contradicting theories of ‘collective identity’, the anti-nuclear movement culture
which was manifest at the April 2011 demonstration was characterised by ambiguous
and shifting subjectivities which convene around the common demand to end nuclear
282 Ryō Isobe, ‘Demo=pāti Ron [On the Demonstration-Parties]’, Jōkyō Dai 3 Ki 5, no 2 bessatsu (2004):
75. My translations of this essay reflects the conversational style Isobe adopted in the original.
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power but often diverge on tactical and philosophical questions. Jasper suggests that,
for participants in a protest to ‘lose themselves’ in a collective expression of ‘weness’, they ‘must know the dances and the lyrics’. He does acknowledge, however,
that ‘it is hard to imagine all participants joining in’. 286 Performance theorist Randy
Martin reflects on the way dance as a form of protest ‘makes legible the social
kinaesthetic, the shared physical sensibility and context we join as we rumble and
tumble together’.287 Dancing together in the streets allows for a collective act of
protest while preserving a space for difference. Dancing bodies can respond to the
same rhythms without having to dance the same steps. In rave culture, which was
one of the inspirations for the development of sound demonstrations, it is precisely
the lack of formalised steps which facilitate the sense of liberation which participants
experience on the dance floor.288
Hardt and Negri have argued that the carnivalesque protest movements which
became popular throughout the world in the 1990s and 2000s are characterised by a
multitude of singular subjectivities which are expressed through collective protest
without creating a unified collective identity.289 Their understanding of multitude is
based on their analysis of the praxes of the alter-globalisation and anti-war
movements of the early 2000s. Sociologist Kevin McDonald also argues that
contemporary globally connected social movements cannot be adequately understood
through notions of collective identity. Writing about the role of dance music at alterglobalisation protests against the World Economic Forum in Melbourne, Australia in
2000, he notes that, rather than trying to generate a collective identity, the dance
protest aimed ‘to change the codes that govern urban experience’. He explains that
‘this is not an experience of simultaneity as one of temporal acceleration and loss of
capacity to produce distance, but one of multiplicity’. 290 This disavowal of
ideological unity and the embrace of multiplicity was evident in the anti-war sound
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demonstrations. They possessed what Hayashi and McKnight call a ‘baggy’
composition reflecting the highly fragmented labour market of post-industrial Japan.
The protests incorporated ‘twentyish furiitā [freeters], students on the verge of
getting a job, and downsized office ladies (OLs) [sic] and salarymen’.291 Mizukoshi
Maki and Noda Tsutomu, two organisers of the anti-war sound demonstrations
celebrated the way they were able to bring musicians, many of whom had displayed
little previous interest in politics, and political activists together.292
Ethnomusicologist Noriko Manabe describes the inclusive style which was adopted
by the organisers of the April 2011 Genpatsu Yamero demonstration. The organisers
relied on their friendship networks and broader contacts. Music critic and Shirōto no
Ran member Futatsugi Shin told Manabe ‘we're not really organizers so much as we
invite people to participate. If someone approaches us and says, “I want to have a
reggae truck, a hard-core truck”, or whatever, we invite them to do it, as long as they
take care of renting the truck and sound system themselves’. Futatsugi explains how
this approach reflected the organising philosophy of Shirōto no Ran. ‘It’s best to
have a diversity of people there—suspicious characters, the shopkeepers and
shoppers of the commercial streets (shōtengai), labor unions, families, everyone—
showing their individuality while saying, “We’re against nuclear power”’.293 The
Shirōto no Ran organisers were inundated with requests from musicians who wanted
to play at the demonstration.294
Social movements in Tokyo today are defined less by shared ideological
commitments or formal group membership than by practices which intervene in and
transform public space.295 The anti-war sound demonstrations transformed the sonic
landscape of Shibuya with their playful combination of techno beats and anti-war
291
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messages. Cassegård, in a recent essay, highlights the importance of play as a tactic
in recent urban social movements in Japan. Play can ameliorate the feelings of
powerlessness which many of the precariat experience due to their social and
economic marginalisation.296 Music and dance are forms of ‘playful empowerment’
which facilitate participation in political protest and create a ‘baggy’ sense of
community among disempowered and alienated youth. In the next section I discuss
the ‘playful’ protest style developed by the Shirōto no Ran network which became
visible to a wide audience at the April 2011 demonstration.

Genpatsu Yamero as a Temporary Autonomous Zone
In the epigraph to this chapter I quoted from Matsumoto Hajime’s 2008 book
Counter-attack of the Poor where he called upon the urban poor to assert their
interests through carnivalesque protest. ‘Festival Festival!’ he wrote, ‘make some
noise! Make some noise!’297 So far in this chapter I have discussed the way the April
2011 demonstration enabled people to express their emotional reactions to the 3.11
disaster. Hirai Gen, for example, described the ‘amazing feeling of liberation’ he felt
while listening to a performance by reggae performer Rankin Taxi at the
demonstration.298 This quest for liberation through festive protest has been key to
Shirōto no Ran’s protest strategy since its inception in Kōenji in 2005.
Humour is an important social movement tactic in post-industrial Japan, as Watanabe
has discussed with regard to precarity movements in Kyoto.299 Shirōto no Ran’s
protest style has always displayed an idiosyncratic sense of humour. This can be seen
in the first demonstration they organised in Kōenji, the Jitensha o kaese! (‘Give Me
My Bike Back!’) demonstration in August 2005. Suginami ward, like most Tokyo
municipalities, impounds bicycles which are not parked in designated bicycle
parking areas. In order to retrieve an impounded bicycle one has to pay a fee. The
Give Me My Bike Back protest was meant to challenge this practice which
296
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disproportionately affects poor people who tend to live further away from major
railway stations and need to commute by bicycle in order to catch the train.
Matsumoto saw as emblematic of the way the rich exploit the poor. Another protest
organised by Shirōto no Ran highlighted the high cost of living in inner-city Tokyo
by demanding ‘Make Rent Free’. In one of their better known demonstrations,
Shirōto no Ran reacted to the excessive policing of their first protest by holding a
‘Three People Demonstration’. The police did not believe the organisers assurances
that only three people would attend the demonstration and a full complement of
police vehicles and personnel was deployed to follow the three as they wandered
aimlessly about Kōenji.300
These protests appear to have largely trivial or unrealistic demands. The slogan ‘Give
Me My Bike Back!’ seems unlikely to succeed. Exactly who was supposed to ‘Make
Rent Free’ was never specified in the protest. For Matsumoto, demonstrations do not
need to make specific demands. Rather, holding a demonstration is a way for the
urban poor to make irregular use of a nominally ‘public’ space which is usually
inaccessible to them. By calling a demonstration ‘you can use the road and say what
you want in the way you want to’, Matsumoto writes. He criticises what he sees as
the ‘boring’ style of demonstrations in which people march along shouting ‘we
oppose xxx’. By making festive noise, he insists, ‘you can cause an enormous uproar
which has tonnes of impact!’ 301
Matsumoto’s tactical approach to demonstrations as a means of reclaiming the streets
for politics and self-expression is reflective of a broader concern with space in recent
social movements. Sociologist Mōri Yoshitaka explains how the struggle for space
has become a central issue for recent social movements in Japan like the anti-Iraq
war movement described above. Space was also central to the carnivalesque protest
movements which took place in Europe and the United States in the 1990s such as
ACT UP302 and Reclaim the Streets.303 These movements all raised questions about
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who space belongs to and what it actually means to ‘reclaim space’. Mōri contrasts
this focus on urban space with what he characterises as the traditional MarxistLeninist concern with the ‘battle for history’. 304 Marxist-Leninist strategy often
prioritised the future revolutionary seizure of state power over contemporary
demands. Mōri’s chronology does, however, tend to obscure the long view of spatial
politics. He claims that the spatial politics of the 1990s and 2000s differed
fundamentally from the concerns of 60s radicalism. As Anthony Ashbolt has argued,
however, space was a central concern of protest movements in the San Francisco Bay
Area in the 1960s.305 In Japan, too, as Peter Eckersall has shown, the concern with
‘reclaiming’ and ‘liberating’ urban space was a key concern of 1960s radicals who
sought to transform the city into a theatre of protest.306
The anarchic transformation of public space through music and dance during the
sound demonstrations produces something like the ‘Temporary Autonomous Zone’
(T.A.Z.) theorised by the radical philosopher Hakim Bey.307 Temporary Autonomous
Zones are based on a prefigurative notion of politics. Prefigurative political strategies
emphasise taking direct action to produce the kinds of spaces, social relations and
temporalities which the movement aims to achieve in the here and now. This is in
contrast to the politics of the ‘battle for history’ discussed by Mōri above, in which
these aims are posited as something to be implemented after the movement has
achieved its goals. Bey’s work was translated into Japanese in 1997. His ideas have
exerted a significant influence on the activists who organised the Genpatsu Yamero
demonstrations. A small indication of this influence was the T-shirt emblazoned with
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the title of Bey’s book, ‘T.A.Z. The Temporary Autonomous Zone, Ontological
Anarchy, Poetic Terrorism’, which one activist was wearing at the Genpatsu Yamero
demonstration.308 The makers of the T-shirt, a small collective of activists, describe
the Temporary Autonomous Zone on their blog as a means of describing the
potential for spaces of freedom and liberation to emerge during short-term
occupations of public space. Because the ‘Autonomous Zone’ is temporary, it takes
advantage of the window before state-power shuts down the space. A temporary
space of liberation can then be created elsewhere.309
In a jubilant column in the online magazine Magajin 9 (Magazine 9) Matsumoto
celebrated the diversity of the participants in the protest.
People sincerely shouting and full of rage at TEPCO and the government, the elderly
walking slowly, people dancing every which way, people with a beer in one hand
who looked like they were headed to a cherry-blossom viewing party,310 families
who looked like they were going for a picnic, people wandering about with
enormous art objects they had made for the occasion, leftists who looked like they
had travelled 40 years through time with their zekken311 and people carrying the
Japanese flag who looked like they had travelled 70 years through time, 312
performers dressed as clowns and celebrities like actor Yamamoto Tarō313 and Bose
from Scha Dara Par.314 The number was endless!315

308 See the festival by Kawanishi Ryō in ‘Tokushū: genpatsu hantai [Special issue: Against Nuclear Power]’,
Shukusai [Festival], 11 June 2011, n.p.
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310 Between March and April each year when the cherry blossoms bloom across the Japanese archipelago
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One activist who helped organise the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration described
how the April 2011 event connected the desire to liberate space with the issue of
nuclear power.
There are close to zero places in the city where you can gather for free. There is too
much control of the streets; in order to dispel anxiety and loneliness you have to pay;
if you make a political claim then people look at you indifferently; and people are
divided one from another. Along with all of this we are now forced to go on living in
a society where all of a sudden you are surrounded by a minefield of nuclear reactors.
Moments/places (shunkan/ba) like the 10 April Kōenji demonstration are more and
more necessary everywhere in Japan! What is going on in a society where
demonstrating is seen as more troublesome (meiwaku) than radiation? 316

This account posits the creation of free and uncontrolled ‘moments/places’ as an
alternative to a city in which freedom of expression is highly restricted. The
Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations, with their festive occupation of the public streets,
enacted a temporary space of liberation.
Both Amamiya Karin and Mōri Yoshitaka have observed how the sound
demonstration format resembles that of Japanese shrine festivals known as
matsuri.317 In matsuri large numbers of people throng in the streets, often bearing
omikoshi (portable shrines). Participants in the festivals typically bang drums, dance
and wear special clothing. Shirōto no Ran have frequently used tropes drawn from
these festivals in their demonstrations. In September 2009 at the ‘Make Rent Free
Demo’ sound demonstration a group of performance artists joined the demonstration
as it approached its destination near Kōenji station. They carried a large portable
omikoshi emblazoned with the slogan ‘Kōenji NEET Union’ and cried out ‘wasshoi,
wasshoi’, the chant which is used when carrying omikoshi at shrine festivals. A
similar omikoshi appeared at the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration in Shibuya in May
2011, this time in the shape of a nuclear reactor.318

316 ‘4.10’, IRREGULAR RHYTHM ASYLUM, 13 April 2011, accessed 23 February 2015,
http://irregularrhythmasylum.blogspot.com.au/2011/04/410.html.
317 For an overview of Japan’s traditional festival culture see Herbert Plutschow, Matsuri: The Festivals of
Japan: With a Selection from P.G. O’Neill’s Photographic Archive of Matsuri (Routledge, 2013).
318 This nuclear reactor mikoshi is depicted in the documentary film Radioactivists. See Leser and Seidel,
Radioactivists.
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Herbert Plutschow argues that the culture of matsuri continues to exercise a strong
influence over many aspects of contemporary Japanese culture. He identifies, for
example, the influence of matsuri on demonstrations in the 1990s. According to
Plutschow, matsuri preserve a tradition of un-making existing social hierarchies.
During matsuri ‘laws, taboos and other rules of behaviour were relaxed in an effort
to abolish the distinctions that uphold the ordinary social order’.319 Matsuri not only
allow for the dissolution of the old order but enable the creation of ‘a healthy antistructure clearly opposed to the real world … It creates a vacuum that makes it
possible to question the efficacy and relevance of the ordinary human order’.320
Carl Cassegård has discussed the way freeter activism goes beyond the critique of the
objective conditions of precarity faced by freeters. Freeter activists have protested
‘the tendency to put the blame for the precarious living conditions of young people
on their own laziness and unwillingness to lead a conventional life’.321 He describes
how activists often find new meaning in their lives and new understandings of
themselves through participating in politics and taking an active role in trying to
shape the conditions of their lives. Playful forms of protest like the sound
demonstrations, Cassegård argues, are a way for the socially excluded freeters to
reinsert themselves in urban public space. These forms of playful empowerment
‘offer subaltern groups the chance of experiencing that they are not one-sidedly
subject to the power of society, but are also capable of ‘retaliating’ by acting back on
it and experiencing it as changeable through human action’.322 While festive noise
may not result in immediate social change it helps empower participants to take
collective action. Developing social networks which can facilitate survival and
further struggles for the empowerment of the precariat has been a key strategy for
Shirōto no Ran. In the next section I explore the networks formed in the group’s six
years of protest and community organising in Kōenji.
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Shirōto no Ran’s Post-industrial ikki
In a scene from one of the official videos of the April demonstration, three youths
who are waving their skateboards for the camera are joined by a shirtless man with
his head swathed in a tenugui323 who would not look out of place in a woodblock
print of an Edo streetscape.324 He cries out ee janai ka! ee janai ka! and the four
dance about maniacally. ‘Ee janai ka’ is a nonsense phrase which translates roughly
as ‘and why not?’ It was the signature slogan of an ikki (peasant uprising) which took
place in 1867, in the final days of the Edo period. Perhaps it was a scene like this
which prompted journalist Itaka Yasuhiko to compare the April Genpatsu Yamero
protest with an Edo period peasant rebellion in the quotation above.325 The ikki were
predominantly peasants rebellions during which people left their villages and
gathered together to seek justice from those in authority. They often involved largescale violence and property destruction.326 The 1867 Ee ja nai ka rebellion, unlike
most ikki, was made up primarily of the urban poor. Its memory has been preserved
in popular culture. Imamura Shōhei’s (1926 – 2006) film Ee ja nai ka,327 for example,
portrays the rebellion as a desperate reaction to the despotism of the ruling classes
during the dying days of the Tokugawa shogunate.
Like the colourfully-dressed participants in the Genpatsu Yamero protest, peasant
protesters donned special garb during the ikki. They gathered to express their anger
as well as making specific demands.328 In Imamura’s film, the rebels dress up in
costumes and dance about chanting ‘ee ja nai ka’. Shirōto no Ran has drawn widely
on the linguistic tropes and practices of the ikki in order to reclaim an indigenous
Japanese tradition of resistance and rebellion. The ‘ran’ (revolt) in the group's name
evokes these historic ikki, some of which were referred to as ‘ran’. In 2007,
Matsumoto Hajime even ran a spoof electoral campaign in the Suginami ward
A tenugui is a thin Japanese hand towel made of cotton and usually bearing some printed pattern. It is
often worn as a headband by workers.
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council elections under the grandiose title of Kōenji ikki (Kōenji Uprising). The
purpose of the election campaign, Matsumoto explains, was not to win a seat on the
ward council but to use various provisions of the electoral law which allow
campaigners to hold rallies in the street without special permits. Taking advantage of
these provisions, the Kōenji Uprising sought to create a ‘state of festive revelry’ in
front of Kōenji station. As part of the campaign organisers parked their campaign
truck outside the station and held daily concerts which featured loud punk rock bands.
They also organised public talks by precarity activists like Amamiya Karin.329
By drawing on these traditions of protest, Shirōto no Ran worked to counter the idea
that protest is something foreign to Japanese culture. The stereotypical view of Japan
as a society uniquely free of social conflict is still prominent both inside and outside
the archipelago today. 330 Recalling a symposium at the New School of Social
Research in New York in which Matsumoto took part alongside Occupy Wall Street
activists in September 2011, he described how the American activists underestimated
Japan’s indigenous traditions of protest and rebellion. They seemed to believe that
democracy was introduced to Japan from above during the Allied Occupation after
the end of the Second World War.331 The idea that democracy was something foreign
to Japan was shared by many of Japan’s post-war intellectuals.332 Maruyama Masao
(1914–1996), one of post-war Japan’s most prominent political theorists, argued that
Japan’s lack of an indigenous democratic tradition had allowed the country to be
subsumed in the drive to total war in the 1930s and 1940s.333 Matsumoto rejects this

329 Matsumoto Hajime, Binbōnin dai hanran: ikinikui yo no naka to tanoshii tatakau hōhō [The Great
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http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/01/world/asia/01radiation.html.

Matsumoto Hajime et al., ‘Kōenji “Shirōto no ran” to woūru gai senkyo o musubu: tōron [Tie up
Kōenji “Shirōto no ran” with Occupy Wall Street: Discussion]’, Quadrante no 14 (March 2012): 11.
331

Matsumoto Kenichi, ‘Sekaishi no chikaku hendō to Takeuchi Yoshimi [The Shift in the Earth’s Crust
of History and Takeuchi Yoshimi]’, in Mukon no nashonarizumu o koete: Takeuchi Yoshimi o saikō suru
[Overcoming Groundless Nationalism: Reconsidering Takeuchi Yoshimi], by Tsurumi Shunsuke and Kagami
Mitsuyuki (Tokyo: Nihon hyōron sha, 2007), 141–142.
332

Maruyama Masao, ‘Anpo tōsō no kyōkun to kongo no taishūtōsō [Lessons of the Anpo Struggle and
the Mass Struggle to Come]’, in Maruyama Masao shū [Works of Maruyama Masao], vol. 8 (Tokyo: Iwanami
shoten, 1996), 337; Rikki Kersten, ‘The Intellectual Culture of Postwar Japan and the 1968-1969
333

81

characterisation of Japanese history. He defends Japan’s history of democratic
traditions which extend back to the ikki and other grassroots practices which existed
prior to the Meiji restoration of 1868.334
Shirōto no Ran is certainly not the first protest group in modern Japan to invoke the
memory of the ikki. Mediaevalist Goza Yuichi explains how Nobel Prize winning
author Ōe Kenzaburō references the ikki in his 1967 novel The Silent Cry,335 a
literary portrayal of the 1960 Anpo struggle. Ōe wove the story of the 1960 protests
with that of an historical peasant uprising which had occurred one hundred years
earlier in 1860. Post-war Marxist historians, too, projected their desires for class
struggle and revolution onto the historic ikki. Goza suggests that the post-war
Marxist understanding of ikki as a form of revolutionary class struggle was
historically inaccurate.336 He suggests, however, that the ikki may have more in
common with today’s social movement culture with its dependence on personal
relationships and social networking technologies. Ikki were not, Goza argues, a
violent force which aimed to topple the existing political system. They were a
particular kind of social relation based on the connection between people (hito to hito
no tsunagari).337
Cassegård explains that the resurrection of the ikki as a model in freeter activism,
reflects the desire of activists in the 2000s to dissociate themselves from the legacy
of the New Left.338 As Patricia Steinhoff explains, the memory of New Left protest
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in Japan is bound up with the violence which descended upon the student movement
in the early 1970s. New Left protest in the late 1960s and early 1970s ‘was a period
of political, ideological, and physical conflict in Japan’ which ‘deeply marked the
generation that came of age as students during that period, and has produced
polarised, contending collective memories in contemporary Japan’. 339 The most
spectacular incident of violence of the New Left period was the harrowing and
carefully mediatised Rengō Sekigun purge and the Asama Mountain Lodge siege.
During the siege five members of the United Red Army holed themselves up in a
remote mountain lodge for nine days in February 1972 while police laid siege. Only
after the siege was broken and the hostage takers were arrested did details of the
purge come to light. Media audiences who had followed the nine day siege learned
that 14 members of the group had been murdered by their comrades as part of a
ferocious internal purge.340 The Asama Mountain Lodge incident, Cassegård explains,
‘achieved iconic status as a powerful symbol of the New Left’s failure’.341
The emergence of the freeter movement in the early 2000s ‘on a scale that invited
comparison to the era of the Vietnam War appears to have made it urgent for many
of them to show that they were not repeating the mistakes of the past’.342 Cassegård
suggests that:
freeter activism may have arisen in opposition to the legacy of the New Left, but its
attempt to overcome this legacy has not meant a rejection of the entire history of
previous struggles. The re-innovation of activism has taken place hand in hand with
politics of choosing predecessors, which are held up as positive models for today’s
movement.343
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Genpatsu Yamero organisers take pains to identify predecessors of the movement
which are not tainted by association with the legacy of New Left protest. Futatsugi
Shin, for example, points to other more modern forms of protest such as the Freedom
and People’s Rights Movement of the late nineteenth century and Taishō democracy
and other popular movements of the Meiji and Taishō periods such as the rice riots
which took place in 1918. 344 Echoing the claims of Mōri Yoshitaka, Futatsugi
regards late 1960s student protest as primarily ideologically driven. He differentiates
this approach from that of today’s anti-nuclear movement which, he claims, as driven
less by ideology than by ‘a fight to protect our health and our children and things like
that, to protect our livelihood (seikatsu)’. 345 The way activists construct their
histories may not always be accurate when viewed from the perspective of an
historian but for the activists themselves they serve as a way of differentiating the
movement from the still traumatic memories of the 1970s. The example of the ikki,
with their basis in the principle of ‘one-to-one connection’, confirms Shirōto no
Ran’s own organising strategy as part of a legacy of indigenous anti-authoritarian
protest.
As I mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, organisers expected perhaps a
thousand people to attend the April 2011 Genpatsu Yamero demonstration which
actually attracted 15,000 people. The average turnout for a demonstration in Kōenji
had previously been around 200 to 500 people.346 The expected number, then, would
have been twice that which the group had attracted to any of their previous events.
Oguma Eiji describes how, after the April demonstration, the notion that ‘young
people in the inner city got together via the internet’ became something of a
stereotype of the Genpatsu Yamero movement.347 Certainly the group used various
forms of online communication to advertise the demonstration. They set up a page on
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social media site Tumblr348 and organisers posted links to the page on their own
blogs,349 for example. Matsumoto insisted, however, that the organisers’ use of social
media was insufficient to explain the success of the event. He felt that the number
and diversity of the participants was a reflection of the way the Shirōto no Ran
network had developed deep and wide roots in local communities. These connections
extended to shopkeepers, musicians, thespians and artists located not only in Kōenji
but across Tokyo. The group had also developed an extensive international network
as Shirōto no Ran activists visited similar groups in other countries and international
activists and residents came to Kōenji. Through these contacts they were able to
reach out even further to related communities.350 In Matsumoto’s view, the success
of the April demonstration was the product of six years of organising in the Kōenji
area.
Shirōto no Ran began when Matsumoto Hajime, a political activist and aspiring
second-hand goods dealer, and Yamashita Hikaru, a second-hand clothing dealer and
performance artist, rented an empty shop in Kōenji’s Kitanaka Street. The shop, like
many in the area, had been shuttered for some time and was destined for demolition.
Matsumoto and Yamashita took over the semi-derelict shopfront and established
Shirōto no Ran Shop No 1 (1 gōten). They patched up the holes in the walls, laid
some artificial turf on the floor and set up a studio in the back. They operated a small
bar and commenced nightly internet radio broadcasts.351 This was the first of a
number of Shirōto no Ran shops which later opened in the district. Like Shop No 1,
each shop was given a number based on the order in which the shops were
established.
Shop No 1 quickly became a gathering place for the pair’s friends and passers-by,
some of whom set up their own shops, bars and meeting spaces under the loose
348 ‘APRIL 10th ANTI-NUCLEAR DEMO!!!!!!!!!!!!!’, Shirōto no ran 5 gō ten tenshu nikki [Shirōto no Ran Shop
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umbrella of ‘Shirōto no Ran’. Film lovers in the network established a Shirōto no
Ran movie night and one local resident established an English class called Shirōto no
Ran University. Some of the shops were used for music and dance performances.
The internet radio station Shirōto no Ran featured programmes by the various
shopkeepers and individuals who were circulating in the group’s orbit. The activists
also established a weekly newsletter.352 As the network grew its boundaries blurred.
Matsumoto reflects that ‘we had no idea who was doing it and who was calling
themselves Shirōto no Ran’ as the network escaped the control of any one
individual.353
The composition of Shirōto no Ran was ‘baggy’ in the sense described by Hayashi
and McKnight. While I have described the April protest as having been organised by
Shirōto no Ran it is not actually possible to determine who is or is not a member of
the network. Shirōto no Ran can be defined narrowly as encompassing those activists
who are directly involved in the operation of the shops, bars and cafés in Kōenji
which use the name Shirōto no Ran. In organising the April demonstration organisers
like Matsumoto, who are more clearly associated with the name ‘Shirōto no Ran’
joined forces with a much broader community of freeter activists which I describe in
the next chapter as the Nantoka Neighbourhood. Many of these activists had taken
part in Shirōto no Ran protests in the past. Many of them had also taken part in
protests against the G8 Summit in Hokkaido in 2008.
As Goza explains, the 3.11 Great East Japan Earthquake disaster prompted the
revival of discussions about the value of kizuna (‘bonds’) and ‘tsunagari’
(‘connections’).354 These discussions have taken place in a society where anxieties
about dying alone and the development of a ‘muen shakai’ (‘a society without
connections’) have become common in media and political discourse.355 In 2009, for
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example, national broadcaster NHK televised a special on muen shakai which
focused in particular on the issue of elderly people dying alone.356 The 3.11 disaster
further exposed the frailty of social connections in contemporary Japan, prompting a
widespread reaction on both the left and the right that some kind of social change is
necessary.357
The development of social connections among the precariat has been the concern of
Shirōto no Ran’s strategy of urban revolt. The group never aimed to build a broad
movement against precarity but rather focused on the one-to-one connections which
sustain life and make activism possible over time. For Matsumoto, rebellion is not a
singular event but a way of life which is made possible through connections with
others. This is the sense in which the history of the ikki is important to Shirōto no
Ran. Matsumoto, in discussion with philosopher Karatani Kōjin, described how the
ikki, which often took place over a number of years, involved a transformation of the
everyday such that the protest ‘really becomes one with daily life’ (‘hontō ni seikatsu
to ittaika shiteiru’). He cites as an example the Kawamata incident where peasant
farmers affected by pollution from the Ashio copper mine in Tochigi Prefecture
walked all the way from Gunma Prefecture to Tokyo.358 When the 3.11 disaster
occurred, an existing set of overlapping social networks came together in protest in
Kōenji. Goza argues that the principle of ikki has remained alive in Japanese culture
as a philosophy of social connectedness.
Shirōto no Ran’s post-industrial ikki is a strategy for developing dense social
relationships which might sustain the urban poor. In order to do so, however, they
have had to develop an alternative to consumerist culture. In the next section I
discuss the presence of anti-consumerist ideas in Shirōto no Ran’s post-3.11 activism.
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Demonstrating Saves Electricity
In an interview with the online magazine Tokyo Timeout in the lead up to the April
demonstration, Matsumoto Hajime was asked: ‘Your event is a campaign against
nuclear power, but what do you see as being the alternatives?’ ‘I have no idea’,
Matsumoto replied jokingly, going on to say:
I’d rather live with much less electricity if it comes with the kind of risk we are
seeing now. Japan’s electricity use is excessively wasteful. Seeing 20 vending
machines lined up on the side of the street is just one example. I think there are lots
of possible alternatives, but our top priority is to stop the nuclear power plants.359

In the immediate aftermath of the Fukushima disaster, TEPCO implemented rolling
blackouts in Tokyo. Corporate, governmental and household consumers were asked
to reduce their use of electricity. Signs announcing ‘currently saving electricity’
(setsuden chū) appeared in public buildings as air conditioners were set a few
degrees higher than usual or lights were switched off. Like Matsumoto,
anthropologist Carolyn Stevens noted the powerful symbolism of the vending
machine. She photographed one machine which bore a ‘setsuden chū’ sign when she
visited Tokyo in early 2012. Commenting on how the hot beverage she purchased
from the machine was ‘just as hot as I thought it needed to be’ she went on to
describe how the sign, ‘[caused] me to reflect on what ‘appropriate’ energy usage
should, or could, be’. Stevens suggests that setsuden chū ‘came to signify a statement
to the government that Japan could manage using less electricity (obviating the need
for so many nuclear reactors, or for any nuclear reactors)’.360
Shirōto no Ran’s politics are deeply rooted in the notion of reducing and conserving
the consumption of energy and goods. These strategies embrace both a critique of
consumer culture and a practical set of tools for surviving on a low income. The first
small recycle shop in Kōenji which Matsumoto and his friend Yamashita Hikaru
opened in 2005 has since been redeveloped, but Matsumoto continues to make his
living by operating another recycle shop in Kōenji’s Kitanaka Street. For Matsumoto,
359
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recycling is not only a means of making a living, it is a strategic attack on what he
calls the ‘bottakuri keizai’ (rip-off economy). 361 In Counter-attack of the Poor,
Matsumoto calls for a ‘recycling revolution’ as part of a broader strategy of creative
resistance to the many pressures and expectations placed on the urban poor in postindustrial Tokyo.362
Counter-attack of the Poor, whose subtitle is ‘how to live for free’, contains a
combination of philosophical musings on life and struggle and practical strategies for
getting by on a shoestring. Some of the ideas in the book are serious suggestions
drawn from his own experiences of precarity, activism and communal living in
Tokyo. Surveying different ways of living cheaply, for example, Matsumoto
advocates sourcing run-down apartments which can be rented inexpensively or
creating shared living arrangements to spread the cost. 363 Some of the other
suggestions are more comical. In a section on ‘The Art of Saving on the Cost of Food’
Matsumoto recalls (presumably fictitious) attempts to live on McDonalds
hamburgers or pieces of torn-up bamboo flooring but that neither of these strategies
was really consistent with a healthy lifestyle. A more realistic strategy, he suggests,
is to share the cost of groceries and cooking with friends. At the core of the book’s
philosophy is the idea that by using less and reducing our dependence on the cash
economy through sharing, recycling and political campaigning it is possible to live, if
not for free, at least for very little.
Matsumoto’s main target in Counter-attack of the Poor is the culture of consumerism.
He regards consumerism as a form of modern slavery which traps us into working
long hours in order to buy things we do not really need. He uses anecdote and
humour to convey his critique of consumer culture.
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I’m walking through Shinjuku on my day off when I get lost in the home theatre
experience corner of one of the ubiquitous Yodobashi Camera outlets. Even though I
didn’t particularly want one, now I do and inadvertently buy one. In the end I even
ended up taking out a loan!364

One of the best strategies for reducing our dependence on the consumer economy,
Matsumoto argues, is to find ways to recycle already existing commodities. He
proposes that we look on second hand goods as ‘allies’ so as to avoid being taken in
by the merchants of expensive consumer products. ‘Let the rich fools buy new stuff!’
he proclaims. He does not argue that we should not enjoy home theatre systems and
other consumer goods but that we should not work the long hours which are
necessary to pay for all these goods. Rather than buying new things, Matsumoto
suggests that the poor buy second-hand goods. Matsumoto suggests that using this
strategy we can work fewer hours and take time off to enjoy life. If we take
advantage of a local recycle shop, Matsumoto insists, we can reduce our expenditure
on transport and circulate money locally rather than giving it all to the major brands.
Matsumoto argues that this reliance on recycling is both a personal saving and an
attack on the ‘rip-off’ economic system. It is therefore implicitly political. He
expresses this idea in a typically grandiose and comedic manner with the call to
‘stand up! The time for insurrection is at hand! I’m going to sell something I don’t
need at the recycle shop!’365
Matsumoto’s philosophy of recycling also includes the idea of repairing and
repurposing existing goods. He suggests that the urban poor can develop the local
economy and produce a kind of ‘autonomy of things’ by making use of local repair
shops or learning how to repair things themselves. He illustrates these ideas with
anecdotal accounts of his own struggle to live cheaply in Kōenji. In one such story he
explains how he sometimes loans the items offered for sale in his recycle shop to
members of the many small theatre troupes and independent filmmakers in the area.
This, he argues, is a way of contributing to the creation of a local economy of sharing
amongst the poor. Similarly, in many of the demonstrations organised by Shirōto no
Ran, they have been able to use items already accumulated in the recycle shop rather
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than having to go out and buy them.366 Applying this philosophy to the Genpatsu
Yamero protests, the group asked participants to bring their used cooking oil so it
could be collected and converted into a renewable energy resource.367
While Matsumoto’s notion of a ‘recycling revolution’ may seem ridiculous, the
group have had to fight to defend the right to recycle. In 2006, Shirōto no Ran took
part in a broader struggle against a new law to regulate the sale of second-hand
electrical goods. The 2001 Product Safety Electrical Appliance and Material Law
(Denki yōhin anzen hō), known as the PSE law, was due to come into effect in 2006.
The law would have restricted the sale of second-hand electrical goods which did not
bear a special mark indicating they had been tested and approved for sale by the
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Shirōto no Ran organised a demonstration
against the law in Kōenji on 18 March 2006, just two weeks before the grace period
was to expire on 1 April. The demonstration attracted approximately 100 people.368
In order to demonstrate the utility of second-hand electrical goods, organisers
mounted a second-hand amplifier and old computer on the sound-truck which was
used for the demonstration.
Writing in the radical intellectual journal VOL, music writer Futatsugi Shin described
the anti-PSE struggle in class terms. He noted that some opponents of the PSE law,
such as musician Sakamoto Ryūichi,369 objected primarily because it would have
restricted the trade in vintage musical equipment. Futatsugi insisted, however, that
the real impact of the law would be on the lifestyle of the urban poor who cannot
afford expensive consumer electrical appliances and instead rely on cheap, secondhand microwaves, refrigerators, washing machines and home hi-fi equipment. For
Futatsugi, the demonstration against the PSE law arose from an explosive class

366

Ibid., 66–68.

367

Matsumoto, ‘Kūzen no chō kyodai demo chikashi!!’

‘“Furukutemo Tsukaeru” PSE Hō Hantai Demo’, Asahi Shimbun, 19 March 2006, Morning edition,
Tokyo.
368

369 Japanese musician Sakamoto Ryūichi is a musician who attained worldwide fame as a member of the
electronic music group Yellow Magic Orchestra.

91

consciousness among the urban poor who responded to calls such as that of
Matsumoto to ‘Save the Household Electrical Goods of the Poor’.370
For Futatsugi, the anti-PSE demonstration was a manifestation of class consciousness.
He compared the movement with a contemporaneous struggle by young people in
France against the introduction of a new type of employment contract known as
‘First Employment Contracts’ (Contrat première embauche) which would make it
easier to fire young workers within the first two years of their employment. These
protests were widely regarded as a signature moment in the emerging global
movement against precarity. 371 Futatsugi’s notion of class consciousness is not,
however, reducible to the traditional Marxist understanding of a unified working
class. Class, for Futatsugi, is not premised on the unity of the proletariat but allows
space for difference and internal heterogeneity. Futatsugi draws on Hardt and Negri’s
notion of multitude,372 which posits that internal differences within the proletariat
actually enable communication and action in common. He insists that within the
riotous space of Shirōto no Ran’s anti-PSE demonstration, with their semi-audible
sound projections from aging electronic hardware, that which separates the
participants is also that which connects them.373 As I have already discussed in this
chapter, the notion that demonstrations are actually strengthened by allowing space
for difference was critical to the inclusive strategy of the Genpatsu Yamero
demonstrations.
The struggle against the PSE law pitted Shirōto no Ran against the powerful industry
which sells consumer electrical goods. It is worth noting that the electrical appliance
industry has close links with the electric power industry. METI, which was to be
responsible for regulating the sale of second-hand electrical goods under the new law,
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is also responsible for the promotion and regulation of the nuclear industry. The antiPSE demonstration provided the group with an opportunity to develop their strategy
and tactics and forge relationships with other movements and organisations. These
links widened the reach of the Shirōto no Ran network and contributed to the group’s
ability to bring tens of thousands of people together for Genpatsu Yamero. Shirōto
no Ran’s playful protest tactics celebrate alternative ways of life based on sharing
and co-operation. Matsumoto’s refusal to provide a clear answer to Tokyo Timeout’s
question about alternatives to nuclear power suggests an understanding of protest not
as a direct engagement with the ‘public’ sphere but as a form of immanent critique
where the performance of protest is imbued with intrinsic meaning. In the next
section I consider the politics of ‘festive noise’ as a protest tactic.

The Politics of Festive Noise
After refusing to provide an alternative to nuclear power in the Tokyo Timeout
interview cited above, Matsumoto poured scorn on conservative Tokyo governor
Ishihara Shintarō’s call for people to exercise ‘self-restraint’ by cancelling the
hanami (cherry blossom viewing) parties which are a feature of life in Tokyo in early
April.374
I want to point out that gatherings are environmentally effective—they’re more fun
and use less electricity compared to each person individually using power at home
… they should encourage year-round cherry blossom viewing parties to save
electricity.375

Matsumoto’s playful suggestion that cherry blossom viewing parties might help save
electricity implies a critique of the increasingly individualised and atomised nature of
life in post-industrial Tokyo. 376 Post-industrial societies are characterised by a
significant increase in the number of single person dwellings. Ronald and Hirayama
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suggest that up to 43 per cent of Tokyo households may contain just one person.377
The proliferation of this individualised lifestyle, in turn, increases demand for and
consumer electrical goods and the electricity needed to power them. Matsumoto’s
response reflects Shirōto no Ran’s rejection of individualism and consumerism.
Matsumoto’s philosophy for surviving in a post-industrial society by learning to live
with less might appear at first to be a fairly ascetic approach to life. Similarly, the
prospect that people might have to curb their electricity usage due to TEPCO’s
reduced capacity to generate electricity from nuclear power with the loss of the
Fukushima Daiichi plant appears to be a kind of hardship which needs to be
overcome. Stevens’ reflections on conserving electricity in Japan quoted above,
however, suggest that the practice might also prompt people to reflect on their real
needs. During the high economic growth period which commenced in the mid-1950s
and continued throughout the 1960s Japanese society underwent what Irokawa
Daikichi calls a ‘lifestyle revolution’. Approximately 10 million people moved from
the countryside to the cities in a process that involved changes to modes of
transportation and communication, consumption, etiquette and ritual and general
social conditions. People began to develop new ‘needs’ for domestic electric
household appliances and other consumer goods. Between 1955 and 1961, as the
post-war boom began to take off, ordinary people began to covet the so-called ‘three
sacred treasures’ of a washing machine, a refrigerator and a television. In the 1970s
the ‘three sacred treasures’ gave way to the ‘three Cs’: the colour television, the car
and the cooler (air conditioner). Domestic consumer demand became one of the
powerful drivers of economic growth.378
As the anti-nuclear movement in Japan has grown, so have the voices which question
not only the technology itself but the notion of material prosperity powered by a fastgrowing economy that was central to the dream of post-war economic growth. When
writer and precarity activist Tsurumi Wataru addressed the crowd at a Genpatsu
Yamero demonstration in Hibiya park in August 2011, he insisted that the problem
377 Richard Ronald and Yosuke Hirayama, ‘Home Alone: The Individualization of Young, Urban Japanese
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of nuclear power raised a fundamental problem about the meaning and purpose of
life. ‘We don’t live for the sake of the economy’, he declared, ‘the economy should
serve us so that we can live well’. Nuclear power, he explained, is a profit-making
industry. Japanese conglomerates Toshiba, Hitachi and Mitsubishi are among the
only companies in the world who still manufacture nuclear reactors. The nuclear
reactors that exploded at Fukushima Daiichi were built by Toshiba, Hitachi and U.S.
conglomerate General Electric. Rather than apologise for having produced such a
dangerous technology, Tsurumi complains, they are aggressively pursuing further
profits through the export of nuclear technology to countries such as Vietnam. The
mass media, he alleges, do not question the propriety of these exports, despite the
obvious problems raised by the Fukushima accident, because these companies are
major sponsors of the mass media. Regardless of the tragedy that has occurred in
Tōhoku, these companies are only motivated by money. For Tsurumi, while the first
aim of the anti-nuclear movement is obviously to shut down the nuclear industry, he
argues that we need to change the whole system in which the economy dictates the
terms of our lives.379
Tsurumi’s critique of nuclear power is bound up with his emerging critique of the
broader structures of capitalism. As a writer, Tsurumi possesses one of the most
powerful voices of the freeter generation. His debut work, the Kanzen jisatsu
manyuaru (The Complete Manual of Suicide), expressed the frustration many of his
generation felt in the 1980s towards a society and a way of life which were entirely
premised on work.380 After the dazzling success of The Complete Manual of Suicide,
Tsurumi went on to detail his various attempts to find meaning in life outside of the
corporate world by taking drugs and getting involved in the blossoming rave party
scene. After Ori no naka no dansu (Dancing in a Cage), published in 1998, and the
book he co-authored with Seino Eiichi Reivu ryoku: rave of life (Rave Power: Rave
of Life) published in 2000, Tsurumi did not release another book for more than ten

379 Tsurumi Wataru, ‘Keizai no tame ni ikiteiru wake janai [We Aren’t Alive For the Sake of the
Economy]’, in Datsu genpatsu to demo: soshite, minshushugi [Demonstrations Against Nuclear Power: And Then,
Democracy] (Tokyo: Chikuma shobō, 2012), 31–33.
380 Tsurumi Wataru, Kanzen jisatsu manyuaru [The Complete Manual of Suicide] (Tokyo: Ōta Shuppan,
1993).
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years.381 In an interview with Anne Allison in 2008, Tsurumi said that his feeling of
dissatisfaction with life had not significantly improved during the early 2000s and
that he had not had any hope for future social change. His attitude shifted, however,
due to the explosion of the precariat movement in 2008. Tsurumi told Allison that
when he saw people taking to the streets and becoming socially engaged he began to
feel a sense of hope.382 In these comments, he reflects Amamiya Karin’s feelings,
noted above, that the alienation they experienced in recessionary Japan was a product
not of economic factors alone but came from a sense of being unable to connect with
other people experiencing similar feelings.
The publication of Datsu shihonshugi sengen (De-capitalism Manifesto) in 2012
suggests that Tsurumi feels that social change is now possible. The critique of the
nuclear industry presented in the De-capitalism Manifesto specifically theorises the
problem of nuclear power as a problem of capitalist social organisation. In the
introduction to this book Tsurumi attacks the notion that ‘there’s no choice because
it’s for the economy’ (keizai no tame dakara shikata ga nai) which he feels is used to
justify the continuation of the dangerous nuclear industry. He suggests that during
the high economic growth period Japanese people were incited to become ‘economic
animals’ who act as if the economy were an external force beyond their control. He
blames the nuclear accident at Fukushima on this same ideology which, even after
such a tragic event, makes it impossible to end nuclear power production because it
is ‘for the economy’.
Political scientist Robin Le Blanc, too, has identified what she calls the ‘salaryman
breadwinner imaginary’ for restricting the debate on nuclear power to the narrow
question of economic livelihoods. She recalls how one anti-nuclear activist she
interviewed during the 1990s tried ‘to draw my attention to the way advocates for all
kinds of power generation silenced opponents by insisting upon the inevitability of
individuals’ sacrifice for the goods dependent on electricity’. 383 Critically, she
Tsurumi, Ori no naka no dansu [Dancing in a Cage]; Tsurumi and Seino, Reivu ryoku - rave of life
[Rave Power: Rave of Life].
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identifies how this imaginary is gendered as male. In the debate on nuclear power,
she notes, ‘manhood matters because behind the nuclear power debate lurks an
unarticulated but framing concern with whether the Japanese economy will allow
workers (breadwinners) to feed their families’. The gendered imagery of the heroic,
self-sacrificing salaryman restricts the debate ‘between the polarising dangers of
nuclear power and economic decline’. One reason for this, she suggests, is that ‘at
each pole of the debate, interlocutors summon up terms of critique that imply failed
manhood, such as unwarranted idealism or unreasonable anxiety’. They are, she
observes, ‘thinking empathetically from a breadwinner’s (male) position’.384
Tsurumi suggests that we re-examine our connection with the natural world in order
to find an alternative way of being in the world to that of the ‘economic animal’. He
believes that many people have begun to recognise this connection in the wake of the
Fukushima disaster ‘as the radioactive fallout makes its way into our bodies through
every conceivable pathway’. 385 He articulates the connections between the
problematics of capitalism, nuclear power and value. Relationships based on money,
he writes, have dispossessed us of our human to human connections, our connections
with the local (chiiki) and our connections with nature (shizen). In the resurgence of
global movements against capitalism which have grown over the past 10 years,
Tsurumi divines a new set of values (kachikan) which are not based on money.
Today we face a choice, he declares, of whether to continue to be an ‘economic
animal’ or not.386
The notion of a ‘kakusa shakai’ (‘gap society’) has become a common way of
describing the growing problems of precarity and inequality in post-industrial
Japan.387 Matsumoto is critical of the way discourses about a kakusa shakai have
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proliferated in the new millennium. He sees this discourse as contributing directly to
the ‘pressure to aim high’ so as not to be left behind.388 Sociologist Shibuya Nozomu
also suggests that the discourse on kakusa shakai focuses attention on the problems
of poverty and the working poor, typically designated as ‘losers’ (makegumi) but it
fails to challenge the supposed ‘wealth’ of the ‘winners’ (kachigumi) or the middle
class.389 Shibuya’s critique echoes that of Matsumoto Hajime and Shirōto no Ran.
They emphasise the agency of the poor and their ability to take political action to
challenge the way in which discussions about youth unemployment and poverty
typically take place. In Counter-Attack of the Poor, Matsumoto presents the ‘NEET
Union’ demonstrations in Kōenji as part of a broader movement among the urban
poor that challenges the way work and livelihood are defined in Japan today.390
Even if one were to achieve an ideal lifestyle and become one of the ‘winners’ in the
gap society, Matsumoto opines, you would still be poor. Here he refers to the
precarity of success, the fact that even ‘winners’ have little financial freedom due to
the proliferation of a consumer lifestyle that means that they spend as quickly as they
earn. Furthermore, ‘winners’ are time poor. They cannot afford to take time off work
because the cost of living a middle class lifestyle is so high. Matsumoto explains that
we are poor precisely because we are surrounded by a bunch of people who have set
up a system that makes them rich no matter what they do. Matsumoto adopts a
simplified notion of class. More than 90 per cent of people in Japan today,
Matsumoto suggests, can be considered to be in the ‘poor’ class. The only difference
is that between the exemplary prisoners and the problem children, in either case we
are prisoners and we have to get out.391 Matsumoto’s somewhat arbitrary selection of
the ’90 per cent’ who make up the ‘poor class’ is reminiscent of the idea of the ‘99%’
developed by the Occupy Wall Street movement in late 2011. It suggests an attempt
to rethink some sort of common basis for politics in an era when subjects like ‘the
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working class’, ‘the masses’ and ‘the people’ are increasingly suspect. Matsumoto
conceives of himself and others like him who lack secure work, family and
community ties as ‘the poor’ (binbōnin). He dismisses the idea that the poor should
‘aim high’ and hope to secure their place in the middle class through the gendered
pathways which had become a prescriptive ideal by the 1970s. He rejects the
gendered division of labour implicit in middle class notions of becoming a ‘winner’,
criticising the choice between becoming ‘half-baked salaryman’ with a 30-year
mortgage or ‘settling for marrying the first man that comes along and leading a
boring life as a housewife, suffocating one’s children with stress’. Similarly,
Matsumoto rejects the idea that one should work hard as a part-timer with the hope
of one day being asked to go full-time only to get used up along the way, develop
depression or die (perhaps through suicide or death by overwork (karōshi). He
criticises the notion that the middle-class lifestyle, which remains an ideal in Japan’s
popular imagination and government policy, is the only way to live.392
Matsumoto understands poverty as a kind of wealth. In order to escape from this
system Matsumoto suggests that we should live how we want and stop working so
hard. Key to this philosophy is the idea of a ‘carefree’ (nobi nobi) existence. ‘Let’s
do as we please!’ he implores, asking the reader to join him in ‘festive uproar’ and
show the world the anger of the poor. Matsumoto’s philosophy and Shirōto no Ran’s
activist practice are based on the assumption that self-organisation is the only way
the urban poor can guarantee their survival.
The festive noise which Shirōto no Ran create in their protests is not meant to
empower them to become ‘winners’ within the existing order of society. Rather, the
protests serve to vent anger and frustration at the lack of real choice available in
contemporary Tokyo. The group do not try to enter into the debate on nuclear power
in the public sphere by presenting themselves as rational actors. They reject the terms
in which ‘public debate’ is conducted in the first place. Futatsugi Shin wrote about
one rapper who posted critical messages about the anti-nuclear demonstrations on
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Twitter, saying ‘if you don’t have an alternative then don’t complain. That is
common sense for an adult. Anyone can criticise’. Futatsugi rejected this criticism:
I have the completely opposite way of thinking. I think we ought to criticise, even if
we don’t have an alternative. I think fools should keep giving voice to their ideas. I
think that is just using a word which sounds serious ‘adult common sense’ to
suppress free expression and free thought.393

Futatsugi poses a different notion of political debate.
Change begins with the angry voice which simply says ‘enough!’. We have to leave
an environment in which people cannot freely express their reckless idealism and
pipedreams. That’s the power people have. To just contribute jointly the opinions
they have and then debate them. Then that unproductive time, which is not bound by
common sense, can become the stimulus for creative change.394

Futatsugi’s further reflections on the demonstration suggest that protest is an end in
itself and does not need to produce alternative policy proposals in order to be
legitimate or effective.
Is it the happiness in the midst of misfortune? Or is it rather that the scattered ranks
of the demonstrators leaves an impression of its diversity. People who enjoy their
lives feel that nuclear power can disrupt their enjoyment of their lives. Because it’s
people like that who are getting together, is it any wonder that they are enjoying
themselves thoroughly at the demonstration? Nuclear power is not over, but we
succeeded in expressing the first step by saying ‘Stop Nuclear Power!!!!’ on a scale
far greater than we could have imagined.395

Summary
In this chapter I have discussed the carnivalesque politics of the April 2011 Genpatsu
Yamero demonstration. The style of the demonstration was the result of tactical
innovations which can be traced to the anti-war movement of the early 2000s. This
festive style created space for the expression of affective responses to the 3.11
disaster while allowing space for the multitude of differences which existed between
participants. The carnivalesque tactics of Genpatsu Yamero emphasised the
liberation and disruption of urban space through creative and noisy protest. The
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Shirōto no Ran network organises on the basis of one-to-one relationships between
people which can sustain them in the atomised world of post-industrial Tokyo. The
group models itself on a notion of ikki which Matsumoto has interpreted as a form of
resistance rooted in everyday life. The group’s anti-consumerist politics reflect the
broader politics of the precarity movements in Tokyo in the 1990s and 2000s. In
Genpatsu Yamero, the critique of middle class values which was implicit in Shirōto
no Ran’s organising prior to 3.11 was articulated with anti-nuclear ideas after 3.11.
The organisers embraced a politics of festive noise which disrupted the everyday
rhythms of the city, reclaiming space for politics and imagining resistance as an
immanent practice which nevertheless had long historical precedents.
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CHAPTER THREE – TOKYO NANTOKA

Just as we’ve been doing up until now we will create community, maintain a ‘place’
where people can connect. Then when things turn sour they can help one another.
This way of doing things will not change whether before or after the earthquake
disaster.
Futatsugi Shin396

Figure 3 Map of the Nantoka Neighbourhood397

The destructive effects of the 3.11 earthquake and tsunami affected primarily the
Tōhoku region. In the Tokyo Metropolitan Area, just 13 houses were destroyed and
351 partially damaged. The immediate consequence of the disaster for most Tokyo
residents was the disruption of Tokyo’s railway services. A survey conducted by the
Cabinet Office found that 5 million of the estimated 7.1 million people who make the
396 Futatsugi, ‘Interview by Kodama Yūdai. Teikō to risei no hazama de [The Interval Between Resistance
and Reason]’, 123.
397

tokyo nantoka, April 2011.

102

daily commute into central Tokyo from the surrounding areas were unable to return
home that day.398 At approximately seven o’clock that evening, four hours after the
earthquake struck, an estimated 3 million pedestrians were attempting to walk home
through the metropolitan area.399 In response, activist and illustrator Narita Keisuke
offered his small shop in Shinjuku as a place to take shelter for anyone who was
stranded in the city. Narita operates the Irregular Rhythm Asylum (IRA), a tiny
bookshop situated on the third floor of a narrow building in a back alley of
Shinjuku’s first district.400 The IRA website describes the space as ‘an infoshop in
Shinjuku where contemporary progressive information, goods and people from both
inside and outside Japan are gathered’.401 ‘Infoshops’ like IRA are self-managed
spaces which typically combine the functions of a bookshop with that of a venue for
meetings and events. They became popular in punk and anarchist sub-cultures in
Europe and North America in the 1990s where they emerged out of the squatting
movements of the 1980s.402 Influenced by the ‘do-it-yourself’ ethic of the global
anarchist movement, Narita established his infoshop in 2004.403
Narita issued his invitation to stranded commuters in a blog post titled ‘Asylum =
hinanjo (shelter)’. The meaning of the English name which Narita uses for his shop
may well have been unfamiliar to regular readers of his blog. By connecting the
English word with its Japanese equivalent the post extended the offer of a place of
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shelter implicit in the name ‘Irregular Rhythm Asylum’.404 The 11 March blog post
suggested that readers could take shelter in the Asylum, drink tea and follow
announcements about the earthquake and the disruption of the transport system on
the radio or internet. The post also offered practical information for readers by
providing a link to a map of the official evacuation areas located all over Tokyo.405
A week later, amidst the continuing disruption to the city’s infrastructure caused by
the 3.11 disaster, Narita assured his readers that IRA was still open.
In these anxious times things may not be ‘business as usual’ but IRA is still open. I
thought I had better make this clear at this time when the number of the shops in the
‘Nantoka Neighbourhood’ (nantoka kaiwai) which are closed due to evacuations is
rising.

The ‘Nantoka Neighbourhood’ which Narita refers to here includes a number of
small shops and activist spaces. Figure 3 is a map of these shops which include
Irregular Rhythm Asylum, the Shirōto no Ran network (which includes several shops
and meeting places) and a number of other bars, bookshops and cafes. The term
‘kaiwai’ (‘neighbourhood’) implies that the Nantoka Neighbourhood is a loosely
connected community rather than a formal organisation. The Japanese word ‘kaiwai’
literally means the nooks and crannies (wai) which exist on the border (kai) of a
defined geographical space. The use of the word ‘nantoka’ to describe the
Neighbourhood emphasises its ephemeral nature. The word has the sense of
‘somehow’ or ‘something’, as in the colloquial phrases ‘nantoka suru’ (‘I’ll manage
somehow’) and ‘nantoka naru’ (‘something will work out’).406 These phrases are
used frequently by members of the precariat who are scraping by in the risky and
alienated social and economic landscape of post-industrial Tokyo.
Historian Jordan Sand explains how the notion of kaiwai was developed by
‘ASYLUM （＝hinanjo） [Asylum (=shelter)]’, IRREGULAR RHYTHM ASYLUM, 11 March 2011,
accessed 11 April 2014, http://irregularrhythmasylum.blogspot.com.au/2011/03/asylum.html.
404

Ibid. These “evacuation areas” are generally open spaces such as parks to which Tokyoites are
encouraged to evacuate in case of earthquake.
405

For a discussion of some of the multifarious ways in which the word “nantoka” is used in
contemporary Japanese see Akemi Tanahashi and Hitomi Tashiro, ‘Learn “nantoka” Any Way You Can’,
The Japan Times Online, 16 March 2015, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/life/2015/03/16/language/learnnantoka-way-can/.
406

104

architectural theorists in the 1960s. Their understanding of kaiwai, which they
translated into English as ‘activity space’, ‘fused an organicist reading of Japanese
space as an integrated order with an emphasis on spontaneity and irregularity’.407
Sand explains Itō Teiji’s reading of kaiwai as being ‘a distinctively Japanese pattern
that was spatial and yet undelineated, a kind of ‘mist’, or atmosphere, generated by
what happened there rather than by the drawing of boundaries’.408 The structure of
the Nantoka Neighbourhood reflects this understanding. It is not a single, clearly
delineated physical place but encompasses a number of spaces which are dispersed
across a wide swathe of western Tokyo from Shinjuku to Kunitachi. These spaces
are ‘somehow’ (nantoka) bound together by the relationships between the people
who use these spaces, common ideas and images, and a rich print and online media.
In this chapter I explore the role of the Nantoka Neighbourhood in the anti-nuclear
movement after 3.11. The Neighbourhood was a conceptual and linguistic device
through which its members oriented themselves spatially in Tokyo. It was also a
temporal concept which, like the politics of festive noise, depended on both
immediacy and historicity. I begin by analysing the way members of the
Neighbourhood responded to the disruption which 3.11 caused in Tokyo. I then
discuss how the idea of the Neighbourhood emerged out of the coming together of
various activist groupings in the mid-2000s. I discuss the role of the print and online
media

associated

with

the

Nantoka

Neighbourhood

in

constructing

the

Neighbourhood. I then show how these media functioned as an informational
infrastructure for the anti-nuclear movement. This is followed by a discussion on the
importance of locality in the Shirōto no Ran movement and the way the notion of
taking activism in the ‘space of everyday life’ (‘seikatsu no ba’) informed the
group’s activism in Kōenji before and after 3.11. In the final section I consider the
notion of ‘ibasho’, ‘a place in which to be’, speculating that the creation of
autonomous space has given shelter to the precariat in the harsh environment of postindustrial Tokyo.
407 Jordan Sand, Tokyo Vernacular: Common Spaces, Local Histories, Found Objects (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 2013), 31–32.
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The Nantoka Neighbourhood Disrupted
Narita updated his blog frequently in the days after the 3.11 disaster. His posts from
this period give a sense of the fear and uncertainty which prevailed in Tokyo while
regular aftershocks rattled the ground beneath residents’ feet and alarming reports
emerged about the situation at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The 3.11
disaster caused significant disruption to the Nantoka Neighbourhood, as it did to
communities across the Greater Tokyo Area.

409

Neighbourhood members’

experiences of this disruption were expressed in online media such as Narita’s blog.
Matsumoto Hajime, for example, in a 19 March post on his recycle shop blog, told
the story of what happened when he announced that he would be temporarily closing
his own shop. On hearing the news ‘Motchan’, the manager of another shop in the
Shirōto no Ran network, packed all of his belongings into a truck and left Tokyo
within the hour. He arrived at his family home in Yamanashi Prefecture only to
encounter another large aftershock which shook the telegraph poles. Deciding it was
just as dangerous in Yamanashi as it was in Tokyo, Motchan immediately returned to
the metropolis and re-opened his shop.410 Matsumoto tells the tale with his usual
humour, marvelling at how quickly his friend had packed his things only to return to
Tokyo with such speed. Despite the humorous tone, however, the story gives a sense
of the sense of chaos and confusion which many in the Nantoka Neighbourhood felt
in the days after 3.11.
As I explained in Chapter Two, many events and concerts were cancelled in the days
after 3.11, including in the Nantoka Neighbourhood. In a blog post dated 20 March,
Narita explained that an event which was scheduled to take place at Nantoka Bar
(nantoka bā), one of the Nantoka Neighbourhood shops, had been cancelled. The
event in question was to be hosted by a German activist visitor who is referred to in
the post by the Japanese nickname ‘Nobita’. Nantoka Bar is a small izakaya411
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located in a side street off Kōenji’s Kitanaka Street. It was opened by the Shirōto no
Ran network in 2010 and is staffed on a roster system. Each night a different person
plays host at the bar, often organising the night based around a particular theme.
Narita writes that Nobita’s plan for the night was to play hip hop from around the
world while Narita screened a number of films about street art.412 Friends of the
Shirōto no Ran network from outside the city often take a turn staffing the bar when
they visit Tokyo, providing an opportunity for them to make a little money for their
trip while meeting likeminded people.413 Nobita, however, had evacuated Tokyo for
Osaka immediately after the 3.11 disaster. From there he returned straight to
Germany, apparently following advice from the German embassy and at the urgent
insistence of his family.414 Narita explained on his blog that he still intended to open
the bar without Nobita, depending on the weather. ‘I can’t say to my friends ‘come
drinking’ in the middle of rain which we suspect might be contaminated with
radioactive substances’, he wrote. In the aftermath of the 3.11 disaster, even
something as unremarkable as the rain had the potential to disrupt the rhythms of
daily life.
Connections between people like Narita, who are active in Nantoka Neighbourhood,
and activists from outside Japan like Nobita were activated in the days after the
earthquake. These connections gave people in the Neighbourhood insight into the
very different way in which the nuclear threat was perceived by media organisations
and governments overseas.415 While the Japanese media tended to echo government
claims that the situation at Fukushima was under control, a number of foreign
embassies reacted to the news of radiation leaks from the Fukushima Daiichi plant by
instructing their nationals to evacuate. The United States government advised its

‘21 nichi Nantoka bā [Nantoka Bar on the 21st]’, IRREGULAR RHYTHM ASYLUM, 20 March
2011, accessed 23 February 2015, http://irregularrhythmasylum.blogspot.com.au/2011/03/21.html.
412

413 ‘Nantoka BAR (16 gō ten) [Nantoka Bar (Shop No 16)]’, Shirōto no Ran, accessed 23 February 2015,
http://trio4.nobody.jp/keita/shop/16_nantoka.html.
414

‘21 nichi Nantoka bā.’

On the differences between Japanese and foreign reporting of the nuclear disaster see David McNeill,
‘Them Versus Us: Japanese and International Reporting of the Fukushima Crisis’, in Japan Copes with
Calamity: Ethnographies of the Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Disasters of March 2011 (Oxford: Peter Lang
AG, 2013), 127–149. Matsumoto wrote about the gap between the way the nuclear disaster was reported
in the Japanese and non-Japanese media in ‘Kūzen no chō kyodai demo chikashi!!’
415

107

citizens to remove themselves to a distance of at least 80 kilometres from the plant.
The French went further, suggesting evacuation from a radius of 250 kilometres
around the plant, a distance which would have included Tokyo.416
Narita’s Irregular Rhythm Asylum is particularly well connected with the
international activist scene.417 As explained above, the ‘infoshop’ model on which it
is based comes from global anarchist and punk sub-cultures. As Narita explains, DIY
punk has a rich internal culture in which bands and fans produce their own media,
organise independent concerts, distribute their own music and form their own music
labels. They develop a network which supports the scene and supports individual
members in their pursuit of an alternative lifestyle. These networks have extended
across national borders as punks self-organise tours and distribution.418 Narita has
always sought to foster connections with global activist networks. His infoshop is
listed in a number of international directories of infoshops, such as that maintained
by the publishers of the Slingshot organiser which lists activist centres and infoshops
from around the world.419 Activist ethnographer Higuchi Takurō points out that the
networks of the alter-globalisation movement largely excluded East Asia prior to
2008. This began to change when hundreds of international activists travelled to
Japan to take part in protests against the G8 summit which took place in the northern
Japanese island of Hokkaido that year.420 Irregular Rhythm Asylum in Shinjuku was
the main convergence centre utilised by international activists in Tokyo.421
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These international connections were visible on the Irregular Rhythm Asylum blog in
the days and weeks after 3.11 in the messages of support which Narita received from
activists in Italy,422 Germany423 and the United States.424 Two of these messages
were from Japanese activists who were in the U.S. when the 3.11 disaster occurred,
further demonstrating the connections between the Neighbourhood and broader
global activist networks. In one such post, Narita reflected on a telephone
conversation he had had with a friend in Germany. ‘Mario’ had called Narita urging
him to evacuate Tokyo immediately. Reflecting on his reasons for staying, Narita
wrote sadly that he felt he lacked the courage to leave. He expressed his admiration
for those who were willing to pack up their lives and make the ‘revolutionary’
decision to start a new life elsewhere. As the conversation wore on, however, he
‘began to get annoyed with Mario’s persistent urge to evacuate’. Nevertheless, Narita
was ‘happy that he cared so much about me’. Narita wrote that while he could not
personally bring himself to leave Tokyo, neither could he reassure his loved ones that
‘everything will be all right’ or that there was ‘no need to worry’.425
Non-Japanese residents in Japan, too, responded to the disaster through their
connections with the Neighbourhood. Narita writes about one American who was
living in Japan at the time who came into his shop and spoke regretfully about not
having done more to help the victims of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans in 2005.
This conversation spurred Narita to propose a model of ‘solidarity not charity’ based
on the work of the Common Ground Collective, a grassroots collective which was set
up in New Orleans in response to Katrina.426 His blog provided an online space for
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circulating ideas about an autonomous approach to disaster response. The ideas of
DIY punk culture, through which Narita came to activist politics, inspired some
musicians in Tokyo to organise their own grassroots relief effort. Narita publicised a
call from the ‘Tokyo Band Scene Disaster Relief’ to ‘all our friends in the
underground music scene’ asking for donations of money and supplies. The group
planned to take a truck to Sendai and distribute these goods at a local live music
venue. The text of the call said that as discussions with larger political parties and
non-profit organisations had been too slow they had decided to organise an
independent relief effort. This initiative evolved into the Human Recovery Project,
self-described as a form of ‘d.i.y. music network ‘nobody for everybody’
outreach’.427 The members of the project organised regular shipments of supplies to
the disaster-affected areas of Tōhoku as well as taking part in organising anti-nuclear
demonstrations in Tokyo.
Self-organised disaster relief such as the Human Recovery Project was not the only
way members of the network sought to assist the victims of the disaster in Tōhoku.
In a post on 28 March, Narita confirmed that he had indeed cancelled his appearance
at Nantoka Bar because of the rain. In his stead, Matsumoto Hajime had organised a
‘Solidarity Party’ to raise money for the city of Minamisōma.428 Minamisōma is a
coastal city in Fukushima Prefecture which was one of the areas worst affected by
the 3.11 disaster. The city was severely affected by the earthquake and tsunami as
well as being exposed to radioactive fallout from Fukushima Daiichi. Matsumoto
explained on his blog how the idea for the fundraiser had emerged after he
discovered that Suginami Ward, the Tokyo municipality in which Kōenji is located,
had a sister city relationship with Minamisōma. The money raised from the
‘Solidarity Party’ was to be donated to a fundraising campaign for Minamisōma
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initiated by the Kōenji Shopkeepers Association. 429 The Kōenji Shopkeepers
Association is an umbrella organisation which represents the numerous Shopkeepers
Associations in each shopping street of the Kōenji area. Shopkeepers Associations,
unlike the Nantoka Neighbourhood, are formally constituted bodies. They have
played an important role in organising street festivals and maintaining social order in
post-war Japan. As will be discussed further below, Shirōto no Ran has pursued a
deliberate strategy of building links with established organisations such as local
Shopkeepers Associations as a means of creating space for their radical activities.
The development of these relationships in providing relief to the disaster-affected
areas of Tōhoku also helped to develop the deep relationships which Shirōto no Ran
and the Nantoka Neighbourhood relied upon to draw tens of thousands of people into
the streets for the Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations.

The Shape of the Nantoka Neighbourhood
The Nantoka Neighbourhood is made up of places, people and media which
‘somehow’ (nantoka) coalesce through common concerns with precarity and the
reclamation of space. The appearance of the first issue of tokyo nantoka in January
2009 signified the growing interconnection of a number of activist communities who
shared the ‘nantoka’ ethos. A short message announcing the new publication
appeared on the Japanese social media site Mixi in December 2008.
Well, to put it simply it’s a joint newsletter for Shirōto no Ran, Irregular Rhythm
Asylum, Poetry in the Kitchen, Mosakusha, Kiryūsha and Akane.
As well as information about all the shops in Tokyo which are doing their own thing
(katte na koto o yatteiru) there is also a monthly schedule of events. How
convenient!!
Even if you are from outside Tokyo, if you come to Tokyo, grab a copy and wander
around Tokyo!!430

429 ‘Asu, hisaichi kyūen SOLIPARTY! [Tomorrow, SOLIPARTY for Disaster Relief]’, Shirōto no ran 5 gō
ten tenshu nikki [Shirōto no Ran Shop No 5 Shopkeeper’s Diary], 20 March 2011, accessed 23 February 2015,
http://ameblo.jp/tsukiji14/entry-10836444669.html.
430 ‘“TOKYO nantoka” zōkan!’, mixi komyuniti, 26 December 2008, accessed 17 March 2014,
http://mixi.jp/view_bbs.pl?comm_id=689660&id=38298756.
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The announcement calls into being a community which encompasses some of the
activist spaces which I have discussed thus far: the Shirōto no Ran network and the
Irregular Rhythm Asylum. Mosakusha431 is a bookshop in Shinjuku which is part of
the Nantoka Neighbourhood. Established in 1970 by student activists, Mosakusha is
by far the oldest shop in the network. It carries a wide variety of books, magazines,
self-published zines and other minikomi as well as the newspapers of numerous leftwing groups who are still active in the city. Poetry in the Kitchen is a bar which
moved to Shinjuku as the January 2009 newsletter went to press. After moving it
changed its name to Café Lavanderia, memorialising the shopfront’s previous use as
a laundry (lavanderia is Spanish for laundry). Kiryūsha is a ‘second-hand bookshop
café’ located in the trendy Shimokitazawa district near Shibuya.432 It is a gathering
place for people who are interested in counter-cultural spirituality, psychedelic drugs
and rave culture. Akane is a small bar near Waseda University, one of Tokyo’s
largest private universities. It was established in 1998 and is closely associated with
the precariat activist group Dame Ren.433
The event schedule which was included in this first edition of tokyo nantoka434 gives
an indication of the diverse activities which take place within the community. At
Shirōto no Ran’s various spaces in Kōenji, these included a vegetarian kitchen (Beji
shokudō)435 open every Wednesday, puppet making and sour dough bread making
workshops, a bar called Sepia, the Ōkura kotatsu craft café,436 an ‘Underground
University’437 event called ‘Local Music: From France to Japan’ and an avant-garde
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performance. The Akane listing simply specified the bar’s rotating managers for each
night of the week. At Shinjuku’s Irregular Rhythm Asylum is a weekly sewing circle,
Numan, which is said to operate ‘until the last train’. At Kiryūsha, special events for
the month include an ‘Evening Knowledge Café’, a reading group on Levi-Strauss, a
‘philosopher’s café’ event on Wittgenstein, and ‘MASA’S CAFÉ’.
The map which I reproduced at the beginning of this chapter as Figure 3 was taken
from the April 2011 edition of tokyo nantoka. Reflecting the steady westward march
of the city’s population centre in the twentieth century, most of the shops are located
to the west of the city rather than in the old Edo districts to the east. There is a
concentration of spaces in the Shinjuku ward area, which was a hive of student
radicalism and avant-garde theatre in the 1960s and 1970s.438 Despite the urban
redevelopment that took place in the 1980s, it continues to be an important cultural
hub.
The February 2011 issue of tokyo nantoka, just prior to the 3.11 triple-disaster, shows
how the nantoka kaiwai was spreading out, particularly to the west of the city. In
addition to the spaces listed above, the newsletter now included a small bar called
Grisette in Shinjuku’s ‘Golden City’ (‘goruden gai’), a district packed with tiny bars
which may seat as few as three or four customers. Another space located far to the
west of the city centre in Yaho was Kakekomitei, a small bar in the municipality of
Kunitachi. These spaces and groups have become increasingly inter-connected,
particularly since the movement against the Iraq war in 2003–04. Figure 3 is a map
of tokyo nantoka taken from the first issue of the newsletter. It shows the location of
the shops and spaces in relation both to one another and to the geography of innercity Tokyo.
Each of the shops listed in tokyo nantoka had its own history, community of regular
users and political culture. While Akane, for example, was first established by non-
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sect student activists from Waseda University, 439 Kiryūsha was set up by a
disillusioned designer who was trying to find an alternative to forms of work which,
he felt, only perpetuated the consumer economy.440 Around what, then, does the
Nantoka Neighbourhood coalesce? In her study of activist culture in Okinawa,
Miyume Tanji tried to understand how activists managed to create and sustain a
sense of commonality among the diverse struggles of the Okinawan islanders over a
long period of time.
The many voices of Okinawan protest are bound informally by common values,
shared experiences, and collective memories that lend themselves to the ideas of
continuous struggle and one people. At the same time, however, the meaning of
these values, experiences, and memories is constantly in contention, constantly
undergoing revision and reinterpretation. Among the protesters who share these
common, invisible elements constitute what I call the ‘community of protest’ in
Okinawa. Likewise and accordingly, these common, invisible elements are
sometimes more encompassing and cohesive and sometimes less so, sometimes
more able to outbid competing claims on loyalty and sometimes less so, sometimes
more single-minded and sometimes less so. The ‘community of protest’, however, is
always there, always a virtual presence.441

The Nantoka Neighbourhood appears bound together in a similar fashion by a set of
‘common values, shared experiences, and collective memories’. One of these
‘common values’ was the notion of ‘doing your own thing’ (katte na koto o yatteiru)
which was mentioned in the original announcement in Mixi. To ‘do one’s own thing’
is to act freely, wilfully and without authorisation. The adjective ‘katte’ which is
used here means ‘one’s own convenience’ or ‘one’s own way’. It also has the sense
of unauthorised or unofficial activity. In an editorial column in the first issue of tokyo
nantoka, Shirōto no Ran’s Matsumoto Hajime also uses ‘katte’ to describe the people
who operate the shops in the Nantoka Neighbourhood. They are ‘katte na yatsura’
(‘rebellious types’ or ‘the type who do their own thing’) he writes, highlighting the
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values of rebelliousness and spontaneity which run through the Neighbourhood.442
The word yatsura (guys/types) is an informal and even derogatory term which is
used here in a way which highlights the casual nature and rebellious attitudes which
characterise the network members and their activities. Like the word yabai, which
literally means terrible, awful or dangerous but is used colloquially to mean
something akin to the English slang ‘sick’ (meaning good), yatsura, when used
among friends, reflects a joking familiarity and closeness that is expressed through
playful linguistic games involving put-downs and mock disrespect.
As a means of characterising the network’s constituency the term katte na yatsura is
‘baggy’ just like the composition of the sound demonstrations discussed in Chapter
Two. Rap pioneer and anti-war activist ECD composed ‘Iu koto kiku yo na yatsura
janai zo’ 443 in response to two arrests which occurred at a sound demonstration in
Shibuya in July 2004.444 Sharon Hayashi and Anne McKnight translate the title of
the rap as ‘Us Guys Don’t Just Do as We’re Told’. The term ‘yatsura’ (‘guys’) was
used in the song to describe the rebellious community which ECD felt was
converging around the anti-war sound demonstrations in 2004. Hayashi and
McKnight suggest that the song ‘create[s] and make[s] an invitation to a rhetorical
community (‘us guys’) that calls out an anti-Ishihara/anti-Koizumi platform and
becomes an activist community working to reclaim public space and its terms of
occupation’.445 The notion of a rebellious community opposed to the policies of then
Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō and Tokyo Governor Ishihara Shintarō has
clearly played a role in formulating a nantoka (‘somehow’) community among
precarity activists in Tokyo. The song became something of an anthem for the
precarity movement in the mid-2000s. In 2007, for example, ECD performed the
song as part of the Kōenji Ikki, Matsumoto’s spoof election campaign for the
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Suginami ward council discussed in Chapter Two.446 The publication of the tokyo
nantoka newsletter in print and online provided a medium for coordinating the
activity of the ‘rebellious types’ in the Neighbourhood.
With the announcement of the launch of tokyo nantoka, the editors envisioned a
community based in Tokyo which extended well beyond the boundaries of the city.
The announcement suggests a kind of radical alternative to the usual tourist routes
where visitors to the capital might connect with the city’s underground culture, rather
than simply visiting landmarks like the Imperial palace or Tokyo Tower. The
announcement goes on to list a number of underground spaces in Fukuoka, Nagoya,
Nara, Nagano, Osaka, Kyoto, Hiroshima, Kokura and Kagoshima where the
publication might be available (though no guarantees are made!), evoking a much
broader radical network that spans the archipelago rather than being limited to the
capital. Groups like Shirōto no Ran have been building these networks since their
inception, often building on earlier networks such as Mosakusha’s national network
and the network of campus activists discussed above. The group has opened Shirōto
no Ran shops in Kyoto as well as maintaining links with fellow travellers across
Japan. Matsumoto, for example, describes the Hiroshima record shop Sharevari in
Counter-Attack of the Poor and suggests that the poor need to build networks across
the country so they can travel and share experiences without spending money.447
The networks of tokyo nantoka are not limited to Japan. They extend to many of the
world’s major cities. The creation of the tokyo nantoka newsletter itself was partly
inspired by the growing links between members of the nantoka kaiwai and the urban
insurrections that are taking place throughout the world’s major cities. In the first
issue of tokyo nantoka Matsumoto describes how the idea for the newsletter
originated during his visit to Germany in 2007 where such free papers listing all the
alternative ‘hot spots’ in Berlin already existed. He explains how the paper lists
alternative spaces, events, demonstrations and places which serve meals. With a
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guide such as this, he enthuses, ‘you can wander around the city without ever having
to consume at the rip-off merchants’. Similarly, he hopes that with tokyo nantoka in
hand one can encounter the manuke toshi (‘fool’s city’) without spending a lot of
money.448

Nantoka Media
While the internet has transformed political organising, the rich print media produced
in the Nantoka Neighbourhood attests to the continuing political importance of
physical artefacts in the internet age. tokyo nantoka is one publication in a dazzling
array of print leaflets, ‘what’s on’ style guides, zines and other media which
represent the geography of Tokyo’s precariat and anti-nuclear movements in print.
These underground media, referred to in Japanese as minikomi,449 have long played
an important role in bridging the gap between radical spaces, individual activists and
events like street protests and rallies. Vera Mackie describes the important role the
diverse minikomi of the feminist movement played in communicating feminist ideas
in the 1980s and early 1990s.450
The relationship between print and electronic publications is a dynamic one. The
original announcement of tokyo nantoka quoted above spoke to the do-it-yourself
ethic of the tokyo nantoka community by highlighting the problems of print and
distribution faced by a small underground cultural community. Electronic
distribution can facilitate the diffusion of print media. Readers of tokyo nantoka were
encouraged to download and print out copies of the guide from the web. The file was
formatted for ease of printing so that it could be printed on a double-sided A3 page
and folded in four to produce the publication. Only some issues of tokyo nantoka
became available online, however. In a Neighbourhood which only ‘somehow’ sticks
together ephemerality is to be expected. Speaking of the feminist minikomi of the
early 1990s, Mackie describes ‘the blurring of public and private concerns’, stories
of ‘personal difficulties’ experienced by the producers of minikomi in the texts
Matsumoto, ‘U~n, benri na mono ga dekiteshimatta! [Yes, We’ve Gone and Created Something
Handy!].’
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themselves and the hard work involved in producing regular publications, resulting at
times in interrupted printing schedules and ‘ephemerality’.451 These are all features
of contemporary activist minikomi like tokyo nantoka.
The activist spaces which are connected through tokyo nantoka also act as
distribution points for the newsletter. Mackie explains how spaces such as
Mosakusha have long served as central hubs for the distribution of underground
media. 452 This continues today, through the various spaces associated with the
Nantoka Neighbourhood. Narita’s IRA serves a similar function. He describes his
infoshop as ‘the international version’ of Mosakusha.453 The shop carries minikomi,
books, T-shirts and other materials produced and distributed in the global activist
‘neighbourhood’. I used the Nantoka Neighbourhood’s function as a distribution
network for activist media myself when I collected copies of tokyo nantoka from
Mosakusha, Irregular Rhythm Asylum and Kiryūsha during my visits to Tokyo. The
overlapping of digital and print media with physical distribution networks helps
create the sense of an interconnected Nantoka Neighbourhood which is ‘somehow’
continuous across different kinds of physical and representational space.
The newsletters always included a map of the Nantoka Neighbourhood which
showed where each of the activist spaces was located with regard to the broader
geography of Tokyo. Figure 3 at the beginning of this chapter is one such map. The
inclusion of a map of the physical space inhabited by the Nantoka Neighbourhood
made this claim to a ‘somehow’ community more tangible. Artist and cartographer
Denis Wood argues that maps should be thought of not as representations of space
but rather as performative objects which create the places which they predict. The
maps which are created by the state, he explains, ‘perform the shape of statehood’.454
The maps included in the Tokyo Nantoka newsletter have a different function. Unlike
official state maps their purpose is not to provide a definitive shape of an ephemeral
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‘somehow’ community. The maps have the practical function of helping people find
the small activist spaces within the Neighbourhood. Beyond this, however, they seem
to have a representational function which invites readers to step down the rabbit hole
and into the world of alternative spaces which lie beneath the streets. The maps are
performative in the sense used by Wood here. They call into being a sense of the
Neighbourhood which goes beyond the individual shops and bars within it,
something which appears as more than the sum of its individual parts.
Images such as these maps in tokyo nantoka can be thought of as a kind of
representational space in the sense discussed by Henri Lefebvre. Representational
space, Lefebvre explained, ‘is the dominated—and hence passively experienced—
space which the imagination seeks to change and appropriate. It overlays physical
space, making symbolic use of its objects’. 455 The images and symbols which
appeared in tokyo nantoka often caricatured symbolic representations of state power
in Tokyo. Figure 4 below is an example of this kind of representational détournement
of urban space. The imposing twin towers of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government
building in Shinjuku is one of the most potent symbols of the project of urban
restructuring I discussed in Chapter One as ‘World City Tokyo’. In Figure 4 a
silhouette of the towers, which appears on the front cover of tokyo nantoka, is
superimposed with the English word ‘Burn!!’
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Figure 4 Silhouette of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government Building on the
cover of tokyo nantoka, January, 2009.

The Tokyo Metropolitan Government building was designed by architect Tange
Kenzō (1913–2005) and completed under the administration of Tokyo Governor
Suzuki Shun’ichi (1910–2010) in March 1991. For Lefebvre the work of architects
and town planners contributed to the production of ‘representations of space’. Such
representations of space, he maintained, are ‘the dominant space in any society (or
mode of production)’.456
They intervene in and modify spatial textures which are informed by effective
knowledge and ideology. Representations of space must therefore have a substantial
role and a specific influence in the production of space. Their intervention occurs by
way of construction—in other words, by way of architecture, conceived of not as the
building of a particular structure, palace or monument, but rather as a project
embedded in a spatial context and a texture which calls for ‘representations’ that will
not vanish into the symbolic or imaginary realms.457

Tange’s architecture played an important part in the creation of ‘representations of
space’ in post-war Japan. He designed the 1964 Olympic stadium and the Hiroshima
Peace Memorial, places which, like the Tokyo Metropolitan Government building,
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projected state-sanctioned images of the kind of Japan elites wanted to build in the
post-war. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government building is a potent symbol of
municipal, and particularly gubernatorial power. Less a building than ‘a city in its
own right’ the Tokyo Metropolitan Government ‘is a fortress of government
authority and administrative power’.458 Its fortress-like appearance is reinforced by
the design of the base of the main tower, made with finely cut granite ‘with the slight
hint of curvature and inward slope which is characteristic of Japanese castle
architecture’. 459 Suzuki, who held office between 1979 and 1994, was ‘the
consummate manager for the capital city as ‘growth machine’ of a developmental
state’. 460 A heavyweight in the LDP, Suzuki had a long track record staging
spectacles. He was largely responsible for overseeing the Tokyo Olympics and was
secretary general in charge of the Osaka World Expo of 1970.461 He also worked
with Tange on both these projects. The supreme power of the Tokyo governor within
the metropolitan government is reflected in the design of the governor’s office itself
which extends across the entire width of Tower I and occupies an area of 195,000
square metres, projecting beyond the exterior walls of the surrounding tower on both
sides, gazing out over the plaza below in a manner which William Coaldrake
compares with ‘the habit of medieval lords in Europe of placing their personal suites
over the main entrances to their castles for better control and supervisory
purposes’.462 The image in Figure 4 overlays a kind of ‘representational space’ of
revolutionary desire over this symbol of technocratic authority.
Another symbol of state power détourned in the first issue of tokyo nantoka is the
Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department’s mascot ‘Piipo-kun’. Piipo-kun is a cute
character whose features are based on a number of animals. He has large ears to
‘hear the voices of the citizenry’, an antenna so he can ‘catch quickly the movement
of society’ and large eyes which enable him ‘to see into every corner of society’.
Created in 1987, Piipo-kun was given his name based on the first two letters of the
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English loan words piipuru (people) and (porisu) symbolising his role as a ‘mediator
between the people and the Metropolitan Police Department’. The image in tokyo
nantoka, however, subverts this helpful image. A bold black line appears over Piipokun’s eyes, giving an aura of impropriety or criminality to a figure which is designed
to soften the image of the police.463 Next to the mascot appear the words ‘Police is
[sic] not our friend’ written in English. To the left of this figure is another spoof. In
this silhouette a policeman is bending down to talk to a little boy. Rather than
listening attentively, however, the little boy is giving him the finger. These images
were part of an article advising readers of their right to refuse police questioning. At
the bottom of the article is the contact information for the Kyūen Renraku Sentā
(Kyūen). Kyūen is an activist legal centre which was established in the late 1960s to
provide legal support to anyone who is ‘oppressed by the state’ regardless of their
ideological affiliation or group membership. 464 If this image of the Tokyo
Metropolitan Government building represents the city which the katte na yatsura
want to (figuratively) ‘burn’ down, their network of radical spaces constitutes an
alternative set of spatial practices, a ‘katte na’ urbanism that is posed against the
capitalist city.

The Neighbourhood against Nuclear Power
On 26 March, less than two weeks after 3.11, Narita’s blog carried the first post
containing details of an upcoming anti-nuclear demonstration. The Ginza
Demo/Parade was organised by a group which had been campaigning for a long time
against the construction of a nuclear waste reprocessing facility in Rokkasho Village
in the northernmost part of Tōhoku.465 This group was not closely associated with the

463 A black line over the eyes is used to obscure the identity of underage suspects in criminal cases and in
adult print and online literature to suggest that, for some reason, the performer is unable to reveal their
identity. See ‘Mesen/kuro mesen [Line Over the Eyes/Black Line Over the Eyes]’, Dōjin yōgo no kiso
chishiki [Basic Knowledge of Fandom Jargon], 20 March 2004, accessed 8 June 2015,
http://www.paradisearmy.com/doujin/pasok_mesen.htm.
464 Patricia G. Steinhoff, ‘No Helmets in Court, No T-Shirts on Death Row: New Left Trial Support
Groups’, in Going to Court to Change Japan: Social Movements and the Law in Contemporary Japan, ed. Patricia G.
Steinhoff (Ann Arbor: Center for Japanese Studies, 2014), 21.
465 ‘Hangenpatsu, Ginza Demo, Parade [No Nukes: Ginza Demonstration/Parade]’, IRREGULAR
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26
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2011,
accessed
23
February
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http://irregularrhythmasylum.blogspot.com.au/2011/03/blog-post_26.html. Rokkashomura is a village
in Aomori, the northermost prefecture in the Tōhoku region. It is the site of the Rokkasho Nuclear Fuel
Reprocessing Facility, a large reprocessing plant which has yet to commence operations. The facility has
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Nantoka Neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the appearance of the post on Narita’s blog
shows how blurry the boundaries between activist groups are.
The Nantoka Neighbourhood’s international connections also supported the
organisation of the Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations. On 27 March, Matsumoto
updated his blog with a post about a countrywide series of anti-nuclear
demonstrations in Germany which had occurred the previous day. ‘Those Germans
are quick!’ he quipped, adding that ‘we had better do something in Tokyo as well’.466
A few days later the Irregular Rhythm Asylum blog confirmed that the
Neighbourhood had begun to prepare their own protest march against nuclear power.
On 2 April, Narita’s blog carried a graphic which utilised DIY punk imagery and
references to seminal DIY punk band Crass. The graphic contained the words
‘Genpatsu nashi de Crass’ (Crass without Nuclear Power), a pun which plays on the
fact that the Japanese pronunciation of the band’s name (kurasu) is the same as a
Japanese word, ‘kurasu’, which means ‘to carry out one’s life’. ‘I don’t have much
time for myself or for this site. But anyhow, let’s go to Kōenji on 10 April!’ Narita
wrote under the graphic, affixing a link to the Tumblr page for the first Genpatsu
Yamero demonstration on 10 April.
On 13 April Narita updated his blog with a report about the Genpatsu Yamero
demonstration, writing ‘while I’ve been putting up a huge number of blog posts I
noticed that I haven’t updated my own website or blog at all. No good!’ The report
was illustrated with pictures and YouTube videos documenting the demonstration.
The report included a link to a page on the Genpatsu Yamero website containing
videos and photographs of solidarity actions in other cities. Narita mentions
‘Kamakura, Montreal and Berlin’ as his favourites, indicating the global imaginary
of the Nantoka Neighbourhood.467
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One week after the April Genpatsu Yamero demonstration, the April issue of tokyo
nantoka appeared on the Irregular Rhythm Asylum blog. 468 This issue, Narita
explains, was produced for the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration. It featured a front
cover which screamed ‘Hey! Was it all a lie?’ along with a picture of a kitten. The
caption below the picture reads ‘Kinako-san, who was born under an old building in
Shinjuku’s second district is also shocked’. The image, with its suggestion that a
stray kitten might have an opinion on the Fukushima disaster, is ridiculous. Yet this
idiosyncratic humour typifies the visual language of the Nantoka Neighbourhood.
Perhaps the kitten symbolises the innocent belief in the safety of nuclear power
which many people shared prior to 3.11. The alleged birthplace of the kitten – born
in the interstices beneath the neon lights of Shinjuku which are powered by nuclear
energy – seems to symbolise the birthplace of the urban precariat.
On the inside of the newsletter is a page reproducing some of the anti-nuclear
iconography from the 10 April Genpatsu Yamero demonstration website. The April
issue also makes reference to the growing number of Tokyo residents evacuating the
city to escape the effects of radiation. On one page of the newsletter is a directory of
activist spaces, bookshops, cafes and bars across Japan which might be of interest to
people in the Nantoka Neighbourhood. Amidst the growing fears of radioactive
contamination a message above the directory contains an ominous warning.
Those of you who usually wander around Tokyo, those who were shocked by the
explosion at the nuclear power plant and have already escaped to the west or even
those who will be running here and there if something happens at the Monju reactor,
you will probably have more opportunities to wander around Japan.469

During my time as a research student at Hitotsubashi University from October 2011 I
went for a drink at a bar in Kōenji where I was given the flier reproduced here as
Figure 5 for an event at Akane, the small bar near Waseda University area which is
part of the Nantoka Neighbourhood. Waseda University is one of the most
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prestigious of the private universities in the capital and the area surrounding it is
home to many students, cheap eateries and bookshops. The flier is a simple black and
white photocopy which could easily have been produced on the cheap coin-operated
photocopiers/printers which are widely available at convenience stores. The ready
availability of these photocopiers has been a boon to social movements in Tokyo.

Figure 5 Flier for an Event at Akane.

The flier parodied the style of the wanted posters which can be found on the
noticeboards outside police boxes and in railway stations all over Japan. These
posters commonly feature the faces of former New Left student activists from the
1970s who are accused of terrorism offences. As I discussed in Chapter Two,
memories of the New Left are frequently associated with the violence of groups like
the Japanese Red Army who conducted a number of very public hijackings, robberies
and murders. Another group who typically feature on wanted posters are members of
the religious sect Aum Tenrikyo. The group conducted the well-known sarin gas
attacks in the Tokyo subway system in the 1990s among a host of other murderous
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acts.470 Rather than long-missing student terrorists, however, Akane’s flier features
the faces of a number of senior politicians and capitalists. The role of each in the
development of the Japanese nuclear industry is summarised in a small text box
below each picture. Their names are given in large Chinese characters above each
face. The Chinese characters used in Japanese names can be difficult to read, even
for native speakers. On wanted posters and other public announcements such as
election posters, difficult to pronounce names are often surtitled with their
pronunciation using the Japanese syllabic alphabet. In keeping with this official style,
the flier follows this convention.
Across the top of Akane’s flier is a headline which reads ‘Indiscriminate Radiation
Terrorist Organisation’ (‘hōshanō musabetsu tero soshiki’). The descriptions
‘indiscriminate killing’ and ‘terror’ are keywords found on the wanted posters for
left-wing terrorists. By using this language, the pamphlet’s author clearly expresses a
view of the actions carried out by the nominally respectable characters whose mug
shots appear in the central panels below. The pamphlet identifies the intelligence
connections between some of the figures displayed and key institutions of the United
States government, including the Central Intelligence Agency, by describing them as
‘Covert Operatives Supporting Nuclear Power’. In the top left corner of the pamphlet
is the word ‘extremist’ which is another word typically used on the wanted posters
for New Left activists. Above the word ‘extremist’ is the word ‘nuclear interests’ and
below ‘a group of radioactive exposure murderers’. Below these dire
pronouncements a touch of humour ‘Ah! I’ve seen him on TV!!’ playfully implies
that those who appear on television as respectable politicians and business people are
actually criminals with links to a shadowy gang of international nuclear terrorists.
The figures represented in the lower half of the flier are key figures in the nuclear
village. They are individuals whom anti-nuclear activists blame for the proliferation
of an unsafe nuclear industry in Japan. Many of them played major roles in
introducing nuclear power to Japan and co-operated closely with U.S. interests. First
on the list is Shōriki Matsutarō whose face is marked ‘shibō’ (‘dead’). He is the only
470 On the memories of Aum see Mark Pendleton, ‘Sarin Traces: Memory Texts and Practices in Postwar
Japan, 1995-2010’ (doctoral dissertation, University of Melbourne, 2011).
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deceased member of this ‘radioactive indiscriminate terrorist organisation’. The
remainder are very much alive and continue to advocate for nuclear power even after
Fukushima. Shōriki is described as an indicted Class A war criminal and a C.I.A.
agent, an accusation for which substantial evidence has come to light.471 Below
Shōriki’s mugshot the pamphlet alleges that Shōriki secured his release from prison
through his dealings with the C.I.A.. Shōriki is also described as the ‘father of
professional baseball’, the ‘father of broadcasting’ and the ‘father of nuclear power’.
His media and communications empire played a key role in the promotion of nuclear
energy technology in Japan in the early post-war period.472 Next to Shōriki is a
politician whose own connection with the United States government was strong,
former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. It was Nakasone who first proposed that
the Diet support a budget for the establishment of nuclear power research in 1950.
The pamphlet accuses him of being the principal culprit responsible for starting
nuclear power as public policy. Furthermore, the pamphlet noted that Nakasone’s
support for nuclear power has been unwavering, even after the Fukushima accident.
The flier represents an alternative history of nuclear power. It demonstrates a deep
understanding of the shadowy connections between U.S. and Japanese officials
which facilitated the development of the nuclear power industry in post-war Japan.
At the same time, the pamphlet advertises a specific event, a free talk at the Akane.
Beside the address for the Akane bar in Waseda, Shinjuku ward, in the bottom right
of the pamphlet is another picture: Piipo-kun, the Tokyo Metropolitan Police mascot
discussed in the previous section.
In the description of Akane as a ‘gekiretsu kōryū supēsu’ (extreme commingling
space) on the flier, the creator appropriates the label ‘extreme’. The word ‘gekiretsu’
(extreme) overlaps with the word ‘kagekiha’ (extremist group) which is often applied
to left wing groups on wanted posters and in general parlance. Reclaiming and
subverting the notion of ‘extremism, the description on the pamphlet suggests that
taking part in the event will involve more than simply absorbing information about
471 Tessa Morris-Suzuki, ‘The CIA and the Japanese Media: A Cautionary Tale.’, Pearls and Irritations: John
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the history of nuclear power and its imbrication with conservative politics in Japan,
but an opportunity to communicate with others in a ‘extreme’ way. Akane is
managed by people who were part of the Dameren circle. Formed by students and
freeters

in

the

1990s,

Dameren

emphasised

the

importance

of

honest

communication.473 Rather than organising street protests the group tried to facilitate
‘intercourse’ (‘kōryū’) by holding discussions and developing and maintaining
relationships.
The notion of ‘intercourse’ is an important one in the Nantoka Neighbourhood, partly
due to the influence of Dameren. This notion goes back further, however, Gomi
Masahiko from the bookshop Mosakusha in Shinjuku describes the bookshop as ‘a
place (basho) for people to gather, to debate, to rest and to interact (kōryū)’.474
Mosakusha’s origins are in the New Left student culture of the late 1960s. It was
established in 1970 after the repression of major student occupations on University
campuses such as the University of Tokyo, had been broken up by police. With
large-scale occupations coming under increasing pressure, the establishment of
Mosakusha in a legally rented building enabled the New Left culture to continue to
grow and network. Gomi describes how, in the early days, Mosakusha had extensive
kōryū with the tent-theatre movement, with producers of minikomi all over Japan,
with independent film producers and with the folk music scene. As a centre for the
distribution of minikomi, Mosakusha also maintained communication with similar
spaces that were cropping up all over the country. Gomi explains how this nationwide network was conceived at the time not in terms of the yet-to-be-introduced
Japanese transliteration of the English network (nettowāku) but with the similar,
indigenous term ami no me (mesh).475
These practices of ‘intercourse’, both in physical activist spaces and through the
sharing of minikomi, enabled the Nantoka Neighbourhood to develop and grow.
After the 3.11 disaster, this existing infrastructure facilitated the development of the
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anti-nuclear movement. As activists responded to contemporary events, they
continued to dialogue with the memories of New Left activism preserved in images
and spaces like Mosakusha. By questioning who the real ‘extremists’ are the Akane
flier suggested that a different memory of the New Left and a different conception of
activism might be possible.

Everyday Life as a Place for Politics
In the interview with Tokyo Timeout discussed in the Chapter Two, Matsumoto
Hajime was asked why the April Genpatsu Yamero demonstration would be held in
Kōenji rather than ‘somewhere that forces TEPCO to see it’? 476 Matsumoto’s
response reveals an important aspect of the group’s relationship to urban space.
This demonstration was planned by a number of people who live and work in Kōenji.
The crisis is casting a shadow over the safety of our livelihoods, so I think it’s
natural to raise our voices from the place where we live (seikatsu no ba).477

This notion of doing politics in the ‘place where we live’ is central to the praxis of
Shirōto no Ran. The group’s success in creating a network which encompasses work,
play and political activism came into clear view with the April 2011 demonstration
which brought 15,000 people into the streets of Kōenji.
The Japanese word seikatsu is a combination of two Chinese characters ‘sei’
meaning life and ‘katsu’ meaning ‘to activate’ or ‘to live’. Seikatsu refers to the
activity which makes up our lives. In everyday use it can refer to the rhythms of daily
activity which make up our lives but it is often used in the more specific sense of
earning a livelihood. Matsumoto has always been concerned with the political
significance of the quotidian. As a university student at Hōsei University in the
1990s he became involved in struggles over access to and control of the physical
space of the campus itself. Japan’s university campuses were key sites of student
movement organising in the 1960s and 1970s. Largely as a result of those struggles
many university campuses had self-governing student dormitories, clubhouses and
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cultural facilities which provided an infrastructure for autonomous activism and
musical culture well into the 1990s. Hōsei University, for example, was famous
among students and music lovers across Japan for its student-run Culture Hall which
hosted many concerts featuring underground Japanese bands.
In the 1990s, however, when Matsumoto entered Hōsei as an undergraduate student,
the student-managed spaces at many universities were under threat. Universities
across the country were under pressure to restructure their campuses so as to increase
the space available for capital accumulation as the ‘internationalisation’ I discussed
in Chapter One forced them to adopt a neoliberal approach. This process intensified
after 1997 when Japanese government education policies encouraged Japan’s
national universities to become Independent Administrative Institutions (dokuritsu
gyōsei hōjin). With the advance of neoliberal managerialism as an ideology within
the universities, university managements across the country struggled to take back
control of these spaces from students, converting them into university-managed
facilities or commercial outlets. This was a trend seen around the world.478 Selfgoverning dormitories at the University of Tokyo and at Yamagata University in the
Tōhoku region, for example, and many of the student self-governing spaces on
university campuses, such as the Komaba dormitory at the University of Tokyo, were
demolished. 479 At Hōsei University, one such struggle erupted over university
management’s move to increase prices in the student canteen. Spatial practices
employed by the movement included organising ‘hot pot parties’ in the university
grounds. Sharing food and drink are central to Matsumoto’s understanding of how to
create communities of resistance because this is a practice grounded not in grand
theory but in everyday life.480

At my own alma mater, the University of Wollongong struggles to defend student-controlled spaces
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once a free student lounge and Student Representative Council controlled organising space in the
university’s Union building is now occupied by a number of retail food outlets.
478

Komaba ryō sonzoku o shien suru kai [committee to Support the Continued Existence of the Komaba
Dormitory], ‘Komaba ryō o kangaeru [Thinking About Komaba Dormitory]’, Gendai shisō [Contemporary
Thought] 25, no 5 (1997): 144–156.
479

480

Matsumoto, Binbōjin dai hanran, 26–75.

130

In 2001, Shirōto no Ran activist Matsumoto was arrested and thrown out of Hōsei
University due to his involvement in a student protest during which paint was thrown
over university officials and guests. After having working in the second-hand
business for a number of years Matsumoto established his recycle shop in Kitanaka
Street, Kōenji. Like the universities, small shopping streets like Kitanaka Street were
facing intense pressure as Tokyo was ‘internationalised’ and corporate-friendly
policies were implemented. Kanezawa Seiichi, citing data from the Statistical Bureau
of Japan’s ‘Labour Force Survey’, explains that the number of self-employed persons
and those working in family businesses, which had reached 9.76 million in 1972 and
10.52 million in 1980, had declined to 6.72 million by 2006. He identifies the
deregulation of the large retail sector as a primary factor in the decline in the number
of people who are self-employed. Deregulation of the large retailers was
implemented following pressure from the United States as part of the bilateral
Structural Impediments Initiative agreement of 1990. This eventually led to the
scrapping of the 1972 Large-scale Retail Store Law (Dai kibo shōbai tenpo hō) and
its replacement in 2000 by the Large-scale Retail Location Law (Dai kibo shōbai
tenpo ricchi hō). These laws facilitated the development of large retail stores, often
international chains. Large retailers also changed their strategy for locating large
stores by shifting from the centre of cities to the outskirts. Large general
supermarkets and shopping centres began to increase on the periphery of cities while
existing central shopping streets were hollowed out, resulting in the creation of
‘shuttered streets’ (shattā dōri).481
In response to these pressures, local shopkeepers’ associations have adopted a variety
of strategies to try and maintain their livelihoods and the cultural traditions of
neighbourhoods centred on the local shopping street.482 In Kōenji, the Kitanaka street
shopkeepers’ association was concerned that their small shopping street (shōtengai)
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was in danger of being redeveloped into a residential area. Members of Kōenji’s
Kitanaka Street shopkeepers’ association decided that they should try and get some
young people in to occupy some of the vacant shops in the street. Matsumoto was put
in contact with the shopkeepers association by a friend in the area.483 The experiment
was very successful. By January 2011 there were seven Shirōto no Ran shops
operating in the Kōenji district, and one in the neighbouring district of Asagaya.484
In Counter-Attack of the Poor, Matsumoto advocates the tactical creation of
autonomous zones in the city as part of a broader strategy of liberation from
inequitable wage-slavery. Matsumoto explains how his ‘Unrivalled City-wide Grand
Strategy’ might create a zone where the urban poor can live independently of the
‘bottakuri keizai’ (rip-off economy).
I want to devise a means of creating a space (kūkan) where it is easy to live (seikatsu
shiyasui) in the broadest sense, encompassing personal connections and the local
area. This is an area-wide self-sufficiency strategy for all the poor. Wow! To put it
another way, if we can devise an amazing fools-area (manuke eria) in which places
of work, of play and housing are lumped together then we wouldn’t have any reason
to be afraid.485

Yamashita Hikaru, who co-founded the first Shirōto no Ran shop with Matsumoto,
came to Kōenji as an 18-year-old and supported himself with part-time employment
while he tried to work out what he wanted to do. Having already developed a
fondness for the area, Yamashita describes how, while he worked part-time, he
developed ‘the feeling that I wanted to do something here’.486 As labour sociologist
Kosugi Reiko has observed, many freeters talk about their decision not to seek fulltime work in terms of having ‘something they want to do’ (yaritai koto). Working
part-time while working towards some artistic or creative project is a common
pattern for freeters. 487 He started a kind of informal gathering, later known as
Matsumoto Hajime, ‘Dai 1 kai “Nobi nobi daisakusen no hajimari hajimari ~!” [No 1 The Carefree
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Bashoppu, outside the McDonalds next to Kōenji station. Bashoppu was a ‘shop’
(shoppu) with no physical shop and no buying or selling. Instead it was a gathering
of 20–30 year olds who used the road ‘just like a salon’. This project was only one of
a number of small underground projects attempting to create some kind of ‘free
space’ in the Kōenji area. Yamashita met Matsumoto Hajime while he was operating
numerous small business ventures where he tried to make money by selling comic
books gathered from people’s rubbish piles or selling second hand clothing.488
These ‘free space’ projects provided a space for intercourse between likeminded
individuals and groups. It was in one such free space, the Oku garō art gallery in
Kōenji, that Yamashita encountered members of the freeter network Dameren. At
Shinjuku’s minikomi distributor Mosakusha, Yamashita first came across
Matsumoto’s work when he picked up a copy of the Binbōnin Shimbun (Pauper’s
Newspaper), which he found particularly engaging. The newspaper, which
Matsumoto put out as part of his activities with the group Binbōnin Daihanran
(Great Pauper Rebellion), sought to appeal to freeters. Yamashita recalls how he
came across an issue of the paper in the basket on his bicycle. It called on ‘Ladies
and Gentlemen, you who are regular subscribers to [employment classifieds paper]
Furomu A, there is nothing left but to riot!’.489 It was in the pages of Furomu A that
the term freeter first appeared in the 1980s, in its section advertising casual part-time
employment.490
Shirōto no Ran developed a political strategy based on building connections in their
local community. This strategy has not changed fundamentally since 3.11. Rather,
the basis of community organising enabled the group to organise its successful
Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations. Futatsugi Shin expressed this idea in the quotation
cited in the epigraph to this chapter.
Just as we’ve been doing up until now we will create community, maintain a ‘place’
where people can connect. Then when things turn sour they can help one another.
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This way of doing things will not change whether before or after the earthquake
disaster.491

Since its establishment in 2005 the group has not only organised demonstrations but
has also become involved with the local shopkeepers association and the flea markets
and festivals which take place in Kitanaka Street. I experienced this connection firsthand when I was working in Japan as an English teacher at the time of the anti-G8
summit demonstrations in 2008. I received an email sent to international activists
asking for people to help out with the Kitanaka Street shopkeepers association
festival as part of Shirōto no Ran’s efforts to improve relations with the local
shopkeepers. Relations had become strained, I was informed at the time, due to the
influx of large numbers of radical activists from abroad whose presence had caused a
degree of tension between activists and the local community.
In his Magazine 9 column on the April 2011 Genpatsu Yamero demonstration in
Kōenji, Matsumoto Hajime refers to the ever-present potential for conflict to arise
between activists and shopkeepers in such a tight-knit community. He jokes that after
the demonstration he spotted the ‘big boss’ of all the Kōenji shopkeepers
associations eyeing him sternly from the corner of the station plaza. Writing about
this encounter in his online Colum at Magajin 9 he feigned concern that the
association boss might be angry about the disturbance caused by the demonstration.
‘Oh no! Am I going to get a good scolding?’ He goes on to suggest, however, that
any tensions caused by the carnivalesque demonstration might be resolved by his
helping out with the local festival. ‘If I annoy the big boss then I might be press
ganged into helping with the Bon odori492 or some shopkeepers’ association event’,
Matsumoto mused. This so-called ‘punishment’ for breaching the peace of the
community Matsumoto positions parenthetically that ‘actually that could be kind of
fun’. When Matsumoto approached the ‘big boss’ he did not receive a reprimand,
however, but was simply asked to keep things under control. The ‘big boss’ even
offered to accompany the demonstrators in the shopkeepers’ association’s own truck
491 Futatsugi, ‘Interview by Kodama Yūdai. Teikō to risei no hazama de [The Interval Between Resistance
and Reason]’, 123.

Bon Odori is a traditional Japanese dance performed during the summer festival of Obon. The Bon
Odori which is performed in Kōenji is the Awa Odori, a traditional dance of the Tokushima region of the
island of Shikoku.
492
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to Tōhoku to help distribute the donations which had been raised during the
demonstration.493 It seems unlikely that relations between an insurgent group of
activists and the established shopkeepers association always proceed as smoothly as
Matsumoto alludes to here. Matsumoto’s description emphasises the need to
constantly negotiate this relationship in order to create space in the area for political
protest.
In his ethnography of a Tokyo neighbourhood anthropologist Theodore Bestor has
described the important role festivals play in the maintenance of the local social
order.494 Shirōto no Ran, as its name (Amateur Revolt) clearly states, explicitly seeks
to disrupt the social order by staging its own festive protests and establishing
autonomous spaces for activism and counter-cultural dissent within the local
community. Their strategy, Matsumoto explains, is to try to resolve this implicit
tension by carrying out their revolt with the local community. The development of
ties to the local social order – such as by participating in the festive life of the
community – is a way of reconciling some of the tensions between their disruptive
and constitutive practices.
The connections which Shirōto no Ran had already developed with local groups such
as the shopkeepers association prior to the Fukushima nuclear disaster smoothed the
way for them to organise the large 10 April 2011 Genpatsu Yamero demonstration.
This strategy for protest rooted in the local community would again inform
Matsumoto’s own involvement in the Datsu-genpatsu Suginami anti-nuclear
demonstrations which also took place in Suginami ward in early 2012. Even when
major demonstrations outside the Prime Minister’s residence (to be discussed below)
reached their peak in the summer of 2012 local demonstrations continued to take
place all over Tokyo. 495 As Matsumoto observes, it is these daily life activities which
connect the community of the poor and facilitate their participation in the
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Bestor, Neighborhood Tokyo, 224–255.

495 Murakami Rappa, ‘Gotōchi datsu genpatsu rōkaru demo!! (4) Genpatsu iya da! Fuchū no katsudō’,
Kikan pīpuruzu puran no 62 (August 2013): 84–85; Yasuda Hibari, ‘Gotōchi rōkaru demo dai 3 kai: Minna
no NONUKES Nishi Tōkyō [Local Demonstrations No 3: Everybody’s No Nukes Western Tokyo]’,
Kikan pīpuruzu puran no 61 (May 2013): 8–9.
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demonstrations.496 These dense networks of relationships, infused with a spirit of
rebellion and resistance, brought the precariat into the streets following the nuclear
disaster at Fukushima. Futatsugi explains his view that so many people responded to
Shirōto no Ran’s call to demonstrate because demonstrating has become an extension
of the everyday culture of play, in clubs, live music houses and bars.497
The spaces established by Shirōto no Ran facilitated daily life activities like eating,
drinking and recycling. Activists then developed their protest strategies while
carrying out these activities. The idea for the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration of
April 2011 was conceived in Shirōto no Ran’s collectively run bar, Nantoka bā
(Nantoka Bar). In the documentary film Radioactivists, which charts the rise of the
Genpatsu Yamero movement, Irregular Rhythm Asylum’s Narita Keisuke explains
how the idea for the April demonstration had come up during a conversation while
he was tending bar a few weeks earlier. Later in the film we see Nantoka Bar come
into its own as an organising space. Crammed into the tiny space, activists are shown
planning the demonstration and debating the best ways to handle the pressure they
anticipate from the police harassment.498
Later in the film we see how the spaces of Shirōto no Ran, like Matsumoto’s recycle
shop, function not only as businesses but as organising spaces. Matsumoto is filmed
answering telephone inquiries about the demonstration from behind his shop counter.
He and a number of other activists also appear on the steps outside his shop painting
a banner in preparation for the May demonstration. Other spaces, like Shop No 12,
an art gallery and meeting and performance space located in Kōenji, also appear in
the film. Here Matsumoto, Oda Masanori and other activists work to make the
portable ‘nuclear reactor’ omikoshi which I described in the previous chapter. The
spaces of Shirōto no ran are multi-functional spaces which embody Matsumoto’s
ideal of an ‘area-wide strategy of self-sufficiency for all the poor’.

Karatani and Matsumoto, ‘Seikatsu to ittaika shita demo wa tezuyoi [Demonstration that are Integrated
with Daily Life are Strong]’, 128–129.
496

497 Hirai, Futatsugi, and Ōkuma, ‘Toppaguchi wa ongaku demo de ee janaika [Musical Demonstration Will
Be an Opening]’, 208.
498
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At Irregular Rhythm Asylum, a weekly sewing group known as NUMAN gathers to
produce clothes, share food and make patches and other textile craft objects. The
emphasis is on the DIY ethos rather than on professional production values. Narita
explains that ‘originally I wanted a place to gather’ but this always seemed to end up
being somewhere where people drink.
Drinking together is certainly fun, but all that is left is a bunch of empty cans. To be
blunt, that is really empty. I was sick of that so I wanted to do something where the
gathering would have some sort of form. Furthermore, fundamentally I am thinking
about the production of a new set of values (kachikan). I wanted a place where I
could do something like that.499

This new set of values, Narita explains, are counter-posed to the dominant values of
consumer society such as buying new things because they are fashionable or wearing
new clothes in order to avoid feeling uncomfortable. ‘I thought we needed to create
values that we can really feel with our own power and share, a kind of
community’.500 The Neighbourhood facilitates the production of a very different kind
of ‘everyday’ in which participants co-operate to ensure their survival by making
clothes, recycling and sharing food and drink. The notion of ‘Neighbourhood’
(‘kaiwai’), Jordan Sand observes, suggested that ‘the unique character of Japanese
urbanism lay in the ways in which ordinary people appropriated space spontaneously
and in the kinds of places that accommodated and lent themselves to this
spontaneous appropriation. Kaiwai thus supplemented citizen politics with an
aesthetic of the everyday’.501

Ibasho
Narita has described Irregular Rhythm Asylum as ‘a meeting place for all those
people who for some reason refuse the social and cultural status quo’.502 Although it
sells books and records, it is ‘first and foremost a meeting point’, a place where you
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can ‘relax on the sofa, have a nice cup of coffee while chatting with interesting
people, and spend as much time as you want’.503 Anne Allison explains how freeters
often feel excluded from spaces like the home, educational institutions or the
workplace which provided defined locations for members of the middle class in postwar Japan. With the collapse of these ‘places’, Anne Allison argues that an
increasing number of people in Japan are experiencing what she calls ‘ordinary
refugeeism’. Through her ethnographic research into ‘precarious Japan’, Allison
explains, she discovered that many people lack a sense of having a place in which
they can simply be.
It is not simply the working poor who get stricken by unease in facing basic
existence. The phrase I kept hearing over and over, and wherever I went, was
‘ibasho ga nai’—without a place or space where one feels comfortable and ‘at
home’.

As she explains, this is not simply a question of a physical ‘home’ but of ‘the
normalcy of being and belonging that often gets associated with the my-home-ism of
the post-war social contract’. 504 Without access to a stable family, home or work
environment where does one spend one’s day? In creating spaces for kōryū, for
economic self-sufficiency, for cultural activities and for political organising, the
spaces of the Nantoka Neighbourhood create an ‘ibasho’, a ‘place in which to be’ in
a society where many feel adrift. In the post-3.11 context, the contamination of the
city through radiation only further intensified the sense of risk, alienation and danger
which many urban residents already felt. When IRA’s Narita Keisuke offered up the
use of his infoshop as a place of refuge to stranded Tokyoites unable to get home in
the wake of the 3.11 earthquake, he emphasised that his shop, the Irregular Rhythm
Asylum, is in fact a place of refuge, an asylum in its original sense. He reinforced
this message by titling the post ‘Asylum (=hinanjo)’, using both the English word
and its Japanese equivalent. He proposed this in quite a literal sense. Cassegård
suggests that the spaces of freeter activism are a form of ‘alternative space’, which
‘can contribute to empowerment [by providing] ‘shelters’ to the subaltern from the
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pressures of mainstream society’.505 By serving as spaces for the dissemination of
knowledge about the effects of radiation and for organising a powerful political
response to the nuclear disaster the Nantoka Neighbourhood constitutes a real
alternative, a ‘space outside’. This space is located in the interstices of the
contaminated capitalist city. It opens, however, into a globally connected geography
of autonomy, cultural creativity, refuge and conviviality.

Summary
In this chapter I have described the shape and texture of the Nantoka Neighbourhood
in space and time. The Neighbourhood emerged as a concept among a group of
precarity activists who were organising around discrete activists spaces in different
parts of the city. After 3.11, these networks took on an important role within the antinuclear movement. The Neighbourhood only has a loose structure but is ‘somehow’
held together as a ‘community of protest’ by shared values, media and lifestyles.
Participants tend to value ‘doing your own thing’ and seek pathways for maintaining
their lifestyles through collective living, protest and creative practice. The media of
the Neighbourhood, both in print and online, are an important representational space
for imagining alternatives to the post-industrial city. These representations, both
before and after 3.11, work by subverting the symbols of state and corporate power.
They also act as objects of memory, changing the way the past is remembered so as
to open up the potential for contemporary activist practice. Activists have tried to
create alternative lifestyles by ‘digging in’ to different parts of the city and trying to
unite strategies of political activism, media production and economic activity so as to
create ‘alternative space’ within ‘the place of everyday life’ (seikatsu no ba). Here
the precariat can not only meet their material needs but find a place to simply be
(ibasho) in the post-industrial metropolis.
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CHAPTER FOUR – HIROBA

This place became ‘No Nukes Plaza’ and all of a sudden a ‘liberated zone’ appeared
in the middle of the bustling streets outside the station!
Amamiya Karin506

Figure 6 ‘Special Issue’ of the ‘Nantoka Newspaper’ celebrating No Nukes
Plaza507

506 Amamiya Karin, ‘Shinjuku “Genpatsu yamero demo!”, mō kono ikioi o dare ni mo tomerarenai!!
[Shinjuku “Genpatsu Yamero Demonstration!”, No-one Can Stop this Momentum Now]’, Magajin 9
[Magazine 9], 15 June 2011, accessed 18 June 2014, http://www.magazine9.jp/karin/110615/.
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On 11 June 2011, three months after 3.11, I was in Tokyo to take part in a conference
on ‘Emergent Forms of Engagement and Activism in Japan’.508 At the end of the day
I accompanied a number of other conference participants to the east exit of Shinjuku
station to witness some ‘engagement and activism’ in practice. There we joined
approximately 20,000 anti-nuclear protesters who were gathered in a small plaza
outside the eastern exit. The event, which organisers referred to as ‘Genpatsu yamero
hiroba’ (‘No Nukes Plaza’), was part of a day of protest dubbed the ‘Million Person
Action Against Nuclear Power’. According to the report of the event reproduced in
Figure 6, an estimated 67,000 people participated in the 144 actions which took place
across Japan as part of the day of action. Internationally, 22 actions took place in 11
countries. A further 32 actions were also organised in France and 200 in Taiwan.509
Three separate protest marches took place in Tokyo that day. Shirōto no Ran
organised a Genpatsu Yamero march which began in Shinjuku’s Central Park and
ended at No Nukes Plaza, where the demonstrators remained late into the night. As I
approached No Nukes Plaza through a pedestrian tunnel connecting the east and west
sides of Shinjuku station I saw a large number of police with megaphones attempting
to control the demonstration. The police had surrounded the east exit plaza and were
refusing people entry. As we walked around the circumference of the plaza I could
see thousands of people inside dancing, singing and waving sunflowers. Finally we
found an entrance to the plaza on the far side and crossed the road to enter. Once
inside I began running into some friends I had made in the Tokyo activist scene
while working in Japan several years prior. Later in the night, after the crowds had
dispersed and the police had gone, some activists remained in the square, talking and
drinking. As I sat with them we relished the feeling of freedom which comes from
occupying public space.

508 ‘ICAS Event: Academic Conference - “Emergent Forms of Engagement and Activism in Japan:
Politics, Cultures and Technologies”’, Temple University Japan Campus, 2012, accessed 9 June 2015,
https://www.tuj.ac.jp/events/2011/0611.html.
509 A comprehensive list of the actions which took place as part of the “Million Person Action Against
Nuclear Power” is given in Sono, Boku ga Tōden mae ni tatta wake [Why I Stood in Front of TEPCO], 124–125.
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A few days later, Figure 6, a mock Nantoka Newspaper front page, appeared on the
Irregular Rhythm Asylum blog.510 This ‘extra’ (gōgai) edition, which was actually
the only ever issue of the Nantoka Newspaper ever published, celebrated the
successful action in Shinjuku. The bold yellow headline across the top screamed ‘No
Nukes Plaza Appears at Alta-mae 6.11’. Superimposed over the headline was a
subheading which read ‘the number of participants in the Shinjuku Genpatsu Yamero
Demo exceeded 20,000’. In the vertical yellow subheading to the right of the image
was another subheading which proclaimed that the action ‘was just like Tahrir
Square!!!’ This reference to the democratic uprising which took place in Egypt as
part of the Arab Spring in 2011 showed how the producers of the image thought
about their own protest action within a global imaginary. The photograph, too, of
thousands of people overflowing from the square also evoked a series of similar
occupied squares and plazas in North Africa, the Middle East and Europe which
were circulating on social media and global news websites at the time.511
The Shirōto no Ran organisers of the 11 June No Nukes Plaza were so taken with the
success of the event that they deployed the idea again at Genpatsu Yamero protests
in August and September and again in July the following year. In this chapter I
discuss the notion of a hiroba in the No Nukes Plaza protests. I begin by discussing
the No Nukes Plaza actions in Shinjuku in June 2011 as a ‘liberated zone’. I consider
the event in terms of Shirōto no Ran’s ongoing interest in intervening in public space.
I then discuss No Nukes Plaza in the context of the history of Shinjuku as a site of
public protest. Shinjuku was the site of major protests during the late 1960s,
including the ‘folk guerrilla’ actions which took place in Shinjuku station’s west exit
plaza in 1969. I show how the history and memory of protest at Shinjuku station
informed the No Nukes Plaza action. Having located the hiroba in time I then discuss
its relations to similar urban square protests which were taking place in major urban
centres around the world in 2011.
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No Nukes Plaza was a contested spatial practice. At the commencement rally for the
11 June Genpatsu Yamero protest, tensions erupted among participants over the
inclusion of a right-wing anti-nuclear activist on the speaker’s platform. I discuss
how the debates which surrounded this controversy demonstrated the limits of the
hiroba. How inclusive can the hiroba be and how might the inclusion of some
preclude the participation of others? Later in the year, at the 11 September Genpatsu
Yamero and No Nukes Plaza actions, conflict between Genpatsu Yamero activists
and the Tokyo Metropolitan Police exploded in Shinjuku. The police arrested 11
participants during the march, including a number of key organisers. In response,
activists and intellectuals associated with the Genpatsu Yamero protests struggled to
articulate their desires for a hiroba where open democracy and freedom might be
possible. Finally I consider the politics of the hiroba in terms of broader theoretical
debates about political participation and street politics in Japan.

The Hiroba as a Liberated Zone
The Tumblr page for the 11 June 2011 Genpatsu Yamero demonstration
foreshadowed the ‘appearance’ (shutsugen) of No Nukes Plaza at six o’clock in the
evening in front of the Alta building at the eastern entrance to Shinjuku station. The
website provided few clues, however, as to what could be expected on the day. The
names of three speakers were given alongside a vague reference to ‘participants and
performers who have finished marching’, implying that the programme for the event
was open-ended. The website text tickled the imagination with the suggestion that
‘something incredible will happen!!!!! and be enacted’ (‘tondemonai nanika ga
okiru !!!!! okosu !!!!!’). This juxtaposition of the intransitive (okiru) and transitive
(okosu) forms of the verb ‘to happen/make happen’ suggested that, while something
would certainly happen (okiru) in the plaza, participants would have to become
active subjects in order to make it happen (okosu).512
The attempt to create an open hiroba at No Nukes Plaza was a continuation of
Shirōto no Ran’s longstanding tactic of intervening in public space to create
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‘liberated zones’ and repurpose public space for contentious politics. In the group’s
‘Smash Christmas’ action of December 2007, for example, a small number of
activists gathered near Shinjuku station and attempted to have a nabe513 party. When
the police arrived to move the group along Matsumoto challenged them, asking what
was wrong with their sharing food in the street. The scene is captured in Nakamura
Yūki’s documentary film Shirōto no ran (Amateur Revolt). In an intertitle which
appears after this scene, Nakamura poses the following question.
The police say ‘you are causing a nuisance in a public place (kōkyō no ba)’. But
what is a public place? To whom does the city belong?514

This is one of the key questions underlying much of Matsumoto Hajime and Shirōto
no Ran’s activism. As I discussed in Chapter Two, in Shirōto no Ran’s
demonstrations and performative protests they have sought to make irregular use of
‘public’ spaces such as streets and plazas as places for political expression. Like the
‘Smash Christmas’ hotpot party, many of their actions have been less concerned with
protesting particular issues than with the attempt to reclaim ‘the street’ as a place for
politics. In a city that lacks extensive public parks, and in which ‘public space’ is
increasingly regulated, they have sought to claim space not only for protest but for
simply being.
Making irregular use of public space is not, however, an easy task. The laws
governing the use of public space in Tokyo are strict. Shirōto no Ran and the
precarity movements have attempted to increase the space for protest in the city by
utilising existing legal loopholes, such as during the aforementioned Kōenji Ikki
election campaign. As sociologist Oguma Eiji explains, the Japanese police usually
aim to bring demonstrations to a close as quickly as possible once they have
completed their pre-approved course. It was only possible for the demonstrators to
remain in the east exit plaza of Shinjuku station on 11 June because the organisers
had contacts with a number of political parties who were willing to lend their
campaigning vehicles to the demonstration. These vehicles are equipped with a
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rooftop platform and public address system from which speakers can address the
crowd. They were thereby able to avoid being broken up by the police thanks to legal
protections for public campaign rallies.515
The organisers speculated that if a large number of people were to attend the No
Nukes Plaza action then it would be unlikely that the police would intervene to make
arrests. When the evening of 11 June arrived and 20,000 people filled the square,
organisers were thrilled with the success of their plan. Precarity activist and writer
Amamiya Karin was one of the organisers of the Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations.
In a passage from her blog at Magazine 9 Amamiya described the jubilant scenes she
witnessed from the roof of a public address vehicle while speaking at No Nukes
Plaza.
The demonstrators who had left Shinjuku Central Park at 3 o’clock began to arrive
outside the Alta building one after the other. From here on in it was more than just
chaotic noise. This place (ba) became ‘No Nukes Plaza’ and all of a sudden a
‘liberated zone’ (kaihōku) appeared in the middle of the bustling streets outside the
station! When I climbed up onto the public address vehicle and looked around I was
blown away. As far as the eye could see for 360º there were people, people, people.
The ranks of the demonstration continued on and on into the far distance and the
hiroba in front of me was overflowing with people. From here and there came the
call ‘genpatsu iranai’ (‘we don’t need nuclear power’) which reverberated across
like a rumble from the ground, the sound of drums, the sound of sirens, the dizzy
faces of person after person and balloons inscribed with ‘genpatsu iranai’, countless
placards, flags and banners. It was a site that made you wonder ‘is this Tahrir
Square?’ Then, when I started chanting ‘No Nukes’ the voices of people crying out
together came back to me from 360º. To tell the truth, it was the best I have ever felt
in my life!!516

Amamiya celebrates the hiroba as a ‘liberated zone’. She delights in the cacophony
created by the different sounds and the large numbers of people who gathered in the
square. After years of experiments in creating ‘liberated zones’ through protests,
election campaigning and guerrilla actions this was without doubt the most
successful attempt at creating a ‘liberated zone’ which Shirōto no Ran had ever been
involved in. The demonstrations and protests which Shirōto no Ran and other
precarity activists had organised in public places prior to June 2011 were usually
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short-lived marches or spontaneous performance actions like ‘Smash Christmas’. No
Nukes Plaza, however, extended the liberation of space which took place during the
various anti-nuclear marches which took place in Tokyo that day well into the night.
The feeling of liberation Amamiya describes is in marked contrast with the ‘ikizurai’
feeling which she became famous for articulating through her speaking and writing.
In her 2007 book Ikisasero! Nanminka suru wakamonotachi (Let Us Live! The
Refugee-isation of Young People) Amamiya had described the ‘pain of life’517 which
she had felt as a young woman stuck in dead-end precarious work. As a young
person she engaged in self-harm, eventually finding a means of self-expression
through the right-wing punk scene. In a 2012 essay, however, she described how the
proliferation of street demonstrations after 3.11 had taken away her ‘pain of life’.518
The No Nukes Plaza action took place in the area known as Aruta mae (in front of
the Alta building).519 Completed in 1980, the Alta building featured the world’s first
large, building-mounted outdoor television screen known as ‘Alta Vision’.520 Its
prominent location took advantage of the estimated 100,000 people who pass by the
building on a daily basis. In addition to the visually striking television screen the
building’s mixed-use design ensures a steady stream of visitors. In its basement are
cafes and restaurants which are connected to Shinjuku station by an underground
passageway. The six floors above are filled with boutiques. ‘In front of the Alta
building’ is a well-known landmark where people rendezvous before heading out
into Shinjuku’s entertainment and shopping districts. At the top of the building is
Studio Alta, a television studio which produces television programmes and
commercials. The construction of the building reflects the logic of post-industrial
forms of information capitalism. As Tong Chen observes, ‘Studio Alta functions as a
medium for the self-presentation of the owner—a joint venture between Fuji

This translation of “ikizurai” as “pain of life” is taken from Anne Allison. She discusses Amamiya’s
work and her understanding of precarity in Precarious Japan, 1–20.
517

518

Amamiya, ‘Demo no aru ikizurakunai machi.’

519 Technically, the demonstration took place opposite the Alta building in the Shinjuku station east exit
plaza but the term “in front of the Alta building” is often used to describe the whole area.
520 ‘Enkaku [History]’, Sutajio Aruta [Studio Alta], accessed 15 July 2014, http://www.studioalta.co.jp/company/history.jsp.

146

Television and Mitsukoshi Department Store, and as an interface for the other parties’
telepresence’.521 Chen even suggests that ‘Studio Alta’s reputation goes far beyond
Shinjuku, even beyond Tokyo’ as the popular television programmes which are
produced in the building which are broadcast to millions of viewers on television sets
around the country.522
The name ‘Alta mae’ references the building’s commercial function thereby defining
it as a space of consumption. By filling the space ‘in front of Alta’ with music and
lively debate and asking passers-by to join in, Genpatsu Yamero activists sought to
re-define the space as a hiroba for the performance of politics. This location seems
particularly appropriate when considered against the transformation of Tokyo from
an industrial to a post-industrial city. If Studio Alta and the development of
television advertising initiated this digitally connected spatial presence, postindustrial social movements, with their savvy use of media and communications
technology made subversive use of these same technologies to develop a ‘hiroba’
that went far beyond the temporary occupation of the Alta-mae station square. The
occupation of space outside the Alta building extended to the building itself which
activists ‘hijacked’ by projecting anti-nuclear messages above the giant television
screen.523 As such, it is representative of the media-saturated consumer society which
Matsumoto saw as the root cause of the nuclear disaster.524 The Shinjuku No Nukes
Plaza therefore serves as a protest against the domination of public space by
commercial activity, something many activists understood as contributing to demand
for nuclear-generated electricity.
By appropriating public space and creating a hiroba, activists did not necessarily
seek to convey a coherent political message. Rather, they aimed to facilitate the
expression of a multitude of voices against nuclear power. Amamiya describes No
521 Tong Chen, ‘Twin Cities: Cyberspatial Qualities of Contemporary Tokyo’ (Masters dissertation,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995), 41, http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/65042.
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Nukes Plaza as a space in which diversity – the different sounds, placards, faces and
drums – coexists with a collective voice – ‘crying out together from 360º’. Amamiya
goes on to describe some of the encounters she had in the hiroba. There were
speakers from a variety of non-governmental organisations and political parties
including Greenpeace Japan, Greens Party, the Social Democratic Party and a
speaker involved in the citizen’s referendum on nuclear power. At the same time,
other voices were giving speeches and making appeals in different parts of the square.
In one corner there was a kind of dance party happening around a drumming group
while in another the chant ‘No Nukes’ continued.
When I joined the No Nukes Plaza that evening I could not make out what any of the
speakers were saying over the hubbub of the crowd. Instead, I roamed about the
square finding different groups of friends and chatting with them about the
demonstrations which had occurred earlier that day. The hiroba facilitated this kind
of encounter. Amamiya Karin recounts some of her own encounters in the square.
She described one young university student who was so overcome with emotion that
he repeated ‘I’m not alone, I’m not alone’ until ‘his voice dried out’.525 This does not
seem to have been an unusual experience. The daily Tōkyō Shimbun (Tokyo
Newspaper) interviewed a 30 year old dentist from Mitaka who explained that ‘I’ve
met so many people. I was able to have a proper conversation about the nuclear issue
which is difficult to talk about with my friends. I feel refreshed’. These reports echo
those discussed in Chapter Two of the feeling of relief participants in the Genpatsu
Yamero demonstration felt when they encountered other people who shared their
concerns about the nuclear issue.
In their wrap-up report after the event the organisers celebrated the demonstration
and the No Nukes Plaza. The report focused on the differences between
participants—scholars, politicians, local and international activists, musicians and
‘people who just happened to be there’. ‘It is often said that ‘there are no hiroba in
Japan’’, the report read, ‘if that is the case then we need to make them’ and ‘on that
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day without doubt a hiroba appeared’. 526 While the report responds to popular
notions of a lack of democratic protest traditions in Japan, the organisers were
actually engaging with that history through their choice of Shinjuku as a site of
protest. In the next section I discuss the relationship between No Nukes Plaza and a
set of protests at Shinjuku station in 1969 which sought to turn the west exit plaza on
the other side of the station into a hiroba, namely, the so-called ‘folk guerrilla’
movement.

The Hiroba in Time
As political scientist Gonoi Ikuo points out, the June demonstration was only the
second time in post-war Japanese history that the east entrance of Shinjuku station
was overflowing with such a crowd. The last time was the so-called ‘Shinjuku riot’
which took place on 21 October 1968 when crowds of students engaged in property
destruction and succeeded in stopping two of Tokyo’s most important commuter
railway lines, the Yamanote and Chūō lines.527 Gonoi emphasises the differences
between the violence of the Shinjuku riot and the ‘tacit understanding shared by
people [at No Nukes Plaza] to protest in a non-violent and peaceful manner’.528 Yet
even though the 1960s are often remembered for the violent scenes visible at the
Shinjuku riot, at the same time a diverse, non-violent and non-sectarian protest
movement was already emerging which prefigured many of the carnivalesque tactics
of the Genpatsu Yamero movement.
The first performer listed to appear at No Nukes Plaza was ‘Jeremy’, who was
described as an American resident in Japan. Clicking on his name on the
demonstration’s Tumblr page took readers to a YouTube video of Jeremy performing
folk singer Okabayashi Nobuyasu’s classic ‘Tomo yo’ (My friend). ‘Tomo yo’ was
the anthem of the student movement of the late 1960s and early 1970s. The song was
often sung in Shinjuku station’s west exit plaza in 1969 when, for several months, a
group of student activists, hippies and musicians staged regular ‘folk guerrilla’
526 ‘6.11 Shinjuku Genpatsu yamero demo hōkoku [Report on the 6.11 Genpatsu Yamero Demonstration
in Shinjuku]’, accessed 4 August 2014, http://611shinjuku.tumblr.com/post/7724014059/6-11.
527
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gatherings where they sang protest songs, held debates and tried to transform the
functional space of the west exit plaza into a genuine hiroba. The Genpatsu Yamero
demonstration in June 2011 also featured a ‘Shinjuku Folk Guerrilla’ sound truck.
This signalled the activists’ awareness of the history of the Shinjuku station precinct
as a site of protest and their desire to infuse their protest with that history.
The ‘Folk Guerrilla’ gatherings, like No Nukes Plaza, contested the right to the city.
The folk guerrillas held their gatherings in an underground plaza of Shinjuku station
which was officially called a hiroba. The activists involved took that idea and tried to
put it into practice by using the plaza as a place for civic action and debate.
Following their eviction by the riot police, however, the plaza underwent an
important symbolic change. Railway authorities renamed the ‘plaza’ (hiroba) a
‘passageway’ (tsūro). As Peter Eckersall points out, ‘the space was transformed from
an associative and collective space to a linear and functional one’.529
Among the crowd at No Nukes Plaza was New York based expatriate writer and
translator Sabu Kohso. Kohso later wrote that standing in the square had conjured up
memories of Japan in the 1960s. 530 As an activist and intellectual, Kohso has
engaged deeply with the history of protest in Japan and the United States. In his
theoretical and historical exploration of what he calls the ‘new anarchism’, he
develops an intriguing conception of place.
‘Place’ (basho) is a meeting point (shūgōten) for events (dekigoto). Different spacetimes are entangled (sakusō suru) in that ‘point’ in ‘sacred places’ or ‘squares’
(hiroba) the assembledness itself appears as a peculiar power. However, it is not that
all of the elements of which it is composed can be seen. The hidden events, the
excluded events, dwell latent within. They are ghosts. This visibility and invisibility
becomes the expression of the place’s politics. The erasure of memory is evidence of
‘primitive accumulation’. But various clues which can call up these memories
remain. All the events of the past are waiting for the day when they will be
excavated once again. They are waiting for the day they will come back to life as a

Peter Eckersall, ‘The Emotional Geography of Shinjuku: The Case of Chikatetsu Hiroba
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model of liberation. In this sense the whole land of America—indeed all the lands of
the earth—are a place of struggle over ‘place and memory’.531

Working from this suggestive starting point, we can understand the manifestation at
Alta-mae by exploring both the visible manifestations and the ‘hidden elements’
which constitute Alta-mae and the Shinjuku station area more generally as a place
(basho) at which a variety of events (dekigoto) are gathered together (shūgō). How
have the memories of protest and gathering in Shinjuku been ‘excluded’ and ‘erased’
and how did No Nukes Plaza serve to reignite the struggles over ‘place and memory’
that are no less a part of the Japanese landscape as they are the American?
As Kohso has argued above, just because ‘events’ have been excluded from a
particular place their memory cannot be entirely suppressed. The memory of the Folk
Guerrilla occupations is preserved through visual media, as in the film Chikatetsu
Hiroba.532 The memory of these struggles has also been kept alive by participants
and their accounts of experiences in the hiroba. As was discussed in Chapter Three,
the hiroba also inspired groups like Mosakusha who set up rented, legal hiroba to
continue the free exchange of information and debate that they regarded as central to
the hiroba as a practice. The bookshop carries shelves of works on the student
movements of the 1960s and 1970s which have served as a resource for
contemporary activists to explore Japan’s sometimes forgotten history. In a
freewheeling essay on the West Exit Plaza and the Folk Guerrillas in 2003, anti-war
activist Oda Masanori reflects on how exclusion the exclusion of activists from the
hiroba by the police signalled the subsumption of citizen’s democracy within the
forms of a spectacular capitalism. As the radical protests of the late 1960s petered out,
Japan’s consumer society began to enter a new golden age. When the police cleared
the folk guerrillas from the West Exit Plaza in 1969 the name of the plaza was
changed from ‘plaza’ (hiroba) to passageway (tsūro) and an announcement was
repeated over the loudspeaker ‘please don’t stop, keep walking’. This announcement,
Oda remarks, ‘trained obedient citizens of the society of the spectacle, it is a
command for the purpose of control, it excluded citizens from a place (genba) in
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which they could construct the situation or intervene in it’.533 By creating a hiroba in
the Shinjuku station area No Nukes Plaza re-inserted this history of defiance and
protest into public space. Furthermore, they did so at a time when activists around
the world were staging protests in the squares of major cities.

The Global Hiroba
The Fukushima nuclear disaster was a global event which quickly became the
catalyst for a global outpouring of anti-nuclear sentiment. On 12 March 2011, the
day after the 3.11 disaster, 60,000 demonstrators marched against nuclear power in
Stuttgart, Germany.534 The protest had been planned long before the Fukushima
disaster but now activists pointed to what had happened in Japan as evidence of the
lack of safety of nuclear power. A few weeks later, after her Christian Democrat
party lost the state elections in Baden-Wurttemberg largely due to nuclear fears,535
German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that Germany would phase out all of
the country’s nuclear power plants by 2020.536 In a referendum in Italy in June to
decide on whether the country should revive its nuclear programme more than 90 per
cent of voters rejected the proposal.537 Amamiya Karin celebrated the referendum
result in her reflections on the 11 June No Nukes Plaza action. 538 Activists in
Australia, too, held solidarity actions in support of the anti-nuclear movement in
Japan and staged protests against uranium mining.539

533 Masanori Oda, ‘Toshi No Minzokushi (2) Tōkyō Fōku Gerira Nō Ritānzu (Besshō = Shōwa
Zankyōden) [Ethnography of the City (2) Tokyo Folk Guerillas No Returns (Or, Reverberations of
Shōwa)]’, Ten plus One no 32 (2003): 34.
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While activists around the world responded to the situation in Fukushima, Genpatsu
Yamero activists in Tokyo were themselves informed and inspired by the global
uprisings of 2011. One example of this was when activists uploaded a picture of the
M1 encampment in Catalonia Square, Barcelona to promote No Nukes Plaza on the
Genpatsu Yamero demonstration Tumblr page. This protest camp was set up as part
of the Spanish indignados movement which challenged the austerity policies of the
Spanish government in early 2011. The Spanish protesters were themselves inspired
by the Arab Spring which was unfolding across North Africa from late 2010. Antinuclear and alter-globalisation activists in Japan followed these developments and
wrote about them in movement publications.540 Some left intellectuals in Japan and
North America established the website ‘Japan: Fissures in the Planetary Apparatus’
in order to support the movement in Japan. They translated key texts between
Japanese and English and provided a central point for the exchange of information
and analysis relating to the anti-nuclear movement.541 These links are a manifestation
of the growing interconnectedness of Tokyo’s urban social movements with the alterglobalisation and global peace movements which, as Ruth Reitan explains, emerged
out of the waves of alter-globalisation and anti-war protest of the late 1990s and
early 2000s.542
The emergence of links between the Japanese anti-nuclear movement and the global
democratic movements of 2011 was predicated on a number of existing relationships.
In 2012 a seminar series at the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies was organised to
explore some of these connections. The seminar series was called ‘Sekai wa
kaerareru to iu yokan’ (‘The Premonition that the World Can Change’) and included
Maralinga’, The Asia-Pacific Journal 13, no 6.5 (16 February 2015), http://japanfocus.org/-VeraMackie/4281/article.html.
540 The intellectual journal Gendai shisō, for example, published a special issue on the Arab Spring which
hit newsstands just after the Fukushima disaster. See, ‘Sōtokushū Arabu kakumei: Chunijia, ejiputo kara
sekai e [Special Issue: The Arab Revolution: From Tunisia and Egypt to the World]’, Gendai shisō
[Contemporary Thought] no Supplement (April 2011).The indignados protests were also discussed by left
intellectuals. See Ishida Nodaka, ‘Supein repōto: subete wa hiroba kara hajimatta [Spain Report:
Everything Began in the Square]’, Sabaku [Desert], August 2011.
541
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three events on the themes of 3.11, the human cost of the nuclear disaster and the
notion of the ‘publicness’ (kōkyōsei) of the streets in the light of various ‘occupations’
then taking place around the world.
At the first of the seminars, ‘Connecting Kōenji ‘Shirōto no Ran’ With Occupy Wall
Street’, political scientist and member of the organising committee for the Genpatsu
Yamero protests Kinoshita Chigaya explained that the visit by Shirōto no Ran
activists to Occupy Wall Street had come out of existing global connections. Prior to
the establishment of the Occupy camp in New York, Kinoshita had planned to visit
the U.S. along with the intellectual Ikegami Yoshihiko as part of a series of events
called ‘The Global Significance of 3.11 Fukushima’543 scheduled to take place from
21–26 October at various locations around New York. The event was organised by
Sabu Kohso of the JFissures group.544
Gonoi Ikuo situates No Nukes Plaza at Shinjuku station within the global context
defined by the Arab spring, the European anti-austerity movements and the Occupy
movement in the United States. In all these movements the occupation of public
space was an important strategy. Like the demonstrators in Tokyo, Occupy protesters
chose to re-name the space they occupied in Zuccotti Park in September. The name
they chose was 'Liberty Square'.545 These strategies of renaming public space are
largely symbolic, but they speak to a common desire to reshape urban space as a
place for participatory democracy. Discussing the global wave of struggles, Gonoi
emphasises the ways in which ideas are translated and transmitted around the world.
Just as the comic book version of Martin Luther King's exposition of civil
disobedience was translated into Arabic and was adapted into the repertoire of the
non-violent occupation of a square, Cairo's Tahrir Square and Spain's Puerta Del Sol
became the No Nukes Plaza at Alta-mae in Japan and ‘Liberty Square’ in New
York’s Zuccotti park.546

543 ‘Todos Somos Japon Presents: GLOBAL SIGNIFICANCE OF 3.11 FUKUSHIMA | Japan Fissures in the Planetary Apparatus’, accessed 12 August 2014, http://www.jfissures.org/todos-somosjapon-presents-global-significance-of-3-11-fukushima/.

Matsumoto et al., ‘Kōenji “Shirōto no ran” to woūru gai senkyo o musubu: tōron [Tie up Kōenji
“Shirōto no ran” with Occupy Wall Street: Discussion]’, 9.
544

545

Gonoi, ‘Demo’ to wa nani ka, 10–12.

546

Ibid., 12.

154

However, for Gonoi it is not only a repertoire of protest and a common language
which are transmitted between globally connected social movements. Perhaps more
important is the way global events can give activists the courage to move from a
sense of injustice to throwing their own bodies into action. Pointing to the influence
of the Russian philosopher Tolstoy's ideas of non-violence on the young Gandhi,
studying in what was then British South Africa, and in turn their manifestation in the
Indian Independence movement, Gonoi emphasises the global circulation of radical
ideas that underlies modern protest movements.547 Sabu Kohso, too, points to the
collective intellectual endeavour which takes place as social movements
communicate across the globe.
In ... Fukushima 3/11 and OWS, we are observing the advent of an age of the
collective intellect as singular events within the general intellect, wherein traditional
roles of intelligent leaders are diminishing while a massive, dialogic and
collaborative engagement in knowledge production is rising on the horizon,
notwithstanding the presence of irregularities, discrepancies and conflicts.548

A few days after the 11 September demonstration in Tokyo, democracy activists in
New York, inspired by the Arab Spring and anti-austerity movements in Europe,
organised a protest march in the financial district around Wall Street and established
the protest camp in Zuccotti Park which would become the symbol of Occupy Wall
Street.549 At the centre of Occupy Wall Street was the democratic experiment for
which it has become famous: the General Assembly.550 Eager to exchange ideas and
draw inspiration from Occupy Wall Street, anti-nuclear activists and intellectuals
from Japan rapidly descended on the Occupy camp.

547 Ibid., 12–13. Intellectual historian Sho Konishi has argued that Russian anarchism already had an
important intercourse with political movements in Japan in the early twentieth century. See his Anarchist
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Like Occupy Wall Street and many of the global democracy movements which
occurred in 2011, Genpatsu Yamero was not a single, unified movement with clearly
defined boundaries. Kohso explains how OWS, too, was made up of a number of
decentralised and diverse individuals and affinity groups each with their own
particular relationality (kankeisei) and ways of intervening (kainyū hōhō).551 Gonoi,
visited Occupy Wall Street in an attempt to better understand the unfolding antinuclear movement back home. Like Kohso, he argues that OWS didn’t end when the
Occupy camp was evicted. Indeed, it had really only just begun. No longer bound by
their location in Liberty Plaza the Occupy movement has spread out to encompass a
range of different activities stitched together by personal and internet-based networks
of communication. Similarly, when we conceive of the No Nukes Plaza as part of
this broader tendency, we can see how the temporary hiroba outside Shinjuku station
serves as a physically bound node in a communication hiroba which spans Tokyo
and has connections with democracy movements around the world.
Sabu Kohso observed, in his commentary on the Japanese edition of the Occupy
Wall Street publication Occupying Wall Street, that ‘the occupy movement which
spread throughout the world is not over. It is in the present continuous (genzai shinkō
chū). Indeed, it has only begun’.552 The Occupy camp in Zuccotti Park may have
been evicted on 15 November 2011 but the movement from which it arose and to
which it gave birth could not be so easily extinguished. It was not, Kohso argues, a
single movement but part of a broad global ‘tendency’ (sūsei) which transcended any
one movement or group. The ‘movement’ known as Occupy Wall Street was not the
whole movement. It was only a part of this broader tendency.553 Yet as global social
movements adopt more diffuse organisational structures, important questions arise
about just who can be included in the hiroba. The rejection of a vaguely defined
‘orthodox leftism’ which is common to many contemporary social movements does
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not necessarily insure against the kind of ideological conflict many participants
would like to avoid.

Beyond Left and Right?
In Chapter Two I quoted from Matsumoto Hajime’s description of a kind of ‘time
travel’ at the first Genpatsu Yamero demonstration in April 2011. He described some
leftists who ‘looked like they had travelled 40 years through time with their zekken
and people carrying the Japanese flag who looked like they had travelled 70 years
through time.’554 Seventy years prior to the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration in 1941,
Japan was in the midst of its war with China and was soon to declare war on the
United States with its attack on Pearl Harbour. The Rising Sun flag remains a potent
symbol of Japanese militarism for most leftists and pacifists in Japan and is widely
reviled in Japan’s former colonies in East Asia. The Japanese flag is revered by
rightist groups known as uyoku555 who constitute a small but very vocal presence in
Tokyo’s streetscape. At the No Nukes Plaza demonstration on 11 June, however, I
was surprised to see numerous groups of people standing around the outside of the
square carrying Japanese flags and other symbols of Japanese nationalism. Were they
there as part of a counter-protest or to support the demonstration?
In recent years a new right-wing nationalist movement has grown in Japan,
particularly on the internet. Many disaffected youth and precarious workers have
combined their anger at the precarious conditions of their lives and labours with
nostalgic longings for an imagined Japanese nationalism.556 In 2007, freeter writer
Akagi Tomohiro articulated a critique of the increasing precariousness of life for
young people in Japanese society in a disturbing essay titled ‘Our Hope is War’ in
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right-wing current affairs magazine Ronza.557 Precarity activist Amamiya Karin, too,
began her journey into political responses to precarity by joining a neo-nationalist
punk band. Amamiya eventually left the right-wing punk scene but she continues to
be one of a number of precarity activists who have sought to articulate a politics
which is ‘beyond left and right’.558
After Fukushima, many new right activists identified with the anti-nuclear cause.
Some rightist groups began to participate in anti-nuclear demonstrations, including
those organised by Shirōto no Ran. Popular neo-nationalist comic book artist
Kobayashi Yasunori’s revisionist history of Japan’s Asia-Pacific War Sensōron (On
War) is a key text for the new right movement. 559 After Fukushima, however,
Kobayashi published a comic book criticising the nuclear power industry in a new
comic called Datsu genpatsu ron (On Abandoning Nuclear Power). 560 As Jeff
Kingston explains, Kobayashi’s intervention ‘seeks to rally people from across the
political spectrum against those who have needlessly exposed Japan to the existential
threat of nuclear energy’.561
One right-wing group which began organising relief in the disaster-affected areas in
Tōhoku was the Tōitsu Sensen Giyūgun (United Front Volunteer Army). In July they
even began to organise their own anti-nuclear demonstrations.562 The group’s leader,
Hariya Daisuke, was invited to speak at a rally at the start of the 11 June Genpatsu
Yamero demonstration in Shinjuku Central Park. His appearance was advertised on
the demonstration’s website. At the last minute, however, Hariya’s address was
cancelled. In a report later published by the Genpatsu Yamero organisers on the
557 The article appeared in English translation as Tomohiro Akagi, ‘War Is the Only Solution. A 31-YearOld Freeter Explains the Plight and Future of Japan’s Marginal Workers’, trans. Kyoko Selden, The AsiaPacific Journal (17 June 2007), http://japanfocus.org/-Akagi-Tomohiro/2452.
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Mechademia 5, no 1 (2010): 251–265.
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demonstration website, they explained the circumstances surrounding the
cancellation.563 According to the report, due to various delays the list of speakers for
the rally had only been decided a few days prior. The final decision as to who would
speak at the rally had been delegated to a single individual on the understanding that
‘if they are opposed to nuclear power then anyone is OK’. With little time and much
to do the organising group was in a chaotic state. There had been no time to secure a
consensus about who would speak. The organising group then received a number of
objections to Hariya’s appearance at the rally. The principle objections were raised
by a group called the Heitosupiichi ni Hantai suru Kai (Committee Against Hate
Speech). The group had been founded in 2009 by a group of people who were
concerned about the rise of the new right.564 In an open letter published on their blog
the Committee Against Hate Speech threatened to disrupt the rally if Hariya were
permitted to speak.565 The Genpatsu Yamero organisers decided to contact Hariya
and ask him not to speak, a decision which was noted on the rally programme on the
demonstration website.
Despite the organisers having cancelled Hariya’s address, controversy over the
rightists’ planned speech did flare up during the rally. Members of the Committee
Against Hate Speech heckled the actor Nakayama Kazuya when he made a reference
to ‘the pride of the Japanese people’ (‘Nihonjin wa sekai ni hokoreru minzoku’)
during his speech. Nakayama challenged them to ‘come here if you’ve got a problem
with what I’m saying’. When he stepped down from the speakers’ platform,
members of the Committee approached the stage and began arguing with him and
with the demonstration organisers.566 While this scuffle took place to one side of the
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stage the MC invited the next speaker to the platform. This speaker was from a
supporters’ group for people who had been arrested at the previous Genpatsu
Yamero demonstration in Shibuya in May. 567 She tried to talk about the success of
the fundraising campaign her group had organised and give advice to the crowd as to
what to do if anyone was arrested. Beside the stage, however, the scuffle continued.
Pointing to the scrum she commented, ‘as you can see here this is a place (ba) in
which there are lots of opinions’. Some applause came up from the crowd while she
continued to comment on the ongoing dispute to the side of the stage. ‘So let’s
express ourselves frankly like that’, she continued, pointing at the disputants. ‘I
support this fight!’ she joked, raising her fist in the air. ‘Let everyone say what they
want to say’.
These comments suggested an understanding of the hiroba as necessarily marked by
internal division and conflict. In this speaker’s view conflict was not something to
shy away from but a virtue of political engagement. The conflict did not end there.
As the defendant support group speaker finished speaking and went to step down
from the platform, a young man holding a Japanese flag on a bamboo pole rushed in
and grabbed the microphone. The rally marshals seemed to tacitly approve of this
and stood to the side of the stage while he made his speech.
I’m sorry but just quickly I’m taking the microphone. He made a fairly garbled
speech, saying ‘I’m not really a leftist … I mean I’m not really a rightist. A rightwing activist Hariya from the United Front Volunteer Army was supposed to be here
but a few misguided leftists said something stupid like ‘don’t let him speak’. I’m
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actually opposed to the Japanese flag and the national anthem but just this once I’ll
raise the flag. Can you believe a story as silly as this?’

He then waved the Japanese rising sun flag he was carrying briefly. Someone who
had been disputing at the side of the stage rushed over and grabbed the microphone
from him before he was wrestled away by rally marshals.
Yamashita Hikaru from Shirōto no Ran, who was master of ceremonies for the rally,
took to the podium while the fight continued to the side of the stage and tried to bring
some resolution to the conflict. ‘There are various points of view’, he yelled. ‘Now is
not the time for bothersome conflicts between left and right’, he continued,
suggesting that surely the contending parties at least shared a common interest in
stopping nuclear power. ‘Let’s go!’ he cried, encouraging the participants to head
into the road and start the march. As people were moving off a member of the
Committee Against Hate Speech stepped onto the podium. He explained that he had
asked for a chance to respond to the previous speaker and spoke briefly as to why his
group objected so strongly to patriotic displays at the demonstration. ‘The national
people (kokumin) or a national people’s movement (kokumin undō) cannot stop
nuclear power’, he stated. He explained his view that in order to stop nuclear power
the movement had to include people both within and without the Japanese
archipelago many of whom are not Japanese citizens.568
The demonstration organisers’ report, while it stopped short of criticising the
heckling, asked participants ‘from now on, please do not disrupt the rally’. In the
report, organisers tried to make sense of the dispute and to defend the idea that only a
broad anti-nuclear movement which went beyond left and right could change energy
policy.
This demonstration was organised with the understanding that ‘it is OK for anyone
to participate so long as they are opposed to nuclear power’ and therefore people
with all sorts of ideological backgrounds were there. There were lots of people at
each of our demonstrations because we accepted this just for that day. Because we
accepted this for the day of the demonstration, lots of people came to each

‘6/11 Shinjuku demo Nakayama Kazuya kara no momegoto epirōgu [Epilogue to the Nakayama
Kazuya Dispute at the 6/11 Shinjuku Demonstration]’, 12 June 2011, accessed 5 March 2015,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mc5kLO8_uzE&feature=youtube_gdata_player.
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demonstration. As a consequence, however, there will be plenty of things which you
do not like and which do not suit your own policy. If, however, we excluded people
whose thoughts do not align with our own based on something other than their
opposition to nuclear power then there would be no end to it. Firstly, let us focus on
stopping nuclear power which, in addition to being extremely dangerous, is built
upon a huge system of special interests.569

While clearly targeted at the Committee Against Hate Speech, this call for unity
under the banner of opposition to nuclear power was not universally accepted, even
among the demonstration organisers. A supplementary report later appeared on the
demonstration website. It began by noting that ‘we have received various indications
from both within and without the organising group with regard to the explanation we
published the other day. Therefore we will explain in more detail what has taken
place’. The supplement revealed how seriously the issue had divided the organising
group. Some organisers, including the organisers of the Human Recovery Project,
had threatened to pull their punk rock sound truck from the demonstration due to the
inclusion of a rightist on the rally’s platform. This was the group, discussed in
Chapter Three, to whose disaster relief activities in Tōhoku the money raised at the
Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations was to be donated. Those within the organising
group who were critical of the inclusion of Hariya on the platform were not, the
report now conceded, concerned about ‘a superficial issue of ‘differing ideologies
between left and right’’. They felt that this was a much larger issue which went ‘to
their very existence’. For these critics the apparent endorsement of a rightist speaker
challenged the very lives of people who suffer from discrimination because of their
gender, because they are day-labourers and or due to their ethnicity.570
In their original open letter to the Genpatsu Yamero demonstration organisers the
Committee Against Hate Speech drew connections between the structural oppression
of regional Japan and the oppression of non-Japanese residents and other minorities
in Japan. The Tōhoku region has been placed in a position where it is forced due to
economic depression to accept nuclear power plants to provide electricity to the
wealthier cities. The letter also suggested that workers in nuclear power plants are

569 ‘6.11 Shinjuku Genpatsu yamero demo hōkoku [Report on the 6.11 Genpatsu Yamero Demonstration
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drawn from the most exploited sectors of the labour force: day-labourers and foreign
workers. While the exact composition of the workforce at the Fukushima Daiichi
plant remains unclear, there is evidence that TEPCO sub-contractors rely on daylabourers, a large percentage of whom are members of one of Japan’s ethnic
minorities or of the burakumin outcast caste.571 Matthew Allen explains how many
Okinawans, for example, are driven to seek work in the mainland nuclear industry
due to a lack of economic development in the south-western archipelago.572 For
members of the Committee Against Hate Speech giving a platform to groups for
whom discrimination against foreigners and low-class workers was a fundamental
part of their ideology was incompatible with building an effective movement against
nuclear power and the underlying structural issues on which the industry is
predicated.573
This incident highlighted how difficult it is to create a truly open hiroba where
everyone who is opposed to nuclear power can participate. The Committee Against
Hate Speech and the Human Recover Project emphasised that not all individuals are
equally powerful in a ‘public’ sphere which is already riven by structural inequalities.
Shirōto no Ran’s entry into anti-nuclear politics after 3.11 brought new challenges
for a group that has tried to carry out politics not primarily in a ‘public place (kōkyō
no ba) but rather in the ‘place of everyday life’ (seikatsu no ba). Yet there is little
doubt that the policy of facilitating maximum participation based on the common
demand to end nuclear power explains why the demonstrations were so successful.
The organisers’ position that opposition to nuclear power should be the only factor in
determining whether someone could speak at Genpatsu Yamero events reflects their
desire to break out of the ‘leftist’ subculture and create a popular movement against
nuclear power. This would have been unlikely to succeed had the organisers
demanded strict ideological unity among demonstration participants. As I will
discuss further in Chapter Six, this tendency towards an anti-ideological position
Paul Jobin, ‘Dying for TEPCO? Fukushima’s Nuclear Contract Workers’, The Asia-Pacific Journal 9, no
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within the movement became even stronger at the Kantei Mae demonstrations (to be
discussed in Chapter Six). For anti-capitalists like Sabu Kohso, the position of the
Genpatsu Yamero demonstrators revealed both a lack of political sophistication and
the way in which the anti-nuclear issue was so closely bound up with the broader
politics of Japanese capitalism.
Since an event space involved in the coalition had too loose a political articulation, it
somehow ended up allowing the participation of a racist group who was not only
present but also demanded to speak at the rally. The group is notorious for denying
the comfort women issue. Of course, there was a harsh dispute and the representative
did not get to speak. Herein arose one of the problems concerning the slogan of antior de-nuke. What does it mean in the post 3/11 climate, in terms of politics, economy,
culture and everyday life? Fascists and nationalists can say No Nuke! [sic] for the
sake of the national well-being. Neoliberal entrepreneurs can propose alternative
energy for their new means of profit making. The government and corporations can
create projects for recovery of the disaster area that would encourage people to
remain there—with radiation—forever. Finally, even a prime minister can propose a
de-nuked society. We have innumerable questions to tackle.574

No Nukes Plaza opened up a space where participants could express these conflicting
understandings of anti-nuclear politics. Disagreements over who is allowed to
participate in the hiroba demonstrate the difficulty of implementing direct
democracy. The conflict which arose over the inclusion of rightists in the 11 June
demonstration was never satisfactorily resolved. At the September Genpatsu Yamero
demonstration, however, a further challenge to the freedom of the hiroba came when
the Metropolitan Police attacked the demonstration and arrested 12 participants,
including a number of demonstration organisers. These attacks, in addition to
bringing out a defensive response, also forced participants to more clearly articulate
the kind of hiroba they wanted to create.
For the Freedom of Demonstration and Assembly575
In response to the arrests at the 11 September Genpatsu Yamero demonstration, a
number of intellectuals, including literature scholar and philosopher Karatani Kōjin,
574
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sociologist Oguma Eiji and French literature scholar Ukai Satoshi, issued a ‘Joint
Statement for the Freedom of Demonstration and Assembly’ to protest the ‘blatantly
gratuitous nature of the arrests’.576 The Joint Statement alleged that, by targeting
members of the organising collective in particular, the police were engaging in a
deliberate strategy to repress anti-nuclear demonstrations.577 The three scholars held
a press conference at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan together with antinuclear activist Amamiya Karin from the demonstration’s organising group to
discuss their opposition to the arrests. They collected signatures in support of the
Joint Statement and raised funds to assist the arrestees with their legal defence.
The Joint Statement was written by Karatani with input from the other two scholars.
It described the post-Fukushima anti-nuclear demonstrations as ‘testament not to
confusion or disorder, but to the maturity of Japanese civil society’. The authors
argued that the organisation and joining of rallies was protected under Article 21 of
the Japanese Constitution which guarantees ‘freedom of assembly and association as
well as speech, press and all other forms of expression’. They accused the police of
‘systematically obstructing the demonstrations’ and conducting ‘coercive arrests
without any reasonable grounds’. The Joint Statement argued that, rather than simply
enforcing the law, the arrests revealed the ‘true intention’ of the police was directed
toward ‘repressing all anti-nuclear demonstrations by targeting the particular group
that has successfully organised rallies with young people’.578
In an article in the monthly current affairs magazine Sekai (World) Karatani
explained how writing the Joint Statement had forced him to think more deeply about
the language of the Japanese Constitution. 579 There is no specific mention of
demonstrating, he notes, within the text of the Constitution. The notion of
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demonstrating is, rather, subsumed within Article 21 which covers freedom of
assembly (shūkai), association (kessha) and expression (hyōgen). Interpreting the
word shūkai, however, Karatani noted that the original English draft indeed used the
word ‘assembly’. For Karatani, movement is central to the democratic power of
demonstrations. The English word ‘assemble’, he explained, implies movement by
the physical act of coming together in one place. In Japanese there is a distinction
between the words demonstration (demo) and assembly (shūkai). He criticises what
he sees as the separation between ‘static’ assemblies and ‘moving’ demonstrations in
Japan. Where there is no freedom to demonstrate, he argues, there is no real freedom
of assembly. This has long been the situation in Japan, he complains, where
demonstrations tended to be made up of small groups of ‘leaders’ while assemblies,
while often large and popularly attended, were not connected with demonstrations.580
Karatani argues that the demonstrations in Japan after 3.11 are neither shūkai nor
demo but true ‘assemblies’.581 Karatani does not use the Japanese word ‘shūkai’ here
but a Japanised word ‘asenburii’ which he uses to indicate Rousseau’s notion of an
assembly. For Rousseau, the assembly is an organ of popular direct democracy. He
contrasts the direct democracy of the assembly with the delegation of popular
sovereignty to elected representatives which occurs in parliamentary systems.582 At
the September Genpatsu Yamero demonstration Karatani gave a speech in which he
repeated some of the clichés about Japanese democracy as immature and imported
from the West which I discussed in Chapter Two. In his Sekai article, however, he
identifies a similarity between Rousseau’s notion of an assembly and a form of
political gathering which has existed in Japan in pre-modern times: the village yoriai.
This village yoriai, as described by folklorist Miyamoto Tsuneichi, was a form of
assembly in which the members of a village or larger community gathered in one
place to discuss and decide on the issues of the day.583 This political form, Karatani
asserts, existed in all clan societies in one form or another and is the origin of later
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forms of peoples’ assemblies and councils. In modern representative democracies it
is this direct democracy of the yoriai which has been lost. In order to reclaim direct
democracy, Karatani argues, we need assemblies.
Karatani rejects the idea that demonstrations are simply a means (shudan) by which
to achieve a particular goal. He is equally critical of two distinct Japanese political
traditions: the revolutionary tradition in which demonstrations were regarded simply
as a means of making violent revolution; and the parliamentary tradition in which
demonstrating was undertaken primarily to help parties win votes in future elections.
He blames both of these approaches, in which the demonstration itself is
subordinated to some greater political goal, for the lack of political demonstrations in
Japan prior to 3.11.584 These ‘two traditions’ are caricatures and Karatani provides
little evidence to support his claims. Nevertheless, the instrumentalist understanding
of demonstrating he identifies here is something many Genpatsu Yamero activists
have rejected.
Karatani rejects the separation between means and ends which is implicit in
instrumental reason. Rather than viewing demonstrating as a means by which society
can influence a separate sphere of parliamentary government, Karatani demands that
demonstrations be considered as ends in themselves. The power of demonstrating is
that it produces ‘a society in which people demonstrate’. The anti-nuclear movement
does have a clearly defined end in terms of its demand to end Japan’s reliance on
nuclear power. Yet Karatani, like many of the activists I have discussed so far, see
the anti-nuclear demonstrations as possessing a much more general potential. Antinuclear demonstrations produce ‘liberated zones’ and hiroba where democratic
discussions and debates can take place. In doing so, they reveal the possibility of
more direct forms of democracy. These notions of democracy are counter-posed to
the representative politics of Japanese parliamentarism. Karatani cites Rousseau’s
idea that in the assembly the people exercise sovereignty directly without the
mediation of any representative. 585 In a ‘society in which people demonstrate’
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sovereignty rests not in the parliament but ‘with ordinary people’. It is not brought
about via electing representatives but by demonstrating.
Karatani’s words echo the reflections of Judith Butler. The global uprisings of 2011,
particularly the Occupy Wall Street movement, prompted the philosopher to theorise
the way demonstrating inscribes democratic praxis into public space.
In the first instance, no one mobilizes a claim to move and assemble freely without
moving and assembling together with others. In the second instance, the square and
the street are not only the material supports for action, but they themselves are part
of any theory of public and corporeal action that we might propose. Human action
depends upon all sorts of supports – it is always supported action. But in the case of
public assemblies, we see quite clearly not only that there is a struggle over what
will be public space, but a struggle as well over those basic ways in which we are, as
bodies, supported in the world – a struggle against disenfranchisement, effacement,
and abandonment.586

In the same article, Butler emphasises the way the assemblies took to the streets as an
act of reclaiming politics as something people already participate in through the
substance of daily life.
And when crowds move outside the square, to the side street or the back alley, to the
neighbourhoods where streets are not yet paved, then something more happens. At
such a moment, politics is no longer defined as the exclusive business of public
sphere distinct from a private one, but it crosses that line again and again, bringing
attention to the way that politics is already in the home, or on the street, or in the
neighbourhood, or indeed in those virtual spaces that are unbound by the architecture
of the public square.587

Hardt and Negri have theorised the subjectivities of contemporary social movements
in terms of a ‘multitude’. Yet the multitude can never become a stable political
subject like ‘the people’, ‘the masses’ or ‘the working class’. Rather, they argue that
‘if the multitude is to form a body ... it will remain always and necessarily an open,
plural composition and never become a unitary whole divided by hierarchical
organs’.588 Amamiya Karin, in her writing on the No Nukes Plaza action in June
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compared the scene with the chimimōryō of Japanese mythology. These are the
nebulous spirits and monsters of mountains and rivers, which, Amamiya suggests are
able to express their version of the ‘No Nukes’ message in whatever way they like.
Japanese mythology inspired freeter activism prior to 3.11, too. Cassegård
documents that anti-war activists Oda Masanori and rapper ECD had been inspired to
organise the anti-war sound demonstrations by a scene in the horror movie Yōkai
hyaku monogatari (One Hundred Ghost Stories) where monsters marched out into
the street from a run-down old house.589 Hardt and Negri suggest that multitude will
always refuse to become a stable political body. It remains a living, monstrous flesh
which refuses to sacrifice its singularity behind a unifying identity. Nevertheless, the
gatherings in the squares demonstrated that singularities can articulate common
political desires for democracy. The multitude is the ‘subjectivity that emerges from
this dynamic of subjectivity and commonality’.590 Yet, despite the importance of
individuality and difference in contemporary social movements, it is through coming
together in the streets and in the squares that activists have been able to creates a
space for the collective expression of difference.

Summary
In this chapter I have discussed the hiroba as a tactic in the anti-nuclear movement.
Genpatsu Yamero activists sought to create a liberated zone where people could
share their thoughts and feelings about nuclear power. In doing so they entered into a
dialogue with the history of hiroba as a social movement tactic in Shinjuku and
contributed to an ongoing discussion about the role of the hiroba as a space for
democracy in Japan. They did not, however, limit these discussions to the Japanese
context. Genpatsu Yamero activists were in contact with activists in the Occupy Wall
Street movement and similar urban social movements in Europe and Asia. Their
development of the hiroba was informed by these global discussions about how to
make cities into spaces for radical democratic praxis. The ideal of the hiroba was
tested, however, by the issue of whether right-wing activists who were opposed to
nuclear power would also be permitted to participate in the hiroba. Activists also had
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to confront the repressive power of the state when activists were arrested at the
September Genpatsu Yamero protest. These challenges also provided an opportunity
for participants to deepen their debate on how democratic praxis could ‘take place’ in
contemporary Tokyo. For some philosophers and activists who were involved in the
movement, this led to the development of a notion of the assembly. The notions of
assembly and of yoriai were marshalled to shed further light on the debate on how to
create a truly democratic hiroba. These debates highlighted once again the
importance of community-building and inter-personal relationships in the democratic
praxis of the Genpatsu Yamero movement.
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CHAPTER FIVE – YAHO VILLAGE

The ‘local’ cannot hold a mass rally or demonstration. If, however,
the ‘local’ is a single star then the ‘power of the people’, is the power of many
stars shining brightly in various colours. If you then link one star to another, you can
make constellations; and constellations cover the whole universe.
Yasuda Hibari591

Figure 7 Kunitachi demonstration, February 2012592
591 Yasuda, ‘Gotōchi rōkaru demo dai 3 kai: Minna no NONUKES Nishi Tōkyō [Local Demonstrations
No 3: Everybody’s No Nukes Western Tokyo]’, 9.
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On Christmas Day in 2011 the ‘We Don’t Need Nuclear Power! Costume!!
Disguise!! Christmas Demonstration in Kunitachi’ wound its way through the streets
of the western Tokyo municipality of Kunitachi. At the time I was living in
Kunitachi at the beginning of an eighteen month research studentship at Hitotsubashi
University which is located in the district. I seized the opportunity to observe one of
the many local demonstrations which took place during my stay.
The Kunitachi ‘costume’ demonstration was true to its name. About half the
participants were dressed in a wide variety of costumes: from a ‘clown army’ with
Santa hats and military fatigues to belly-dancers, Mexican Zapatista guerrillas and
drummers wearing the Guy Fawkes masks which were made popular in 2011 during
the Occupy Wall Street protests. 593 The demonstration began in the north of
Kunitachi in a park near Yaho railway station. It snaked through the Yaho shopping
district before heading along University Avenue towards the main Kunitachi
shopping district outside Kunitachi railway station. That evening, the demonstrators
reconvened outside the station and marched back up University Avenue to the Yaho
area where the protest march culminated in an all-night party at a local bar.
The Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations which I have discussed in Chapters Two,
Three and Four were the largest protests to take place in the first six months after
3.11. After the eleven arrests at the September 2011 Genpatsu Yamero demonstration
in Shinjuku, however, Shirōto no Ran did not organise another Genpatsu Yamero
action until July 2012. Oguma Eiji records how the mounting pressure on the group
caused by the arrests and their almost incessant activity during the six months after
3.11 had left them exhausted. Over the winter of 2011–2012 the anti-nuclear
movement in Tokyo entered a quiet phase. 594 Yet while there were no large
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centralised demonstrations during this period innumerable smaller actions continued
to take place across the metropolitan area. The Christmas 2011 demonstration and
subsequent actions in Kunitachi were an example of this.
As I explained in Chapter Two, Shirōto no Ran’s politics were built upon the notion
of the ‘place of everyday life’ (seikatsu no ba). After the first Genpatsu Yamero
demonstration in April 2011, however, the focus of the group’s activity had shifted
from Shirōto no Ran’s home in Kōenji to larger urban centres such as Shibuya and
Shinjuku. In 2012 many Genpatsu Yamero activists returned to the neighbourhoods
where they lived to organise and take part in local actions against nuclear power. The
Datsugenpatsu Suginami demonstrations in February and May of 2012, for example,
took place in Suginami ward, the municipality which includes Kōenji. They were
supported by Matsumoto Hajime and other Shirōto no Ran activists from the area.595
Many of the activists who took part in the Kunitachi demonstrations were also
involved in Genpatsu Yamero, some in organisational roles. The convenient location
of the Kunitachi and Kōenji railway stations on the Chūō railway line readily
facilitated the participation of activists based in Kunitachi in the Genpatsu Yamero
movement. As political scientist and anti-nuclear activist Kinoshita Chigaya points
out, the various neighbourhoods along the Sōbu and Chūō lines596 constituted an
important axis of anti-nuclear struggle in Tokyo. These neighbourhoods have a long
cultural history of non-sectarian protest. Anti-nuclear protests were held at numerous
towns along the Sōbu-Chūō line after 3.11597
Kinoshita Chigaya, ‘Hangenpatsu demo wa dono yō ni tenkai shita ka [How Did the Anti-nuclear
Demonstrations Evolve?]’, in Genpatsu o tomeru hitobito: 3.11 kara kantaei mae made [People Who Stop
Nuclear Power Plants: From 3.11 to the Prime Minister’s Residence], ed. Oguma Eiji and Kinoshita
Chigaya (Tokyo: Bungei shunjū, 2013), 310.
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As I have discussed in the previous three chapters, the demonstrations organised by
Shirōto no Ran and the Nantoka Neighbourhood emerged from a set of already
existing alternative communities in Tokyo which then formed the basis of an antinuclear movement after 3.11. Like Genpatsu Yamero, the Kunitachi demonstrations
incorporated music, costume, dance and street theatre into their protest repertoire.
The demonstrations reflected the growth of the new activist culture in western Tokyo.
Kunitachi has a proud tradition of residents’ movements (jūmin undō) and peace
activism.598 The anti-nuclear protests I discuss in this chapter, while overlapping with
these movements in various ways, were primarily organised by a group of relatively
recent migrants to this part of the city. The growing number of precarious workers,
artists and musicians in Kunitachi who maintained links to the cultural world of the
Suginami and Nakano ward areas in the inner-city brought the political style of the
precarity movements into the mix of Kunitachi’s existing grassroots political
culture.599
The Kunitachi demonstrations were organised at a small bar located near the Yaho
railway station. It was to this bar that participants generally returned at the end of the
day to drink, eat and ‘mingle’ (kōryū). I begin by discussing the way Kunitachi
demonstration organisers conceived of the demonstration as a means not only of
political expression but also of community building. I then analyse the way the music
of the demonstrations acted as a conduit for the cultural memories of anti-nuclear
activism in Japan. The music of the late Imawano Kiyoshirō (1951–2009), a onetime Kunitachi resident, helped local activists to connect with a long history of anti598 On Kunitachi’s residents’ movements see, Kadomatsu Narufumi, ‘Keikan hogo teki machizukuri to hō
no yakuwari: Kunitachi shi manshon funsō o megutte [Community Development for Scenic Preservation
and the Role of Law: A Case Study of the Kunitachi High-rise Apartment Dispute]’, Toshi jūtaku gaku
[Urban Housing Sciences] no 38 (2002): 48–57; André Sorensen and Carolin Funck, Living Cities in Japan:
Citizens’ Movements, Machizukuri and Local Environments (Taylor & Francis, 2009), 41–42, 262–264. Kunitachi
is located nearby to Sunagawa where, in the 1950s, a major struggle broke out against the expansion of a
U.S. military airbase. See Kenji Hasegawa, ‘The Lost Half-Decade Revived and Reconfigured: Sunagawa,
1956’, Yokohama Kokuritsu Daigaku Ryūgakusei Sentā Kyōiku Kenkyū Ronshū 16 (2009): 117–141. Eventually
the U.S. airbase was returned to Japan and it has now become a Japanese Self-Defense Forces base. Local
residents continue to protest the base to this day and some activists associated with the anti-base
movement in Sunagawa became involved in anti-nuclear protests after 3.11. See, for example, the account
of one such activist in Oguma, Genpatsu o tomeru hitobito, 152–154.
599 Kinoshita, ‘Hangenpatsu demo wa dono yō ni tenkai shita ka [How Did the Anti-nuclear
Demonstrations Evolve?]’, 311.
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nuclear struggle. The region’s ties to the counter-culture and the anti-nuclear ‘new
wave’ movement of the 1980s were also reflected in the music of the Kunitachi
demonstrations. As has been discussed in previous chapters, anti-nuclear activists in
Tokyo were well aware of the connections between their struggle and anti-nuclear
and democracy movements around the world. I analyse the way Kunitachi activists
made these connections explicit through the use of film and song from the Women’s
Peace Camp at Greenham Common in England, one of the most important feminist
and anti-nuclear movements of the 1980s and 1990s. In the final two sections I
discuss the way performance and props were used at the Kunitachi demonstrations.
Activists lampooned powerful figures such as the Tokyo Electric Power Company
and tried to act out possible alternative futures through street theatre. They also ‘gave
shape’ to these ideas by creating props and costumes which were exhibited at a small
gallery in Kunitachi in early 2013. In this chapter I discuss the role of memory and
place in the development of anti-nuclear culture in a local community. I show how
the ‘localisation’ of the anti-nuclear movement in this western Tokyo community
reflected the politics of the seikatsu no ba, the ‘place of everyday life’ discussed in
Chapter Two and how the memories of past protest captured in music and film
informed contemporary practices.

Walking for the Future You Desire
In the lead up to the first Kunitachi Demonstration on Christmas Day 2011, protest
organisers released the following short statement.
What is the purpose of a demonstration?
There are probably people who think:
‘I wonder if you can really say that nuclear power can be stopped by going to a
demonstration?’
What might be the purpose of a demonstration?
Demonstrations exist to show one’s feeling that ‘I do not accept this situation’.
There is no winning or losing here.
There is only your determination.
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There is only your body, walking for the future you desire.600

In this extract organisers explicitly reject the idea that a demonstration is simply a
means by which to effect policy change. Rather, they suggest an understanding of the
practice of demonstrating as a collective performance which gives expression to
participants’ desires for a different kind of future. Like the Shirōto no Ran
demonstrations discussed in Chapter Two, these Kunitachi demonstrations proposed
a festive, immanent conception of protest. In a sense they would achieve their
purpose if participants felt they were able to give vent to their feelings regardless of
whether they were successful at stopping the nuclear power plants. Such protests are
concerned as much with the constitution of a community as they are with making an
intervention into the formal political sphere.
New York-based political philosopher Sabu Kohso draws on Rebecca Solnit’s
history of walking601 to highlight the importance of ‘walking together’. When the
people of the world “walk together” and “fight together”’, he writes, the space they
occupy becomes ‘a place of ‘projection’, ‘retrogression’ and ‘divergence’’. Here the
direct connection between cause and effect is broken right from the start. Even the
dyads ‘hope’ and ‘despair’, ‘forward’ and ‘backward’ and ‘victory’ and ‘failure’ are
not simply antagonisms. They are all indispensable elements of the demonstration.602
Like the Committee to Hold the Kunitachi Demonstration, Kohso rejects the
simplistic binaries of winning and losing; success and failure. Walking together, he
suggests, is a means of embodying the kind of community that participants desire.
Implicit in this idea is the rejection of instrumental logic which has been a common
feature of the anti-nuclear movements across the industrialised world since the 1980s.
Antonio Negri, writing on the anti-nuclear movements of the 1980s, reflects that
‘nowadays the centre of struggles for liberation consists in the multiplication of
movements and in the daily, on-going effort to eliminate the fear which derives from
600 ‘Demonsutoreeshon in Kunitachi: Kurisumasu demonsutoreeshon yarō kai kara no messeeji
[Demonstration in Kunitachi: A Message from the Committee for Holding the Kunitachi
Demonstration]’, Demonsutoreeshon in Kunitachi, 14 December 2011, accessed 14 May 2014,
http://nonukes-kunitachi.blogspot.com.au/2011/12/blog-post_14.html.
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the logic of nuclear power – and the spontaneous proposal of new modes of existence,
in the affirmation of a project of renewal and transformation which is in no
circumstance subordinated to a logocentric and instrumental logic’.603
The tactical rejection of logo-centrism and instrumental logic within anti-nuclear
movements stands out because the nuclear power industry always appears cloaked in
the language of scientific reason. If the anti-nuclear movement is understood as a
thoroughgoing movement to ‘de-nuclearise’ (datsu genpatsu) society, then the
premises upon which that industry is built must be called into question. ‘Walking for
the future you desire’ is a projective project. Victory and defeat can be seen as part of
a learning process for a logic based on solidarity rather than the authority of expertise.
Activists in the precarity movements in Tokyo prior to 3.11 recognised that their
ability to affect the formal political sphere was limited. Amamiya Karin, writing
about the precarity movements, suggests that the act of demonstrating is its own
reward. ‘A bunch of oddballs suddenly turning the street into a liberated area! That is
the real pleasure of a demonstration’, she explains.604 Such an approach could be
interpreted as evidence of a lack of confidence in the power of street politics. Yet
activists have attempted to turn their relative weakness in the public sphere around
by creating spaces in which to celebrate their marginalised positionality.
Demonstrating in this vein is not about party politics. Rather, it is an assertion of the
political nature of the everyday and of the everydayness of political practice.
Takemasa Ando explains how, after the Fukushima disaster, ‘people have been
thinking about the everyday politics of living an affluent, consumerist lifestyle urban residents in particular who depend on the generation of power in villages and
small towns’.
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Mizota Miyuki, one of the organisers of the Kunitachi

demonstrations, distributed a flier in the lead up to the Christmas Day demonstration
in which he called on his readers to ‘make demonstrating just like pooing and

603 Antonio Negri, The Politics of Subversion: A Manifesto for the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge, UK  : Malden,
MA: Polity Press, 2005), 199.
604

Amamiya, Hangeki karuchā: purekariāto no yutaka na sekai, 87.

Takemasa Ando, Japan’s New Left Movements: Legacies for Civil Society (London: Routledge, 2013), 2. Ando
shows how the politics of the everyday are rooted in the political legacy of the New Left movements of
the 1960s and 1970s.
605

177

weeing’. He explained this crude expression further by saying that ‘demonstrating is
a way of life, an act of expression that is a natural part of daily life’. In this sense ‘it
doesn’t differ much from pooing or weeing’.606
This call to make demonstrating an everyday activity recalls the discussion between
Shirōto no Ran’s Matsumoto Hajime and political philosopher Karatani Kōjin which
I discussed in Chapter Two. Here, Matsumoto recalled the peasant rebellions (ikki)
which have inspired his own understanding of radical politics. ‘The peasant
rebellions really had to be carried out over an extremely long time. Sometimes they
continued for years. That is when it really becomes integrated into daily life’.607
Karatani and Matsumoto agree that demonstrating is powerful because it transforms
everyday life, making rebellion a habitual and ordinary state of affairs. Miyadai
Shinji has argued that the struggle against nuclear power is really a struggle to
transform the kind of society in which the building of nuclear power plants has been
made possible.
Mizota’s use of the crude analogy ‘pooing and weeing’ for demonstrating might be
understood in terms of the literary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin’s observation of the
importance of crude folk humour in the folk culture of the marketplaces of mediaeval
Europe. In the ‘grotesque realism’ of the marketplace, Bakhtin explains, ‘the bodily
element is deeply positive. It is presented not in a private, egotistical form, severed
from the other spheres of life, but as something universal, representing all the
people’. 608 Bakhtin contrasts the comedic recognition of the body in grotesque
realism with the bourgeois desire to ‘contain the bodily functions in the bourgeois
ego’. Rather than being contained within the individualistic bourgeois ego, the
‘material bodily principle is contained not in the biological individual … but in the

606 Kamite Keiko, ‘Gotōchi datsu genpatsu rōkaru demo dai 1 kai: Hōshanō wa iranee! kasō! henshin!
demonsutorēshon in Kunitachi [My Local Anti-nuclear Demonstration Number 1: We Don’t Need No
Radiation! Costume! Disguise! Demonstration in Kunitachi]’, Kikan pīpuruzu puran [People’s Plan Quarterly]
no 59 (October 2012): 95.
607 Karatani and Matsumoto, ‘Seikatsu to ittaika shita demo wa tezuyoi [Demonstration that are Integrated
with Daily Life are Strong]’, 129.
608 M. M. Bakhtin, ‘Rabelais and His World’, in Literary Theory, an Anthology (Malden: Blackwell Publishers,
2004), 687–688.
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people, a people who are continually growing and renewing’.609 Mizota’s crudeness
upsets middle class sensibilities about appropriate language. He embraces an
embodied positionality from which participants might challenge the bourgeois
sensibilities which make the dominance of the nuclear village seem ordinary and
natural.
In a tight-knit community like Kunitachi, however, engaging in contentious politics
poses a risk to an individual’s reputation. Kamite Keiko, a participant in the
demonstrations, explains why organisers decided to make the Kunitachi
demonstrations a costumed affair. Some local mothers, she writes, had spoken to
Mizota of their desire to express their anger over the nuclear issue. They were
concerned, however, that they might be recognised by other mothers if they were
seen attending a demonstration. Thus the idea of a ‘Costume and Disguise’ (kasō
henshin) demonstration was born.610 The difficulties raised by these women suggests
that there might be a problem holding demonstrations in a local neighbourhood in
which participants already possess strong community ties. Disagreements over
political questions might pose a threat to the relationships through local schools,
workplaces and families which residents need to maintain in order to continue living
in the community.
Based on my experience of observing the Kunitachi demonstrations I find it hard to
believe that the costumes would have served as an effective means of disguise. Few
of the participants were so well concealed that they could not have been recognised
with a cursory glance. Donning costumes does, however, serve as a symbolic marker
of separation from everyday life. The use of costume and dance in the Kunitachi
demonstrations draws attention to the bodies of the participants but it also masks
their individuality, ‘turning upside-down’ the daily reproduction of an individualistic
subjectivity and allowing collective subjectivities to emerge in the rhythms of the
carnival. The Kunitachi demonstrations therefore contained a paradox. Organisers
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wanted to make demonstrating an everyday act ‘like pooing and weeing’. They chose
to do so, however, through the medium of carnival – something which implicitly lies
outside of everyday experience.
Kamite paints a picture of the Kunitachi demonstrations which embraces both the
everyday and the carnivalesque.
People walking while playing drums or guitars, people carrying their own homemade placards, people in costume. Of course, just as there are people walking in
their everyday clothes and others who joined in along the way, there are people with
their pets.611

Mizota calls for demonstrating to become a part of everyday life but he insists that
we have to transform the way we demonstrate in order to make that possible. We
have to don costumes and disguises and take a step outside our daily life routines in
order to make demonstrating a simple act of daily life. Perhaps this suggests an
‘ordinariness’ that is more open to change, more flexible than the ‘mundane’
repetition which characterises much of everyday life. Mizota further argues that we
have to change the way we demonstrate in order to overcome the idea that street
politics is boring. Clichéd notions of demonstrations as overly serious and aggressive
limit participation. In the flier in which he called on participants to make
demonstrating ‘like pooing and weeing’ he also asked participants to re-invent their
understanding of what a demonstration is. ‘Please be inventive in your participation
and transform (dai henshin) the image of a “demonstration” that we have held up
until now’, he says.612
The sight of the Kunitachi demonstrations passing through the streets of the city and
along the long University Avenue lined with cherry and maple trees was not an
everyday one. It did, however, bear a strong resemblance to local festivals which also
utilise this route. The Kunitachi demonstrations typically commenced at the Yaho
end of University Avenue and marched towards Kunitachi railway station. The Yaho
Tenmangū Shinto shrine is also located in the Yaho district, a very old settlement

611

Ibid., 95.

612

Ibid.

180

which predates the more modern development around Kunitachi station. Cycling
down University Avenue one morning at the beginning of the Tenmangū shrine
festival I witnessed a parade of priests on horseback, shrine maidens and members of
the community riding on large portable shrines. The shrine festival parade reminded
me of the Kunitachi demonstrations with their costumes, props and music. I realised
that the theatrical style of the demonstrations was not dissimilar to the festive
traditions of the Kunitachi area. I also evoked the image of the peasant ikki, which
were often carried out in the name of religious ritual and used many of the tropes of
shrine festivals.
Like the Christmas Day demonstration of 2011 with which I opened this chapter, the
Kunitachi demonstrations always took place on or about significant events in the
calendar. Organisers made use of both indigenous and imported festival days,
creating a new culture of festive anti-nuclear protest which might form a new kind of
calendar with strong ties to the seasonal life of the local area. Following the
Christmas demonstration in 2011 was a demonstration on the setsubun613 festival in
February. Playing on the setsubun ritual, which involves throwing soy beans at a
family member dressed as a ‘demon’ and driving him out of the house, this
demonstration featured a number of costumed ‘demons’. Emblazoned on the banner
at the front of the demonstration was the humorous slogan ‘Hey! Even the Demons
are Angry!!’ On April Fool’s Day a group of clowning performers distributed ‘Safe
Sweets’ from a fictitious ‘Restart Shop’. When they were unwrapped the packages
were found to contain nothing but crumpled paper (I will discuss this prop further
below). At the Tanabata Star Festival Demonstration in July a costumed ‘prince’
(hikoboshi) and princess (orihime) acted out the annual reunion of two celestial
lovers which is celebrated in this traditional festival.614 In October, the Kunitachi
demonstration took a Halloween theme while in March 2013 the theme was the Dolls
Festival (hinamatsuri).
Setsubun, the “bean-throwing festival”, is an old lunar festival in which households enact a ritualistic
casting out of demons by throwing soybeans at a family member who is dressed as a demon (oni) while
chanting “oni wa soto, fuku wa uchi” (“Demons out, good luck in”).
613
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These seasonal themes served to connect the demonstrations with the existing
rhythms of the festive year while infusing it with a spirit of resistance and rebellion.
The Christmas Day demonstration featured a TEPCO Santa and Setsubun had a
number of different coloured ‘demons’. At the Tanabata Star Festival demonstration,
activists adapted the Tanabata custom of writing wishes on slips of paper and
hanging them on a bamboo frond. Participants wrote out their wishes for a nuclearfree Japan, attached them to bamboo fronds and carried them through the street as
part of the procession. At the Halloween demonstration, a cast of ghosts and ghouls
broke into an ‘anti-nuclear’ version of Michael Jackson’s hit song ‘Thriller’ as they
paraded past Kunitachi station and turned into University Avenue. At the Dolls
Festival demonstration two costumed demonstrators played the role of ‘Odairisama’
and ‘Himesama’, the dolls representing the emperor and empress of Japan which are
displayed in Japanese homes during this festival.
While the carnivalesque atmosphere of the parades lasted for only a few hours, the
demonstration served to connect participants to a ritualised community of the streets.
In a sense the demonstration adapted the function of local shrine festivals in
consolidating a community through ritual.615 While local shrine festivals work to
preserve the social order, however, the Kunitachi Demonstration aimed to subvert
and transform it. They disrupt the soundscape of the capitalist city for a few hours
before the bodies of the demonstrators disperse and the sounds of the city return. The
seasonal manifestations of the anti-nuclear movement in Kunitachi were one means
by which a community of resistance was produced and sustained in the municipality.
By adapting the existing rhythms of the festive calendar, the protests sought to invest
the seasonal rhythms which punctuate everyday life in Japan with the spirit of protest.
While making protest a part of these familiar rhythms activists also sought to call up
memories of protest captured in music. In a city with a vibrant music scene the
histories and practices of rebel music were another powerful means by which to
produce an anti-nuclear community.

615 Bestor discusses the role of local shrine festivals in maintaining neighbourhood communities in Tokyo
in Neighborhood Tokyo, 224–255.
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Remembering Kiyoshirō
In the centre of Figure 7, a photograph of the ‘setsubun’ Kunitachi demonstration in
February 2012, are two figures dressed in brightly coloured clothes with skin-tight
leggings and white-painted faces. These two protesters paid homage to the memory
of the late Imawano Kiyoshirō, Japan’s glamorous ‘King of Rock’, by imitating his
garish style of dress. At the April Fool’s Day demonstration later that year,
‘Kiyoshirō’ made another appearance, this time as a man wearing a Kiyoshirō mask
and riding a bicycle while wearing a bright yellow shawl. He joined the
demonstration as it passed the ‘Tamaranzaka’ area at the end of Kunitachi’s Asahi
Street. Kiyoshirō, as he is affectionately known by his fans, grew up in the Kunitachi
area. Later in life he lodged in the Tamaranzaka district, a period he commemorated
in a song of the same name. Local anti-nuclear protesters, many of whom were active
in the region’s underground rock and roll music scene, displayed great pride in the
fact that the former rock legend had once lived in their town. They mourned his
untimely death in 2009 at the age of just 58 by evoking his memory at the
demonstrations.
Kiyoshirō was an important figure for the anti-nuclear movement primarily because
of two anti-nuclear songs which he and his band R.C. Succession had recorded for
their Covers album in 1988.616 The songs were covers of two classic American
songs—Eddie Cochran’s ‘Summertime blues’ and Elvis Presley’s ‘Love me
tender’—which he had rewritten with anti-nuclear lyrics. The album was planned for
release by the band’s record company Toshiba-EMI. The inclusion of the antinuclear songs, however, caused the label to cancel the release of the album.617 At the
time, a Toshiba-EMI spokesperson explained the company’s decision not to release
the album by stating that the album was ‘not suitable for Toshiba-EMI to sell’.618 The
record label’s parent company Toshiba, is one of Japan’s largest manufacturers of
nuclear reactors. They had built 10 of the 36 nuclear reactors operating in Japan at
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the time the album was recorded. Toshiba-EMI’s actions typified the cosy
relationship between the nuclear power industry, the electrical appliance industry and
the entertainment business.
Covers was subsequently released under a different label and the controversy
surrounding the cancellation did nothing to hurt sales. The record debuted at number
one in Japan’s Oricon music charts.619 After Fukushima, video recordings of R.C.
Succession’s live performances of these songs began attracting attention on the video
sharing site YouTube. Tokyo disc jockey Peter Barakan reportedly received
numerous requests to play them on his radio show on InterFM. He played
‘Summertime blues’ but, after consultation with station management, he did not play
‘Love me tender’. In this rendition of Elvis’s original song Imawano referenced the
contamination of the milk supply after the Chernobyl disaster by singing ‘I want to
drink milk’. Station management claimed that they did not want to play the song out
of a concern that it would create fear about the safety of drinking milk.620 Whatever
their motives, the incident demonstrated that more than 20 years after their release,
the songs still had the power to ignite controversy and invite censorship from the
gatekeepers of the music industry.
Kiyoshirō’s example as a popular artist who risked his career in order to speak out
against the nuclear industry was an inspiration to many of the artists who intervened
in the debate on nuclear power after 3.11. Rocker Saitō Kazuyoshi, whose ‘It was
always a lie’ was discussed in Chapter Two, acknowledges Kiyoshirō as a key
inspiration as do rapper Arai Rumi and Kunitachi-based reggae singer Likkle Mai.621
Remembering Kiyoshirō and his anti-nuclear music at the Kunitachi demonstration
connected the movement against nuclear power in post-Fukushima Japan with a long
history of anti-nuclear struggle. Furthermore, the anti-nuclear songs, taken as they
are from the great American rock and roll tradition, bring longer histories of
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resistance into the cultural world of Tokyo’s contemporary anti-nuclear movement.
Sociologists Ron Eyerman and Andrew Jamison have shown how the music of social
movements can act as a repository for the memories of protest. In their study of the
music of the U.S. Civil Rights movement and of protest music in the 1960s, they
showed that songs often outlives the original waves of social protest in which they
are created, making the histories of these movements available to future
generations.622 Nor is this a simple matter of singing old songs and evoking nostalgic
longings about movements past. Like Kiyoshirō, artists typically adapt and modify
existing songs, either directly by creating cover-versions or by adapting aspects of
earlier musical styles. Like Saitō or Arai they can also adapt their own earlier
repertoire to address current political issues. The musical cultures of social
movements are ‘spaces for cultural growth and experimentation, for the mixing of
musical and other artistic genres and for the infusion of new kinds of meaning into
music’.623
The artists who took part in the Kunitachi demonstrations celebrated Kiyoshirō’s
political stance in numerous ways. The demonstrations in Kunitachi were organised
by people who were very active in Tokyo’s musical and artistic sub-cultures. The
organising committee met in a Yaho bar which hosted weekly concerts featuring
underground bands from the area and around the country. Local musicians regularly
held intimate concerts at the bar, where they took turns to perform songs from
Kiyoshirō’s oeuvre. Unlike the ‘King of Rock’, however, the musicians who were
active in the Kunitachi demonstrations were primarily independent artists who were
not signed to major labels. Reggae singer Likkle Mai, a local resident who performed
at the Kunitachi demonstrations, explained in an interview with Shirōto no Ran’s
Futatsugi Shin how her independence from the major labels gave her the freedom to
speak her mind on the nuclear issue.624 The invocation of Kiyoshirō’s memory at
demonstrations and at more intimate occasions such as the concerts helped Kunitachi
artists to create a popular mythology which legitimated their own positionality as
activist-musicians.
622

Eyerman and Jamison, Music and Social Movements, 1–2.

623

Ibid., 1.

624

Likkle Mai, Rumi, and Futatsugi, ‘One Step to Live’, 97–100.

185

In an interview with Shirōto no Ran’s Futatsugi Shin, Likkle Mai explained how she
was influenced by Kiyoshirō as well as figures such as Bob Marley within her own
roots reggae tradition. She explained the web of political relationships which sustain
the nuclear village using the conceptual language of roots reggae culture.
Nuclear power is being supported by the Babylon system under which large
corporations with huge vested interests and some powerful people force these risks
onto us ordinary citizens in order to make money. 625

The notion of ‘Babylon’ in reggae and Rastafarian culture refers to the corruption
and immorality of Western colonialism and neoliberal capitalism. Marvin Sterling
explains that in Japanese reggae culture, the notion of Babylon has been adapted to
encompass both notions of the domination of Japan by Western culture and the way
Japanese capitalism exploits the poor in Japan and around the world.626 Likkle Mai
uses her understanding of the ‘Babylon system’, derived from roots reggae culture, to
develop a critique of the contemporary nuclear industry in Japan.
Like Likkle Mai, Kiyoshirō relied on his own musical roots in the rebellious culture
of rock and roll music to produce the critiques of nuclear power on the Covers album.
Imawano’s anti-nuclear cover of ‘Summertime blues’, pays homage to the original.
George Lipsitz explains that the politics of Eddie Cochrane’s ‘Summertime blues’,
‘drew a connection between youth, dependency, sexual repression, poverty, and the
political impotence of youth’. He argues that the genre of rock and roll music to
involve ‘a dialogic process of active remembering’. It ‘derives its comedic and
dramatic tensions from working-class vernacular traditions, and ... carries on a
prejudice in favour of community, collectivity, and creativity in its very forms and
constructs’.627 By drawing on American rock and roll to communicate his opposition
to nuclear power and to the networks of power which sustain the industry, Kiyoshirō
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entered into an ongoing dialogue that positions rock and roll as a subversive medium
for speaking truth to power and giving expression to the frustrations of oppression.
Cultural sociologist Mōri Yoshitaka has highlighted the importance of culture as a
site of politics in social movements around the world since the 1990s.628 He notes
that in the cultural politics of recent ‘carnivalesque’ social movements politics has
become a ‘war of position’.
This war of position is not a temporary battle over the solution of a specific problem
but rather an endless struggle. This struggle develops in the streets, parks, schools
and other specific places, as it is controlled and suppressed and subjected inevitably
to oppression and surveillance it is scattered and dispersed but, while it goes
underground, it somehow manages to live on.629

In the absence of centralised organisational structures or consistent ideological
positions, social movements in post-industrial societies reproduce themselves by
developing cultural forms, such as rebel music, which are also sometimes taken up
by the broader culture. Eyerman and Jamison explain that ‘it is through songs, art
and literature—and as ritualized practices and evaluative criteria—that social
movements retain their presence in the collective memory in the absence of the
particular political platforms and struggles that first brought them into being’.630 The
phenomenal chart success of the American rock and roll band Rage Against the
Machine in the 1990s, for example, signified the popularity of the ideals behind the
alter-globalisation movement. Similarly, the chart success of the Covers album
suggests that Kiyoshirō’s tackling of political issues such as nuclear power brought
the ideas of the mass anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s to a much broader
audience.

Bringing
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demonstrations served to connect these small, local demonstrations with these
rebellious musical histories.
Eyerman contrasts this understanding of music as a repository of cultural memory
with the way culture is understood in the models of political change rooted in
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sociological theories of resource mobilisation and political process theory.631 These
theories tend to see the cultural forms of social movements as little more than
political tools to be utilised instrumentally in order to achieve the clearly-defined
goals of rational actors. At best, these theories recognise culture as a ‘frame of
meaning’ through which actors understand their activities. Political activists, too,
may share the narrow, instrumentalist understandings of culture contained in some
sociological theory and see cultural production as a means to an end rather than an
end in itself. Eyerman argues that we should recognise the intrinsic importance of
cultural politics by seeing them as part of the ‘expressive/symbolic dimension’ of
social movements which he defines as the ‘spaces/opportunities for political and
cultural experimentation and learning’ within movements.
As I will discuss in the next section, instrumentalism within social movement culture
was challenged in the 1960s, leading to the innovative cultural and artistic forms of
protest which were visible in the Japanese anti-nuclear movement in the 1980s. By
invoking the memory of a popular local hero, the Kunitachi demonstrations
performed the longer history of anti-nuclear protest in Japan. Music critic Futatsugi
Shin suggests that, prior to 3.11 and the re-emergence of Kiyoshirō’s anti-nuclear
songs, few young people in Japan were aware of the important role played by
musicians in the anti-nuclear ‘new wave’ of the 1980s.632 As a new anti-nuclear
movement developed after 3.11, the language of resistance which was developed in
earlier waves was re-appropriated and re-purposed. Renditions of Kiyoshirō’s antinuclear covers of popular western songs by anti-nuclear protesters helped to
construct a cultural imaginary of longstanding and legitimate opposition to nuclear
power.
I have already touched on how Bakhtin’s work can help us to read the Kunitachi
demonstrations. In his studies of European literature, Bakhtin detected the traces of a

631 Ron Eyerman, ‘Music in Movement: Cultural Politics and Old and New Social Movements’, Qualitative
Sociology 25, no 3 (2002): 445–446.

Futatsugi Shin, ‘Ongaku to hangenpatsu demo: tsui ni demo de “saikadō hantai!” to sakenda [Music
and the Anti-nuclear Demonstrations: Finally, we Cried out “No Restarts” at the Demonstration]’, in
Datsu genpatsu to demo: soshite, minshushugi [Demonstrations Against Nuclear Power: And Then, Democracy] (Tokyo:
Chikuma shobō, 2012), 154.
632
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folk culture of laughter which had bubbled beneath the surface of official culture
during the middle ages.633 Renate Lachmann explains how, for Bakhtin, folk culture
is unable to pose a permanent, unified alternative to official culture. Rather, ‘folk
culture appears periodically as a culture of laughter by means of an ensemble or rites
and symbols, a temporarily existing life-form that enables the carnival to take place’.
The culture of laughter offers the prospect of a ‘permanent revolution’ against
official authority.634 Eyerman’s conception of the politics of social movements can
be compared with this Bakhtinian view. Eyerman values the ‘more invisible aspects
[of movements], like those based in collective memories and, more superficially and
fleetingly, in networks formed through (sub)cultural symbols and tastes’. The
Kunitachi demonstrations can be thought of as a kind of Bakhtinian carnival, an
expression of folk resistance to nuclear power and a celebration of the alternative
cultural values of opposition to authority. The memory of Kiyoshirō serves to
maintain the memory of carnivalesque rebellion across the discontinuities of time
and place, providing a way for participants to understand themselves as part of a
longer history of resistance to nuclear power. In Kunitachi, that humorous and
sometimes grotesque culture is celebrated in the diverse musical sub-cultures which
proliferate in the municipality and the broader Tama region. It is to these links
between the Kunitachi movements and the festive counter-culture of western Tokyo
that I now turn.

Folk, Rock and the Festive Life of Western Tokyo
Kiyoshirō’s music and costume were only one of the ways participants wove cultural
memories into their anti-nuclear carnivals. Although the protests were quite small,
attracting no more than 150 participants at any one time, these anti-nuclear carnivals
contained a kind of bricolage of protest history. For Bakhtin, the mediaeval carnival
was ‘the true feast of time, the feast of becoming, change and renewal’.635 The
diverse musical styles present at the demonstration traced the municipality’s political
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and cultural history. The musical traditions of the municipality were central to this
‘feast of becoming, change and renewal’.
The Tama district of western Tokyo is located approximately one hour by train from
the central Tokyo districts of Kōenji, Shibuya and Shinjuku where the Genpatsu
Yamero demonstrations took place. Snaking through the Tama district and giving it
its name is the great Tama river, which passes through the district on its journey from
the mountains of Okutama to the sea. Parts of the region are still relatively
undeveloped. Rice paddies and vegetable plots dotted the banks of the small canal
which ran past the house I lived in in the district. This beautiful natural environment
attracts artists and musicians. The region is also home to a thriving market in local
produce. There were many unmanned stalls where I could purchase fresh vegetables
located in easy cycling distance from my house.636 The easy access provided by the
Chūō line to live performance venues in the inner city no doubt further added to the
appeal of the district for musicians.
Organising meetings for the Kunitachi demonstrations were held in a local Yaho bar
and live house which celebrated its 20 year anniversary at the end of 2011. Despite
this longstanding connection to the area the owner often jokingly referred to himself
as a ‘new resident’ of Kunitachi. While Kunitachi is relatively famous for its active
residents’ movements, in this section I discuss the somewhat different lineage of the
festive

protests

Demonstration’.

organised
637

by

the

‘Committee

to

Hold

the

Kunitachi

The power of these demonstrations derived from their

connections to a host of existing networks. These networks embrace music, art, craft
and food as well as existing political movements and organisations, all of which
found a central gathering point in the demonstration.
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is a small tin in which one can leave the money. See Cory Doctorow, ‘Tokyo’s “Unmanned Stores” Honor-System Sheds Where Farmers Sell Their Surplus Produce’, Boing Boing, 7 August 2013, accessed 31
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The Yaho bar where the meetings took place is named ‘Kakekomitei’. The name is
taken from the kakekomi dera which, in feudal times, provided a refuge for women
seeking divorce. The location of the bar in Yaho, not far from the old Kōshūkaidō
which connected the capital Edo with the inland city of Kōfu in Tokugawa times,
highlights this sense of connection with Japan’s folk history. Yet the bar and its
philosophy have more recent political origins. On the back of a monthly schedule
which lists the bands and other events at Kakekomitei was a short blurb which
described the philosophy which underpinned the space. The blurb describes how the
bar’s owner once worked for the Japan Consumers’ Cooperative Union (Seikyō). He
provides food whose flavourings and ingredients are produced using organic or lowchemical methods with many of the ingredients being purchased from Seikyō. The
menu includes ‘simple but healthy food’ such as ‘brown rice, udon made with local
flour and fish and soya bean croquettes’. This description orients the bar owner’s
philosophy in the Japanese consumer movement.
As Darrell Gene Moen explains, growing concerns about environmental pollution
and food safety issues have spurred the development and growth of consumer
movements since the 1960s. Seikyō was established in 1951 with the backing of the
Japan Communist Party, Japan Socialist Party and leading unions. After the 1970s,
however, numerous new consumer cooperatives influenced by the New Left also
emerged. There was a growing market for foods which were both safe and whose
production benefited the threatened livelihoods of Japanese farmers. Consumer
movement organisations have also been active in campaigning around anti-nuclear
issues.638 One such movement, the Seikatsu Club (Seikatsu kurabu) even formed its
own political party, the Citizens Network (seikatsusha nettowāku), which has
become a political force in some urban municipal councils including Kunitachi.639
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Seikyō, like many other consumer co-operatives in Japan, has developed a regime for
testing food products for radioactive contaminants.640
The text included on the monthly schedule of Kakekomitei promotes the bar’s links
with the consumer co-operative movements. These movements are, in turn, closely
linked to the broader environmental and social movements of the 1980s and 1990s.
As a live performance space its connections to the music of the post-1960s counterculture is even more revealing. A more recent schedule provides another insight into
the community which makes up the Kunitachi demonstration. The following list of
‘Kakekomitei Keywords’ was included in a recent monthly schedule.
Hippie. Reggae. Rock. Film Screening. Aquarium Theatre Group. Harappa Festival.
Feminist English Conversation Class. Temple Elementary School. Dameren. No
Nukes. Okinawa. 88 Festival of Life. Clown Army. Folk. Student Movement.
Yuntaku Takae. Backpacker. Poetry Reading. ‘Person with a Disability’.
Demonstration. DIY … etc. In other words, Chaos! Anything is OK! No Violence or
Sexual Harassment.

It would be possible to trace the lineage of a number of Japanese political
movements which are intimately tied up with the anti-nuclear ‘new wave’ of the
1980s through these keywords. Here I focus on the words ‘Hippie’, ‘Harappa
Festival’, ‘No Nukes’, ‘88 Festival of Live’ and ‘Folk’. These words situate
Kakekomitei and the Kunitachi anti-nuclear demonstrations in the development of
the counter-culture in western Tokyo.
The Festival of Life, which was held in Japan’s southern alps in 1988, marked the
coming together of Japan’s hippie, new age and folk music movements with a
growing anti-nuclear consciousness after Chernobyl.641 It attracted between 6000 and
8000 people over nine days, creating a kind of ‘temporary commune’ based on the
values of the counter-culture. On the inside cover of a commemorative book about
the festival published in 1990 is an English language description of the festival.
640 ‘Shokuhin chū no hōsha sei busshitsu mondai e no Nihon seikyōren no taiō ni tsuite [The Japan
Consumer Co-operatives Response to the Problem of Radioactive Contaminants in Food]’, Nihon seikatsu
kyōdō kumiai rengōkai [Japanese Consumer Co-operatives Union], 23 July 2014, accessed 16 April 2015,
http://jccu.coop/topics/radiation/index.html.
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One night at a small gathering in a tipi on the slopes of Mt. Yatsugatake the idea for
a festival in honour of Gaia: the life of the earth/universe, to be held on the
auspicious day of 8/8/88 was born. It would be a festival with music, an all night
concert; a ‘tribal’ campground/village; an outdoor bazaar and restaurants; workshops,
symposiums on environmental issues; kids land etc. etc.642

This description evokes the complex interweaving of new-age spirituality, utopian
desires and political consciousness which was central to the counter-culture. As
Takada Akihiko explains, after the dissolution of the student movement after about
1970 there was a growing trend among those youth who shared the sense of
alienation with the student radicals to ‘drop-out’ from mainstream society. In Japan,
as in the United States, communes began to appear which fused hippiedom with
Buddhist and Hindu beliefs and values. The counter-culture bore considerable fruit in
the fields of drama, music and independent journalism.643 This was the dawn of the
post-industrial age, which was already being identified by scholars such as Alain
Touraine who studied the student movement in the early 1970s.644 The growing
chaos in the international situation heralded by the oil price shocks of the early 1970s
and a sense that student protest had failed to fundamentally change society led to
apathy and ennui among youth. Many such youths joined the counter-culture and
challenged the ideals of hard work and economic growth which had been the bedrock
of Japan’s post-war industrialisation. In the 1980s, the counter-culture embraced a set
of beliefs which rejected the ideology of industrial society and embraced the idea that
human life and the earth were part of an integrated whole.645 These trends can be
read in the description of the Festival of Life above. The notion of Gaia, for example,
which was popularised in the transnational New Age movement, was a popular
symbol of this notion of a conscious connection with the earth.646
642 One love jamming, ed., No Nukes one Love: inochi no matsuri ’88 Jamming book [No Nukes One
Love: Festival of Life ’88 Jamming Book] (Purasdo shoten, 1990).
643 Akihiko Takada, ‘Contemporary Youth and Youth Culture in Japan’, International Journal of Japanese
Sociology 1, no 1 (1 October 1992): 108–111. The commune movement was an inspiration to the Japanese
sociologist Mita Munesuke whose influential writings under the pseudonym Maki Yūsuke are still popular
among intellectuals with an interest in anti-nuclear politics. See Maki, Kiryū no naru oto: kōkyō suru komyūn
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The emergence of the anti-nuclear ‘new wave’ movement in Japan in the 1980s was
closely connected to the growth of the counter-culture. In 1988, for example, a series
of protest actions were held in Shikoku against the Ikata Nuclear Power Plant. These
actions, dubbed ‘Farewell Nuclear Power Memorial Day’, were characterised by the
ideas and imagery of the counter-culture. Demonstrators dressed in rabbit and gorilla
costumes, beat drums and clapped in time while watching lion dances. This
carnivalesque protest style anticipated that of the Genpatsu Yamero and Kunitachi
demonstrations.647 The spirit of the protests converged in the Festival of Life (Inochi
no matsuri), which was organised following the demonstrations in Shikoku in
August 1988. With its subtitle of ‘No Nukes, One Love’, the event attracted an
estimated 8,000 people over 8 days.648
The music and values of the counter-culture are alive and well in Kunitachi and the
wider Tama region and along the Chūō line. Japan’s first ‘rock café’ was established
in Kunitachi’s neighbouring city of Kokubunji in 1968. In Nishiogikubu, half an
hour closer to the centre of Tokyo along the Chūō line, a shop called Hobitto Mura
(Hobbit Village) was established in 1975 to facilitate the sharing of information
within the commune movement which now stretched across the Japanese archipelago
from Hokkaido in the north to Okinawa in the far south-west.649 Kakekomitei , which
was established in 1991, continues this tradition of folk, politics and counter-culture.
These values are reflected in the list keywords cited above including ‘hippie’, ‘folk’
and ‘88 Festival of Life’. Similarly, the live house ‘Earth Bar’ near Kunitachi railway
station uses counter-cultural images and symbols in their promotional literature and
hosts concerts featuring contemporary psychedelic and folk-rock musicians. The
‘Harappa Festival’ mentioned in the keywords is one of a number of outdoor music
festivals held in the wider Tama area which keep the counter-culture alive today.

Suga Hidemi, Hangenpatsu no shisōshi: reisen kara Fukushima e [A History of Anti-nuclear thought:
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Tsuchikkure is a local band who played regularly at the demonstrations in Kunitachi
as well as at larger Genpatsu Yamero and Sayonara Genpatsu demonstrations in
central Tokyo. Tsuchikkure is an independent band not signed to a major record label.
In their former incarnation Hana to Fenominon, they enjoy a cult status in the festival
scene and in the live music circuit in western Tokyo. Performing regularly at
Chikyūya, Kakekomitei and other small live houses in the Tama region, members of
the group, particularly lead vocalist ‘Hana-chan’, make frequent reference to the antinuclear movement and exhort audiences to attend demonstrations and express their
anger and frustration about the disaster.650 Their music has an idiosyncratic folk-rock
style which reflects that of the hippie counter-culture.
Most of Tsuchikkure’s members live and work in the local area and have strong ties
to the region. In the 1990s, a number of band members lived in an encampment on
the banks of the Tama river. In a special issue of the monthly magazine Bungei
(Arts) on ‘Street Movements’ published in 1999, Dameren member Ogura Mushitarō
interviewed Hana and a fellow riverside dweller. This connection with the Dameren
circle, one of the pioneering freeter movement groups which was discussed in
Chapter Three, shows the overlapping of political and counter-cultural movements in
the 1990s. These longstanding relationships were reflected in the composition of the
Kunitachi demonstrations in which many members of the Dameren milieu marched
alongside musicians from Tsuchikkure and other folk rock bands. While living on the
side of the river in the 1990s, Hana and his fellow campers draw water from a local
spring and gathered discarded, out-of-date food from a local supermarket in order to
support themselves. At one stage they organised a three-day festival at the
encampment which attracted up to 4000 visitors.651 Along with the obvious influence
of the global hippie movement of the 1960s and 1970s, it is tempting to think about
the encampment in terms of the Japanese concept of the kawaramono (riverside
dwellers). During the Middle Ages and into the early modern period, entertainers

650 See, for example, the band’s blog, in which they encourage fans to attend the demonstrations.
‘Kunitachi demonsutoreeshon o yarō kai ōen [Support the Committee to Hold the Kunitachi
Demonstration]’,
Tsuchikkure,
25
February
2013,
accessed
11
March
2015,
http://tsuchikkure.blog79.fc2.com/blog-entry-70.html.
651 Hana, Tarō, and Ogura Mushitarō, ‘Mainichi ga nichiyōbi, Tamagawa kawara tento seikatsu [Everyday
is Sunday, Tent Life on the Banks of the Tama River]’, Bungei 38, no 2 (May 1999): 183–187.
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often camped on riverbanks as they travelled the country spreading music, news and
gossip. After a typhoon and subsequent flooding washed them out, many of the
riverside dwellers remained in the area. Kakekomitei, whose name invokes the
mediaeval ‘kakekomi dera’ in which travellers and vagrants could spend the night,
became a kind of refuge for many of the riverside dwellers who continue to be active
in political, musical and artistic activities in the area.
The ecological politics of the ‘new wave’ in the 1980s and the hippie counter-culture
play an obvious role in the ideology of the contemporary anti-nuclear movement.
One of Tsuchikkure’s signature songs ‘Inochi kara’ (From life) celebrates the power
of life to create and nurture life. Suga Hidemi argues that a philosophy of ‘life-ism’
(seimei shugi) animated the ‘new wave’ of the 1980s. Leading activists in the new
wave, such as Ohara Yoshiko, were uninterested in the Cold War ideological
divisions which had been a hallmark of Japanese anti-nuclear politics in the 1950s
and 1960s. Ohara, like many leading activists in the new wave, was a housewife who
rejected the male-dominated politics of earlier social movements. Suga sees the
women who led the new wave as a new, more popular manifestation of the feminist
politics which had emerged out of the movement for women’s liberation.652 This
ecological feminism emphasised concepts of nature, life and motherhood.653
As I discussed in Chapter Two, the notion of ‘life’ as a basis for anti-nuclear politics
was celebrated by many activists. I attended numerous performances by Tsuchikkure
in which the ‘Song of Life’ appeared to function as an ecstatic peak for the emotions
building up between audience members and band members during the concert. The
song celebrates ‘life’,
There is only one important thing
The joy that exists between different forms of life (inochi to inochi ga ikiru
yorokobi)

652 For a more comprehensive analysis of the feminist politics which underpinned the anti-nuclear ‘new
wave’ movement see Wöhr, ‘Gender and Citizenship in the Anti-Nuclear Power Movement in 1970s
Japan.’ On the women’s liberation movement in Japan more broadly see Vera Mackie, Feminism in Modern
Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 144–173; Setsu Shigematsu, Scream from the Shadows:
The Women’s Liberation Movement in Japan (Univ of Minnesota Press, 2012).
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Again, in the chorus, this philosophy of life takes pride of place,
We are born from life (inochi kara umareta yo)
We begin with life (inochi kara hajimaru yo)

Sabu Kohso has observed the re-emergence of ‘life’ as a basis for politics in the
globally connected social movements of the past two decades. He finds evidence of
this in the notion of the ‘common’ which underpins many contemporary movements
in defence of water, land and air. The notion of the common reflects a growing
awareness in environmental movements that all human beings depend upon a set of
resources which ought not to be subject to the rule of the market. Kohso writes of
how the individual experience of connectedness arises from mutual relationships
which are created by ‘body and body, life and life’.654 Tsuchikkure’s song about the
‘joy which arises between two living things’ seems to reference a similar
understanding of the experience of relatedness.
The use of music, costume and dance at the Kunitachi demonstrations reflected the
continuing power of the counter-culture in the Tama region. In Bakhtin’s
understanding, folk culture is a kind of subterranean stream which is never subsumed
completely within the dominant culture. At the Kunitachi demonstration, traces of
the ‘new wave’ anti-nuclear movement of the 1980s, the values of ecofeminism and
the continuing power of the counter-culture coalesced. The festive style of the
Kunitachi demonstrations resembled that of Genpatsu Yamero but it bore the imprint
of the vibrant counter-culture of the Tama region. This was a local demonstration but
it was one whose connections extended through time to the legacy of the ‘new wave’
and the counter-culture and across space, drawing transnational connections between
their struggle and the anti-nuclear and women’s movement in Europe.
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Which Side Are You On?
In December 2012, the Committee to Hold the Kunitachi Demonstration held a
screening of Beebon Kidron’s 1983 documentary Carry Greenham Home.655 The
film records the Greenham Common Women’s Peace Camp, an iconic struggle of the
feminist and peace movements in the 1980s and 1990s. In September 1981, a group
of women marched from Cardiff in Wales to the Greenham Common United States
Air Force base in Berkshire, England. They marched to protest a 1979 NATO
decision to deploy U.S. nuclear cruise missiles in Europe. With 100 warheads
scheduled to arrive at Greenham, the women demanded a televised debate with the
Ministry of Defence over the decision. When this request was not granted they
refused to leave and set up an encampment. In 1982, the protesters decided that the
camp would be a women-only space. In the following years hundreds of women
camped outside the base. The number of supporters often swelled to several thousand.
The missiles were removed in 1991 but the encampment remained in place until
2000 when the camp was designated as a memorial site.
The film documents six months in the life of the peace camp, commencing with a
‘human chain’ action which took place on 12 December 1982 when 30,000 people
encircled the base. The film showed the Greenham women’s use of creative nonviolent direct action. In one scene, for example, the women break into the base
singing and proceed to dance on top of the missile silos. Activists at the women’s
peace camp used music, singing and costume to build their community of protest and
to refuse the patriarchal logic of nuclear warfare. In promoting their screening of the
film in 2012, the Kunitachi demonstration organisers emphasised the creative tactics
employed by the women.
The women suffered a not insignificant amount of violence.
Tragedies happened.
Even so, the women did not give in.
Even while they shouted out ‘no’ they had fun;
They never forgot their connection with one another. 656

655 ‘Kunitachi demonsutoreeshon presents Kurisumasu jōeikai [The Kunitachi Demonstration Presents a
Christmas Film Screening]’, Demonsutoreeshon in Kunitachi [Demonstration in Kunitachi], 20 December 2012,
accessed 14 April 2015, http://nonukes-kunitachi.blogspot.jp/2012/12/presents_20.html.
656

Ibid.

198

The December 2012 screening was so successful that a second screening was
organised for February 2013. This time the film screening was accompanied by a talk
from Kondō Kazuko, a feminist activist and writer who had helped translate the film
into Japanese.657 In her contribution to the book Fukushima genpatsu jiko to onna
tachi: deai o tsunagu (Women and the Fukushima Nuclear Accident: Connecting
Encounters), Kondō explains that when she first became involved in the anti-nuclear
weapons movement in the late 1970s, it was dominated by men.658 Kondō notes that
women in Japan at that time were increasingly frustrated by their experience of
patriarchy not only within the society at large but even within the social movements.
The 1970s and 1980s saw a global resurgence of the feminist movement. This was
motivated in part by the gender discrimination which many women had experienced
within the student and anti-war movements of the 1960s. It was in this context that
the women of Greenham decided to make the peace camp a women-only space.
Carry Greenham Home was shown around the world where it helped to circulate the
experience of the Greenham women and create a network of women against nuclear
weapons and for peace. In 1984, Hiroko Sumpter, the only Japanese woman known
to have lived at the Women’s Peace Camp, toured Japan with the film.659 The tour,
which was organised by Kondō and other women activists, called on women to join
the anti-nuclear movement.660 Nearly 30 years later, the screenings in Kunitachi
showed that the film still had the power to forge transnational commonalities
between communities in struggle.

657 ‘Jōeikai futatabi! eiga “Guriinamu no onna tachi Carry Greenham Home” jōei kai & tōku [Repeat Film
Showing! Screening of the Film “Carry Greenham Home” and Talk]’, Demonsutoreeshon in Kunitachi
[Demonstration in Kunitachi], 6 February 2013, accessed 19 March 2015, http://nonukeskunitachi.blogspot.com.au/2013/02/carry-greenham-home.html.
658 Kondō Kazuko, ‘Guriinamu no onna tachi kara Fukushima no onna tachi e [From the Women of
Greenham to the Women of Fukushima]’, in Fukushima genpatsu jiko to onna tachi: deai o tsunagu [The
Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Women: Connecting Encounters, ed. Kondō Kazuko, Ōhashi Yukako, and
Ōkoshi Kyōko (Nashi no ki sha, 2012), 168–170.
659 For a discussion of Hiroko Sumpter and the politics of ethnicity at Greenham see Ulrike Wöhr,
‘Radical Objects: A Photo of Hiroko Sumpter, History Workshop Online, 17 November 2014, accessed 17
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Composing and singing songs was one of the most important cultural practices at
Greenham. Well-known feminist musicians such as Peggy Seeger—who composed
the song Carry Greenham Home which was used as the title track for the film—
visited the camp, as did Australian folk singer Judy Small. Following the screenings,
members of the Committee to Hold the Kunitachi Demonstration decided to adapt a
version of the Greenham song ‘Which side are you on?’ for the March 2013 ‘Dolls
Festival’ demonstration. The song was translated by Ochoko, lead singer of local
band Kokubunji Experience.661 Ochoko, along with the lead guitarist of Kokubunji
Experience and a number of other demonstration organisers, filmed themselves
performing the song while walking down a street in Kunitachi. The film was
circulated via YouTube in the lead up to the Dolls Festival demonstration as a means
of promoting the event.662
Ochoko did not make a literal translation of the Greenham song. ‘Which side are you
on?’ was originally an American union song and was later taken up by the Civil
Rights movement. In both these contexts the song was used to target ‘fence-sitters’,
people who were seen as members of the working class and later of the black
community by protesters and were being asked to join with the movement on the
basis of a presumed pre-existing group solidarity. The Greenham version sought to
highlight the differences between the protesters and the police.
Which side are you on
Which side are you on
are you on the other side from me
which side are you on?
Are you on the side of atrocity
are you on the side of perjury
are you on the side of misery
which side are you on?, ...

Later verses highlight the connections between the suppression of the Greenham
women, the nuclear arms race and the broader structures of patriarchy. ‘Are you on
‘Which side are you on? Kunitachi ver. kashi [Which side are you on? Kunitachi version lyrics]’,
Demonsutoreeshon in Kunitachi [Demonstration in Kunitachi], 16 February 2013, accessed 14 April 2015,
http://nonukes-kunitachi.blogspot.jp/2013/02/which-side-are-you-on-ver.html.
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the side that beats your wife’, one line asks, while another says ‘are you on the side
who calls me cunt’. Kokubunji Experience’s version, however, does not ask the
listener to choose sides. Instead, it asks the question of what it is that creates
divisions between people.
Which side are you on? (repeated 3 times)
You are on that side, I am on this side
Why is it again that we are so divided?
I want to love the world like I love women
I want to protect the world like I protect men
Our two hearts which are currently divided
I walk this road in which they can meet
When you hit me, do you hurt?
When you look away, do you like yourself?
When I attack you, I become smaller
In my small room, I just look at myself
Our two hearts which are currently divided
I walk this road in which they can meet
Do you believe in your truth?
Do you believe in your own words?
Do you believe in my truth?
Do you believe in my words?
Our two hearts which are currently divided
I walk this road in which they can meet
(Repeat first verse)

One blogger described the thinking within the Committee which lay behind this new
version.
Originally in the film, it was a song full of sarcasm (hiniku) which the women who
gathered in opposition to the base sung when they were being forced out by the
police (the song which has been sung in many different movements for a long time).
After the film screening, someone suggested we compose a version of ‘Which side
are you on?’ which reflected our character (jibun tachi rashii)’. Ochoko had stated
that she ‘didn’t want to make it a song which separated people into enemy and
friend.663

663 ‘Which side are you on? Kunitachi version’, Haapii nikki [Haapii’s Diary], 19 February 2013, accessed
18 April 2015, http://blog.goo.ne.jp/worldsendsupernova/e/d5925032d2d20b29f328af9a932304c8.
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Of course, while the Greenham version of ‘Which side are you on?’ may have
sounded aggressive to the ears of the Kunitachi demonstrators, the purpose of singing
at Greenham was very much in the same spirit of creating a feeling of belonging and
connectedness among participants.664 The song was sung at Greenham when the
women were under attack by media crews, police and soldiers, something which the
Kunitachi demonstrators have not had to withstand. It may have been a
confrontational song, but singing was also seen as a non-violent tactic. Feigenbaum
points out that ‘in contrast to shouting or chanting singing is harder to write-off as
aggressive or violent, making it highly useful in highly policed and surveyed
situations’.665 At Greenham, however, while the song was sung in a confrontational
mode and directed at police and soldiers, it was really meant as ‘a broader appeal to
humanity and our collective belonging to a global community’.666
In the section ‘Walking for the Future’ I showed how ‘walking together’ at the
Kunitachi demonstration was considered to be more important than the question of
whether the protest could bring about immediate policy change. Ochoko’s version
suggests a critique of the social divisions upon which the power of the nuclear
village depends. This was a common concern for anti-nuclear activists after
Fukushima. The lyrics to another popular anti-nuclear song, ‘human Error’ by
Kyoto-based band Frying Dutchman highlighted the problem of ‘division’ and
‘separation’ in relation to communities affected by nuclear power.
Power companies get up to a trillion yen (about $13 billion U.S. dollars) in subsidies
from the government to build a nuclear power plant. Once the location is chosen, the
power company showers the locals with money. They take the guys to hostess bars
and the old people to hot springs. Wine and dine, wine and dine! And they lie to
them about the nuclear plant being good for the local economy. They actually have a
manual on how to use money to divide the community into supporters and
opponents.667

664 Anna Feigenbaum, ‘Tactics and Technology: Cultural Resistance at the Greenham Common Women’s
Peace Camp’ (doctoral dissertation, McGill University, 2008), 235–253; Anna Feigenbaum, ‘“Now I’m a
Happy Dyke!”: Creating Collective Identity and Queer Community in Greenham Women’s Songs’, Journal
of Popular Music Studies 22, no 4 (2010): 367–368.
665

Feigenbaum, ‘Tactics and Technology’, 252.

666

Ibid., 251.

667
‘humanERROR Lyrics’, frying
http://fryingdutchman.jp/lyric.php.

dutchman

Official

202

Website,

accessed

18

April

2015,

Organisers were already concerned about the possibility that people would not want
to participate in the demonstration due to the social pressure they might experience
from other community members. The motivations behind the song reveal the
Kunitachi demonstration organisers’ concern with building community consensus
around the anti-nuclear issue and overcoming division. Ochoko and the Kunitachi
demonstration organisers created a song which would not exacerbate the existing
divisions within the community over the issue of nuclear power. Rather, the song
called attention to the way the issue of nuclear power was being used as a form of
‘divide and rule’. The chorus line in particular spoke to the notion of ‘walking
together’ which I discussed above. ‘Our two hearts which are currently divided / I
walk this road in which they can meet’. The song opens up the possibility that even
though we may share different views it is possible to find a common ground by
‘walking together’. Similarly, while the original song expressed righteous (and
justifiable) anger towards the police, the military and patriarchal violence, the
Kunitachi version tries to find a way through the division between abuser and abused.
The song highlights the structural nature of this relationship. ‘When you hit me, do
you hurt? / When you look away, do you like yourself?’
Feigenbaum raises concerns over the way Greenham songs have been adapted for
mixed-gender groups while neglecting the ‘gendered political economic context in
which they emerged’. It might be argued that the Kunitachi version of ‘Which side
are you on?’ misinterprets the feminist politics of the Greenham song by attempting
to smooth over the gendered social divisions it highlighted in the name of community
unity.668 It is important to remember, however, that the re-writing of ‘Which side are
you on?’ took place in the context of two screenings of the Carry Greenham Home
film and extensive discussions between activists on the gender politics of Greenham
and the contemporary anti-nuclear movement in Tokyo. Ochoko’s lyrics contain their
own commentary on the politics of gendered violence. They speak to an
understanding of violence as damaging to both victims and perpetrators.
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As Anne Feigenbaum points out, Greenham songs ‘travelled through the larger
Greenham network, [where] they helped to create and shape a movement culture that
extended far beyond the military base’.669 Like the screenings of the film Carry
Greenham Home, which took place around the world, the songs carried the
experiences of the Greenham women across spatial and temporal boundaries. Yet, as
I discussed above with regard to Kiyoshirō’s music, for forms of cultural resistance
to remain relevant, activists have to interpret historical memories and cultural
artefacts through the lens of their own concerns. For Ochoko and the Kunitachi
demonstrators, ‘Which side are you on?’ provoked a debate about the merits of
dividing people based on their view of nuclear power. Forcing people to choose sides
might actually work against the inclusion of the whole community in an anti-nuclear
movement. The Kunitachi demonstration organisers paid tribute to the Greenham
women’s struggle by adapting their legacy for today’s needs.
In this section I have highlighted the way the history and memory of struggle is
performed in the Kunitachi demonstrations. Kondō emphasises the way the showing
of Carry Greenham Home helped create a global network of women for peace and
against nuclear weapons in the 1980s. The screening of the film in Kunitachi, the
inclusion of Kondō as a speaker and the attempt to translate the Greenham
experience in a way which spoke to the concerns of the Kunitachi demonstrators
revealed the powerful role cultural memory plays in the construction of the
contemporary anti-nuclear struggle. Like the previous two sections, this one has
discussed the important role played by music and musicians in the Kunitachi
demonstrations. I now turn to the medium of street theatre to explore another tactic in
the repertoire of protest in Kunitachi.

Graduation
Carnivalesque demonstrations are a means of intervening in the everyday life of the
city. They transform the urban environment into a theatre of protest, making irregular
use of streets and plazas, which are usually coded as places of consumption, and
turning them into places for politics. The tactical transformation of urban space into a
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site for the performance of protest can be traced to the protest movements and avantgarde theatre practices of the 1960s. Peter Eckersall has shown how the urban
environment in the 1960s became ‘accessible as an active agent in radical
performance and no longer simply an environment in which performance, radical or
otherwise, occurred’.670 The Kunitachi demonstrations developed a similar tactical
use of theatrical performance to turn the streets of the municipality into a theatre of
protest.
Some of these were short skits directly related to the festive ‘themes’ of the
demonstrations. During the Star Festival demonstration, for example, a mime based
on the legend of the Tanabata Star Festival took place on a pedestrian overpass on
University Street as the main body of the demonstration passed underneath. The
Tanabata Star Festival celebrates the meeting of two lovers, the deities Orihime and
Hikoboshi. The lovers are separated by the Milky Way but once a year, on the
seventh day of the seventh lunar month, they are reunited. During the mime, two
costumed performers playing Orihime and Hikoboshi emerged from opposite sides
of the overpass to the tune of Whitney Houston’s ‘And I will always love you’. They
performed a short dance before finally embracing to the cheers of the crowd below.
This skit did not appear to have any particular connection with the anti-nuclear theme.
Other skits, however, involved cleverly constructed parodies which spoke directly to
the nuclear issue.
At the April Fool’s Day demonstration in April 2012 a ‘Graduation From Nuclear
Power Ceremony’—a short piece of street theatre lasting just under five minutes—
took place prior to the commencement of the protest march.671 In order to set the
scene for the ‘ceremony’, performers held a red and white banner at the back of the
performance space on the grassy verge next to University Avenue. The red and white
banner (kōhaku maku) is a ubiquitous symbol of celebration used at school
graduation ceremonies in Japan. In the centre of the banner was a long sheet of rice
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paper brushed with the words ‘genpatsu sotsugyōshiki’ (‘Nuclear Power Graduation
Ceremony’). Like the red and white banner, a piece of calligraphy like this, with
characteristic bold and unambiguous brushstrokes, lends a sense of gravity to
graduation ceremonies in Japan.
The skit commenced when a winged master of ceremonies took to the stage in front
of the banner. The bright pink of her clown wig and loudhailer provided a brilliant
contrast with the formalism of the backdrop. A further juxtaposition was the sash
(tasuki) worn by the master of ceremonies which was inscribed with the phrase ‘no
nukes’ (‘genpatsu iranai’). Tasuki are not a usual part of the graduation ceremony
format. They are more typically worn by politicians on the campaign trail, awarded
to the winners of contests or used in the entertainment and sales industries. The
master of ceremonies spoke in the highly polite, respectful Japanese known as keigo
which is used on formal occasions as she called on the ‘guests’ to take their position
to the side of the ceremonial ground. With this assortment of mismatched symbols
the stage was set for a mockery of the traditional graduation ceremony.
Bakhtin understood the function of the mediaeval European carnival in terms of the
‘turn-about’, the inversion of existing social hierarchies and structures.
The experience [of the carnival] opposed to all that was ready-made and completed,
to all pretence at immutability, sought a dynamic expression; it demanded ever
changing, playful, undefined forms. All the symbols of the carnival idiom are filled
with the pathos of change and renewal, with the sense of the gay relativity of
prevailing truths and authorities. We find here a characteristic logic, the peculiar
logic of the ‘inside-out’ (à l'envers), of the ‘turn-about’, of a continual shifting from
top to bottom, from front to rear, of numerous parodies and travesties, humiliations,
profanations, comic crownings and uncrownings.672

The ‘Nuclear Power Graduation Ceremony’ involved many of these elements. The
juxtaposition of the formal decoration of the ceremonial ground with its kōhaku
maku banner and calligraphy with the master of ceremonies’ outrageous pink wig
created an environment which invited viewers to suspend their disbelief and enter
into an alternative reality where nuclear power might already be over. As the
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performance continued, the peculiar logic of the ‘turn-about’ deepened as fantastical
and contradictory elements continued to appear on stage.
The ‘guests’, who lined up on one side of the ceremonial ground, each had a sign
pinned to the front of their clothes indicating the name of one of the regional power
utilities which operates nuclear reactors. The Tokyo Electric Power Company was
represented by a man dressed as the marionette Pinocchio. A ‘political fixer’ dressed
in a dark suit literally ‘held the strings’ which were attached to TEPCO Pinocchio’s
body. The master of ceremonies summoned the ‘Kunitachi Demonstration School
Principal’ who moved to the centre of the performance space. He was dressed in the
formal black tail coat which is still favoured by school principals in Japan on
ceremonial occasions. The performer ‘uncrowned’ the authority figure he was
playing, however, by complementing the formal tails with a rainbow coloured helmet
and a pair of jikatabi, the split-toed heavy cloth shoes worn by tradespeople in Japan.
The helmet, which resembled those employed by student radicals during the
university struggles of the 1960s and 1970s, inevitably conjures up the violent
student protests of the period. In his Zenkyōto Graffiti, former Red Army member
and journalist Takazawa Kōji includes a picture of 16 different helmets favoured by
the various sects involved in the demonstrations. These helmets served to
differentiate and divide activists along ideological lines into clearly identifiable
groups. Yet the helmets, which originally served to protect the head during
skirmishes with the police, increasingly came to be used as a means of selfexpression. Students would paint their helmets with a variety of different colours and
inscribe them with the names of sects to which they were affiliated.673 The sense of
division which was implicit in the colouring of helmets along ideological lines is
completely ‘turned upside down’ by the burst of rainbow colours that appears on the
principle’s helmet in this performance. We can see the influence of the countercultural movements which sprung up in the late 1960s, many of which turned away
from the violence of student protest and embraced the values of love, connection
with nature and a rejection of the urban rat race. The helmet also recalled Imawano
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Kiyoshirō’s side project Taimaazu (Timers) whose members performed wearing this
style of helmet decorated in outrageous styles.
When the ‘principal’ summoned ‘TEPCO Pinocchio’ to receive his ‘Graduation
Certificate’ the marionette resisted going to the centre of the stage. This provided an
opportunity for spectators to become participants by pushing and pulling him into
position. He continued to defy the ‘principal’, calling out ‘I don’t want to graduate’.
After some time he reluctantly agreed. As he said the words, ‘I will graduate’,
however, ‘Pinocchio’ tugged on his nose which was cleverly designed to extend in
imitation of the puppet in the original story. People from the audience took the cue
and called out ‘hey, his nose is getting longer. He must be telling a lie’. The principal
then gave TEPCO Pinocchio a stern scolding. ‘Hey, you don’t even have one reactor
in operation’ he pointed out, confronting ‘TEPCO’ with the fact that the last of the
company’s functioning nuclear reactors had gone offline a few days earlier on 26
March. Finally, a contrite Pinocchio agreed to graduate from nuclear power. The
performer retracted his nose and bowed before the principal in supplication. He was
then issued with the ‘Graduation Certificate’ which he held up proudly before the
crowd who applaud loudly.
Following TEPCO-Pinocchio’s acceptance of the inevitability of ‘graduating’ from
nuclear power, the master of ceremonies called on the crowd to sing the song ‘Glow
of TEPCO’. This was a parody of the popular song ‘Glow of a Firefly’ (Hotaru no
hikari) by Chikai Inagaki which was written during the Meiji period. The song,
which is sung to the tune of Auld Lang Syne, is often used during graduation
ceremonies in Japan. It celebrates an industrious student who has endured great
hardship in the pursuit of knowledge and the service of his country. ‘Glow of
TEPCO’, which was written for the Kunitachi performance, describes instead the
‘glow of TEPCO’ and the lies and deceit which the company deployed when that
light was extinguished in the 3.11 disaster. The song also contained a line asking that
the Tomari nuclear power plant in Hokkaido, the last nuclear power plant which
remained in operation at the time of the April Fool’s Day demonstration, be stopped.
The whole crowd joined in the singing using song sheets which had been distributed
prior to the performance.
208

This theatrical display provided some entertainment to the marchers as they gathered
outside Hitotsubashi University and waited for the march to commence. It was also a
powerful subversion of the traditional graduation ceremony. Peter Eckersall, drawing
on the work of anthropologist Victor Turner,674 explains how ritual begins through a
process of separation from the daily world through means which may include
ceremony. ‘Ritual’, Eckersall observes, is ‘a liminal activity that crosses a threshold
into another dimension of human experience’.675 He explains that, for Turner,
rituals are alternative playful spaces or scenes where taboos can be expressed, crises
enacted, and problems resolved. Such an idea is a therapeutic one, comparable to the
ancient idea of theatrical catharsis that likewise features a temporary suspension of
classical norms only to conclude with the restoration of a given ‘natural’ order.
Turner understands ritual as an almost bacchanalian form of collective social
behaviour that temporarily enables a place for generally unacceptable activity.

Yet for Turner, as Eckersall goes on to explain, the opening of ritual space is
premised on an eventual return to the established order. What happens, Eckersall
asks, ‘what if the return promised in Turner's theory is forever pending and
undecided?’676
Turner argued that ritual creates a separation from the everyday social world which
facilitates transgressive behaviour. Turner believed, however, that once the ritual is
complete that the social order is restored. As Peter Eckersall explains, ‘the point for
Turner … is that ritual space, like classical drama, is a temporary suspension of
order’.677 Mikhail Bakhtin also recognised these limits to the carnival as a means of
actually changing the social order. Yet, as Lachmann explains, he recognised that the
power of carnivalesque ritual was not in directly overturning the social order but in
revealing and reinforcing the potential for an alternative mode of being.
In the carnival, dogma, hegemony, and authority are dispersed through ridicule and
laughter. In their stead, change and crisis, which for Bakhtin constitute the primary
674
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factors of life and which represent the consequences of the primordial life/death
opposition, become the theme of the laugh act. The spectacle staged by
carnivalesque rituals is not actually directed against institutions, whose functions and
forms are only usurped for a temporary period of time, but rather against the loss of
utopian potential brought about by dogma and authority. The festival, however,
which is not aimed at work and production and which produces only itself, also
releases this utopian potential.678

Eckersall’s discussion of the street theatre of 1960s avant-garde performance group
Zero Jigen (Zero Dimension) suggests a reading of political street theatre as play.
Zero Jigen's work, he explains,
is finally about direct action with the aim of making disturbances. The work has no
meaning unless the act of participation, as performers or audience members giving
themselves over to the ritualised qualities of ambiguity and play, is taken into
account. In this way the repetitious nature of Zero Jigen's work iterates a physical
transformation of the political landscape of the 1960s. The naked bodies solemnise
the performative nature of ritual, but the profane misperformance of this also
counters tendencies towards imperialist and spectacular ritual sanctification’.679

The performative rituals at the Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations served to bind the
participants together through a cathartic experiences. Yet they also went beyond this,
suggesting through the ‘turn-about’ that the power of the nuclear village could
indeed be checked. Furthermore, in organising these performances, activists focused
immense energy on bringing into being the kinds of utopian possibilities they
imagined. By creating costumes and props these desires literally ‘took shape’ in ways
which would then be photographed, given away and exhibited to continue the spirit
of the performances long after they had taken place.

The Shape of Resistance
Many of the props and costumes utilised in these theatrical demonstrations were
exhibited at a small bar in Kunitachi in February 2013 as part of the Shape of
Resistance Exhibition (Teikō no katachi ten).680 A short blurb from the flier which
advertised the exhibition explained the motivation behind the exhibition.
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Since 3.11 the year before last, the absurdity of society has become evident
People have begun to raise their voices in resistance.
The number of people who are beginning their own experiments in a unique
resistance which is different from that which has come before has increased.
Kunitachi has become one hypocentre of this trend.
With the contemporaneous (dōjidai) art which activists have made with their own
hands
At a snap collaborative ‘Shape of Resistance Exhibition’ in a place for expression
which is known as a public place (kōkyō kūkan)
We want to show the various ‘forms’ (katachi) of resisting this warped society.

This framing of the exhibition poses a number of questions about how social
phenomena ‘take shape’. The ‘absurdity’ of society (shakai no fujōri) posited here,
for example, is said to have ‘become evident’ (kenzai ka) after 3.11. The word kenzai
has the sense of something which is visible as opposed to being hidden or obscured.
The implication is that society was already absurd but that this absurdity has become
much more visible. As I have discussed throughout this dissertation, the notion that
the Fukushima reactor had exposed the existing fault lines in Japan’s post-industrial
society was widely shared by activists and commentators. This exhibition considered
the ‘shape’ (katachi) of resistance to these deep social inequalities from the point of
view of activist art practice.
The exhibition featured a wide variety of artefacts from the Kunitachi demonstrations.
These included copies of the lyrics of parody songs composed for the Christmas
Demonstration in 2011 and costumes from the various themed demonstrations. One
wall in the exhibition space was covered in photographs of the demonstrations. In
addition to artefacts from the Kunitachi demonstrations, the exhibition featured
objects assembled from other anti-nuclear movements in Japan and even badges from
various global resistance movements. In one corner of the exhibition was a series of
objects relating to the environmental movement pioneer Tanaka Shōzō. Tanaka was
a former samurai who was an advocate for the farmers and other members of his
native village who were the victims of pollution from the nearby Ashio copper
mine. 681 2013 was the 100th anniversary of Tanaka’s death. The blog for the
exhibition described Tanaka as the ‘symbol of resistance in Japan’. The displayed
681 For a biography of Tanaka see Kenneth Strong, Ox Against the Storm: A Biography of Tanaka Shozo –
Japan’s Conservationist Pioneer (Folkestone: Japan Library, 1995).
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objects were on loan from ‘a famous grandmother who has been very active in social
movements in Kunitachi for many years’. Placing these objects alongside one
another in the tiny gallery space at the bar created a kind of three dimensional map of
the ‘shape of resistance’ in contemporary Kunitachi, a map which stretched back in
time to the origins of the environmental movement in Japan and outward to
incorporate global struggles.682
In one corner of the gallery space was an exhibition of objects and costumes from a
performance which took place during the April Fool’s Day demonstration in
Kunitachi in 2012. The performance was the work of the Tokyo Clown Army, a
group of predominantly Kunitachi-based activists and artists who staged frequent
performances during a number of anti-nuclear demonstrations in Tokyo. Clowning as
a protest tactic has become increasingly popular in European social movements since
the mid-2000s. Perhaps the best known clowning group is the Clandestine Insurgent
Rebel Clown Army (CIRCA) which was founded in November 2003 during the antiIraq war movement.683 The Clown Army TKO was formed in Tokyo in late 2010
following a visit by a group of European clowns.684 A year later the group were
holding their own three-day workshops at Kakekomitei in Kunitachi to teach rebel
clowning skills.685

682 A relatively complete “catalogue” of the exhibits is available on this blog post, ‘“Teikō no katachi ten”
o oete [’The Shape of Resistance Exhibition’ Draws to an End]’, Kaigyaku no kobeya [The Closet of Jests], 27
February 2013, accessed 9 October 2014, http://asobisenn.blogspot.com.au/2013/02/blog-post_27.html.
683 Paul Routledge, ‘Sensuous Solidarities: Emotion, Politics and Performance in the Clandestine
Insurgent Rebel Clown Army’, Antipode 44, no 2 (1 March 2012): 429.
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Figure 8 Packaged ‘Famous Cakes’ from the Shape of Resistance Exhibition.686

During the April Fool’s Day demonstration in Kunitachi, the Clown Army group
mingled with the crowd on the footpath next to the street in which the main protest
march was taking place. There they distributed the mock meika (famous cakes)
depicted in Figure 8. ‘Famous cakes’ are a class of regional specialty products which
are marketed to tourists. The cakes had names like ‘Fuku ichi’ (an abbreviation of the
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant), ‘Anzen shinwa’ (myth of safety) and
merutodaun (meltdown). They bore logos and images such as the TEPCO logo, the
international radiation symbol and a picture of the devastated landscape of a nuclear
fallout zone. The cakes bore the maker’s mark of the fictional manufacturer
‘Genpatsu saikadō’. This is another play on words wherein the suffix ‘dō’, meaning
hall but typically used as a grandiose description by large shops of their business,
with the phrase ‘restart nuclear power plants’ (genpatsu saikadō). On the back of the
packages was an ‘ingredient and nutrition information’ label which listed fictional

‘Meika “saikadō”: seizō manyuaru no daikōkai [’Saikadō’ Famous Cakes: Big Opening of the
Production Manual]’, clownarmy TKO, 19 June 2013, accessed 11 June 2015, http://clownarmytko.blogspot.com.au/2013/06/blog-post_19.html.
686

213

ingredients such as iodine, caesium, plutonium and strontium. The expiration date for
these long-lasting delicacies referred to the half-life of many radioactive elements:
‘they will lose half their flavour in 24,000 years’. The seller was listed as ‘the nuclear
village’.
Members of the clown army wove in and out of the demonstration proper,
distributing these ‘packaged cakes’ to bystanders and people carrying out their
weekend shopping in Kunitachi. With their brightly coloured costumes they were
clearly part of the march but by moving in and out and giving passers-by a small
token they attempted to disrupt the border between the demonstration and those
observing it from the footpath. In a video of the march a young family closely
examines the ingredient list of the ‘cake’ they have been given by one of the
members.687 Attempting to spread the action further, the group even included a ‘how
to make Saikadō Famous Sweets’ manual on their website complete with detailed
instructions for folding the packages and printing the designs. The manual is
accompanied by an encouragement to ‘make lots of them and give them away as
presents and souvenirs to people who work for electric power companies and
government officials’.688 Street theatre, as Brown and Pickerill observe, ‘is used to
transcend activist boundaries and create common ground between activists and
audiences’.689
As the Tokyo group explains on its website, clowning as a protest tactic involves
fighting the forms of authority and power which emerge in all kinds of relationships
‘non-violently with humour, pathos, [and] silly actions as our weapons’. 690 The
notion that ‘authority and power’ (ken’i ya kenryoku) are located not only in the
external ‘nuclear village’ which has been the anti-nuclear movement’s main target
but in ‘various relationships’ (samazama na kankei) helps explain why for clowns a

687 See the scene at at 1:53 in ‘4.1 datsu genpatsu demo ’eipuriru fūru demonsutorēshon in Kunitachi [4.1
No Nukes Demonstration “April Fool”s Demonstration in Kunitachi]’, 2 April 2012,
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TDwT70GfIzI&feature=youtube_gdata_player.
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performative intervention in the performance space itself is important. As I discussed
in relation to the Kunitachi version of ‘Which side are you on?’, activists questioned
the dominant modes of social relationship which they associated with the
undemocratic nature of the nuclear industry. The notion that the relationships of
domination are reproduced within movements themselves underpins much of
contemporary anarchist thinking in the global justice movements. Hence, for clowns,
it is not only an instrumental goal of policy change but an immanent transformation
of the relationships between people in urban space that is important.
Clowning practices such as this not only aim to blur the boundaries between
demonstrators and participants but also to smooth over possible tensions with police.
Clowning is one way of de-escalating relationships between protesters and police. By
imitating policemen, clowns can mock these authority figures in a humorous manner,
exorcising some of the tensions in the crowd without the use of violence. Clowns
nevertheless take their mockery of authority figures to the edge of what is
permissible. At a Genpatsu Yamero demonstration in Shinjuku in July 2012, for
example, I watched the Clown Army group dressed in police uniforms line up
alongside the police. They imitated the stance and actions of the police perfectly, no
doubt causing a degree of irritation for the police involved. As in the Graduation
Ceremony performance, these clowning actions seem to invite a comparison with
Bakhtin’s ideas of carnival.
In the carnivalesque game of inverting official values [Bakhtin] sees the anticipation
of another, utopian world in which anti-hierarchism, relativity of values, questioning
of authority, openness, joyous anarchy, and the ridiculing of dogmas hold sway, a
world in which syncretism and a myriad of differing perspectives are permitted.691

The display of these ‘famous cakes’ at the Shape of Resistance Exhibition invited
viewers to recollect and reflect on the protests. Objects produce connections between
diverse movement experiences, outlasting the transitory street demonstrations and
becoming memory objects which evoke the demonstration long after it has passed.
Tamura Takanori has discussed how anti-nuclear activists order their memories by
collecting artefacts from demonstrations.
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Stickers and fliers, voluntarily designed by artists, were not only the expression of
protests but also mnemonics for participants to order their memories and create an
internally consistent timeline through which they can reflexively create their own
identity.692

Placing these objects alongside artefacts of historical social movements in Japan and
of contemporary social movements outside the archipelago suggested that resistance
‘takes shape’ across time and space.
Among the exhibits was a ‘Mysterious Okinawa Rail Man’ costume. The Okinawa
Rail is an almost flightless bird which is found in the Yanbaru forest of northern
Okinawa. The bird’s habitat is threatened by the construction of military helipads at
the U.S. Marine Northern Training Area in the region of Takae village in Higashi
Son.693 The ‘superhero’ style costume is an example of how the bird has become a
symbol of the local resistance to the military base construction. The exhibition
website explains that the costume was on loan from an anti-base activist to increase
awareness of the struggle going on in Takae village.694 Many activists in Kunitachi
are involved in the struggle in this remote corner of northern Okinawa. Fundraising
concerts have been held at local live music venues, for example, and many local
activists have travelled to Okinawa to take part in the residents’ 24-hour sit-in protest
outside the construction site. Locating the Okinawan Rail beside Tanaka Shōzō and
the famous cakes gives shape to a complex pattern of resistance in modern Japan.

Summary
In this chapter I have discussed the tactics of an anti-nuclear protest group located in
the municipality of Kunitachi in Tokyo’s western Tama region. Like Shirōto no Ran,
it is not possible to draw clear boundaries around the Committee to Hold the
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Kunitachi Demonstration. Some members of the group had connections with Shirōto
no Ran and the Nantoka Neighbourhood while others were more embedded in the
Tama region and its activist and sub-cultural histories. Being part of a smaller, more
intimate community, the Kunitachi demonstration organisers tried to lower the
barriers to participation by making their demonstrations as playful and nonconfrontational as possible. They emphasised the importance of community
relationships for building a sustained anti-nuclear movement. Many of the activists
and musicians who took part in the Kunitachi demonstrations had strong ties to the
musical history of the Tama region that stretched back to the anti-nuclear ‘new wave’
of the 1980s. They interpreted this cultural legacy, however, in their own way to
make it relevant to the contemporary movement. By staging street performances and
memorialising these performances in the Shape of Resistance exhibition, activists
developed a carnivalesque anti-nuclear culture which enabled them to build a
community of protest and imagine post-nuclear futures. In the next chapter I return to
central Tokyo to discuss the protests outside Japan’s official prime ministerial
residence. The Committee to Hold the Kunitachi Demonstration was part of the
Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes which had organisational responsibility for
these demonstrations. The Kunitachi protesters brought the tactics of clowning and
performance developed in Kunitachi to the mass anti-nuclear protests in Tokyo’s
government district which represented the peak of the movement in 2012.
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CHAPTER SIX – THE KANTEI MAE

The tent in front of METI has come to be situated at a corner of the global occupy
movement. It has become a place of support for people who are fighting as part of
the anti-nuke movement in various places across the country, and the centre of media
attention where foreign (though mainly Western) journalists frequently visit. Like
Liberty Park in New York City, it has become a kind of symbol. By visiting the site,
however, I am learning that its significance lies less in the fact that it was occupied
than the continuous practice of occupying and making the space alive with the
people.
Odawara Rin695

Figure 9 Photo of Kantei Mae protest on 29 June 2012 on front cover of Days
Japan magazine. Photograph by Noda Masaya. 696
Rin Odawara, ‘What Arises from the Small Space’, Japan - Fissures in the Planetary Apparatus, accessed 25
February 2015, https://jfissures.wordpress.com/2012/03/30/what-arises-from-the-small-space. The
translation in the original has been modified slightly for clarity.
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On Friday 29 June 2012 an estimated one hundred thousand people gathered in front
of the Kantei, the official residence of the prime minister of Japan. This ‘Kantei mae
kōdō’ (literally ‘action in front of the prime minister’s official residence’, referred to
hereafter as the Kantei Mae protests) was organised by an umbrella group of antinuclear organisations known as the Metropolitan Coalition Against Nukes (MCAN).
They were protesting against the restart of the Ōi nuclear power plant located in
Fukui Prefecture on the Japan Sea coast which was scheduled for the following day.
Although protest organisers attempted to obey police directions and restrict
participants to a narrow section of the footpath leading up to the Kantei, the sheer
number of people attending the demonstration overwhelmed both police and
organisers. The crowd overflowed the temporary barriers which had been erected by
the police and spilled out onto the road, eventually blocking all traffic. 697 The
following week a similar number of protesters gathered. Once again they crossed
police barricades and occupied the street. Over the following months tens and then
hundreds of thousands of people gathered outside the Kantei in a weekly ritual of
protest which has continued, albeit with reduced numbers, up to the time of
writing.698
On 5 May 2012 the Tomari nuclear reactor in Hokkaido had been shut down for
routine maintenance and Japan was nuclear free for the first time since 1970.699 Antinuclear activists hailed the temporary shutdown of all of Japan’s nuclear reactors as a
great victory. Many people attributed the complete shutdown of the commercial
nuclear power industry to the power of the broad anti-nuclear movement. Activist
Sugihara Kōji, for example, wrote that ‘although nobody knows exactly how many
[anti-nuclear actions] there were it was these efforts by innumerable citizens which
Noda Masaya, ‘Kansai denryoku Ōi genshiryoku hatsudensho no saikadō ni hantai shite, shushō kantei
mae de okonawareta demo no kūsatsu shashin [Aerial Photograph of a Demonstration Outside the Prime
Minister’s Official Residence Against the Restart of Kansai Electric Power Company’s Ōi Nuclear Power
Plant]’, Days Japan, 20 July 2012.
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698 A detailed summary of all anti-nuclear demonstrations held in Japan between January 2011 and early
June 2013 is given in Kinoshita, ‘2011 nen ikō no hangenpatsu demo risuto.’
699 ‘Japan Nuke-Free for First Time since ’70’, The
Japan Times Online, 6 May 2012,
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/05/06/national/japan-nuke-free-for-first-time-since-70/.

219

brought about the current situation’.700 Activist group Sayonara Genpatsu held a rally
of 5,500 people in Shiba Park on Saturday 5 May to celebrate the occasion. The
following day Datsugenpatsu Suginami, a group which included many Genpatsu
Yamero organisers, held a grand costume parade through the municipality which
attracted 4000 people. The demonstration finished in front of Kōenji station where
celebrations continued into the night. The first large anti-nuclear protest after 3.11,
which I described in Chapter Two, had been held in Kōenji April 2011. Returning to
the place where the movement began, activists were able to celebrate a significant
victory.701 The restart of two reactors at the Ōi nuclear power plant, which threatened
to undo this achievement, triggered an outpouring of anti-nuclear sentiment in front
of the prime minister’s residence.
At the time of the 3.11 disaster Kan Naoto, then leader of the governing Democratic
Party of Japan, was prime minister. As the anti-nuclear movement grew in the first
few months after 3.11, Kan had shown a degree of support for the anti-nuclear
agenda. On 6 May 2011 he requested that Chūbu Electric, the owner of the Hamaoka
nuclear power plant in Shizuoka Prefecture, suspend operations at the plant due to a
heightened earthquake risk at the site. The particularly risky location of the Hamaoka
plant along a major fault line was widely known prior to 3.11 and activists had long
campaigned to shut this particular plant.702 The demonstration in Shiba Park on 10
April which took place on the same day as the first Genpatsu Yamero demonstration
had specifically targeted the Hamaoka plant. As if in response to Kan’s action over
Hamaoka, the Japan Business Federation Keidanren issued a statement on 11 July
2011 supporting the continued use of nuclear power. It called on the government to

700 Sugihara Kōji, ‘5.5 zen genpatsu teishi kara “genpatsu zero no natsu” e: Ōi genpatsu 3, 4 gouki no
saikadō o meguru kōbō no naka de [From the Suspension of Nuclear Power on 5.5 to a “Summer of Zero
Nuclear Power”: In the Midst of the Struggle Over the Restart of Reactors 3 and 4 at Ōi]’, Impaction no
185 (10 June 2012): 5–8.

Iwakami Yasumi, ‘5 gatsu 6 nichi Datsu genpatsu Suginami “Iwai! Genpatsu zero parēdo” [6 May No
Nukes Suginami “Celebrate! Zero Nuclear Power Plants Parade”]’, IWJ Independent Web Journal, 6 May
2012, accessed 11 September 2014, http://iwj.co.jp/wj/open/archives/14191.
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restart those reactors which had completed their scheduled maintenance checks as
quickly as possible.703 The following day, however, Kan hardened his anti-nuclear
stance. He called a press conference where he suggested that Japan’s energy policy
ought to ‘aim for a society which does not rely upon nuclear power’ by gradually
reducing and finally eliminating the society’s dependence on the technology.704 He
imposed new and more stringent ‘stress tests’ on Japan’s nuclear reactor fleet.
During the course of their normal operation, nuclear reactors are periodically taken
offline for routine safety and maintenance inspections. The new stress tests were to
be carried out during these routine inspections. Nuclear reactors would not be able to
be switched back on until they had been certified as safe by a new procedure.705 It
was the implementation of these tests and the failure of the electric power companies
to meet the new safety requirements which eventually led to the shutdown of Japan’s
entire reactor fleet by May 2012.
Kan’s apparently sympathetic stance towards the anti-nuclear movement earned him
the ire of the nuclear village who began to fight back.706 Major publications such as
the Yomiuri newspaper, Japan’s largest circulation daily, began carrying articles
condemning Kan’s handling of the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disasters. On 1
June 2011 three opposition parties tabled a motion of no-confidence in Kan’s
government. In order to head off the motion Kan announced the following day that
he would step down, but only once post-disaster reconstruction was under way. Just
two months later, however, on 26 August, Kan announced that his preconditions for
resignation had been met and he would resign. He was succeeded as DPJ leader and
prime minister on 2 September by his Finance Minister Noda Yoshihiko.707 The
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election of Noda marked a shift in the DPJ government’s attitude towards nuclear
power. As he announced his new cabinet, he asserted that his government ‘would
proceed with restarts of those reactors which, after having been subject to rigorous
checks, are found to be suitable for restarting’.708 This announcement set Noda on a
collision course with the growing anti-nuclear movement.
I begin this chapter by examining the ‘Tent Plaza’ outside the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI). In addition to maintaining a 24-hour sit-in, the Tent
Plaza hosted regular anti-nuclear events. Protests outside the METI building were an
important precursor of the mass rallies in front of the Prime Minister’s residence in
June, July and August with which I opened this chapter. The building continues to be
a focus of anti-nuclear protest at the time of writing. The Tent Plaza also served as a
base for monitoring the implementation of the stress tests which had to be approved
by METI officials before reactor restarts could proceed. I then turn to the Kantei Mae
protests themselves. Unlike Genpatsu Yamero, the Kantei Mae protests directly
addressed the official institutions of representative democracy. In doing so, they
opened up spaces for dissent in the streets and they exacerbated the existing divisions
between the local and national governments and within the ruling DPJ. The success
of the MCAN demonstrations in attracting large crowds to the government district
ultimately led to a number of MCAN representatives entering the Kantei to meet
with the prime minister. I discuss the way this meeting highlighted the ambiguities of
representation and participation in Japanese democracy. In the final two sections I
return once more to the notion of hiroba. The Kantei Mae protests produced a space
for political expression and community-building in the streets outside the Kantei and
the Diet. The location of the protests explicitly addressed the existing institutions of
representative democracy. In the hiroba outside the Kantei, the National Diet and the
METI building, however, the MCAN protests went beyond merely petitioning the
state to enact a more participatory form of democracy. In the final sections of this
chapter I analyse some of the theoretical questions which these projects raised about
the nature of democracy in Japan today.

‘Noda naikaku hossoku, tōnai yūwa ni hairyo “Fukkō to genpatsu, saiyūsen” [The Inauguratino of
Noda’s Cabinet, With Consideration of Party Harmony and ’First Priority to Reconstruction and Nuclear
Power]’, Asahi shimbun, 3 September 2011, Morning edition.
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The Tent Plaza: Confronting the Nuclear Village in Kasumigaseki
With the executive branch of government once more leading the charge to restart
Japan’s nuclear reactor fleet, anti-nuclear activists increasingly shifted their focus to
the parliamentary and administrative districts of Nagatachō and Kasumigaseki, both
located in Chiyoda ward. On 11 September 2011, while Genpatsu Yamero activists
were protesting in Shinjuku, 2,000 people gathered in a separate anti-nuclear protest
in Tokyo’s Hibiya Park. Hibiya Park is located in Chiyoda ward near the Imperial
Palace. Hibiya Park is a short walk from the Japanese National Diet and the Kantei in
Nagatachō and the cabinet ministry offices in neighbouring Kasumigaseki. With its
convenient location close to the seat of government, Hibiya Park has played host to
both state-sponsored events and political protests since it first became a public park
in 1903.709 On 11 September 2011, anti-nuclear protesters marched from the park to
TEPCO headquarters in Shinbashi and then on to the nearby Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry (METI) building in Kasumigaseki. METI contains the key
agencies responsible for the development of the nuclear power industry and for
safety regulation.
Outside METI the activists staged a number of protests. At 3:40 p.m. they created a
‘human chain’ surrounding the METI building. A few hours later one group of
protesters commenced a 10 day hunger strike.710 Another group took advantage of
the spectacle to erect a tent on the grounds of the METI building. The activists then
commenced a 24-hour occupation of the tent which they named the ‘METI Tent
Plaza’ (Keisanshō mae tento hiroba). As at No Nukes Plaza, the activists outside
METI deployed the term ‘hiroba’ in order to assert their right to occupy public space
and transform it into a place for participatory democracy. Fuchigami Tarō, an activist
with the Tent Plaza and a member of a group called the Committee to Prevent the
Revision of Article 9 of the Constitution (Kyūjō kaiken bōshi no kai) explained that
the tent would serve as ‘a place for popular discussion about nuclear power’. In the
face of demands from Ministry officials that the tent be removed, he defended the
709 Hoyt J. Long, On Uneven Ground  : Miyazawa Kenji and the Making of Place in Modern Japan / Hoyt
Long (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2012), 141.
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Tent Plaza activists’ right to occupy the space on the basis that ‘originally, METI and
the land which it manages belong to the people’. The Tent Plaza countered that
METI ought to ‘provide this place to us as place ‘for a people’s discussion on nuclear
power’’.711
As discussed in Chapter One, the powerful Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
played an important role in the development of Japan’s nuclear energy policy. The
Ministry was charged with developing policy and encouraging utility companies to
build nuclear power plants. Yet the Ministry was also responsible for overseeing
safety standards in the industry. Many anti-nuclear activists saw these two roles as
contradictory. Satō Eisaku, former Governor of Fukushima Prefecture, hit out at the
Ministry in an article published in the weekly Shūkan Asahi a few weeks after the
Fukushima accident. He recalled how, during his time as Governor from 1988 to
2006 he had, ‘fought hard against METI, demanding a transparency guarantee on
accident information and working to secure the prefectural government’s rights with
regard to where nuclear plants are built’. The establishment of the tent on the
grounds of the METI building made a statement about the locus of power behind the
nuclear industry. It constituted a critique of the Ministry’s continuing role in
supporting nuclear power after the Fukushima accident by insisting that nuclear
power was ‘safe’ and for working to promote reactor restarts in spite of growing
public opposition.712
As feminist scholar Odawara Rin points out, the first event at the METI Tent Plaza to
attract national attention took place approximately six weeks after the establishment
of the tent when a group of women from Fukushima staged a three day sit-in protest
which began on 27 October 2011.713 The action was organised by a group of women
who called themselves the ‘Fukushima Women Who Don’t Want Nuclear Power’
(Genpatsu iranai Fukushima no onna tachi). The group issued a list of demands
which included the immediate cessation of all nuclear power plants and their
Fuchigami Tarō, ‘Keisanshō mae no tento to wa nani ka! [What is The Tent Outside the Ministry of
Economy, Trade and Industry]’, Jōkyō dai san ki [Situation Third Series] 2, no 15 (October 2011): 6–9.
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decommissioning; not restarting any of the reactors which were offline due to either
maintenance checks or incidents; that the state take responsibility for the evacuation
of all children and provide compensation payments to all those residents who had
already evacuated; and the repeal of the ‘Three Nuclear Power Laws’ which make
local municipalities dependent on subsidies and impede their independence.
Inspired by this action, women from all over Japan organised a second seven day sitin protest which followed immediately after the Fukushima women’s protest. Like
some of the other hiroba actions which I have discussed in this thesis the women’s
sit-in at the Tent Plaza provided an opportunity for intercourse between activists
from different generations, activist backgrounds and genders. Odawara describes
how ‘young mothers whom I met at the sit-in … were collecting petitions, submitting
them to local governments, organising study groups and making networks with
similar groups in neighbouring townships’. I visited the METI Tent Plaza during the
women’s sit-in where I too noted the great diversity of groups represented among the
participants. In addition to various pieces of paper from the sit-in organisers
themselves I was given fliers and other material from a group in Hokkaido who were
organising a summer camp for children from Fukushima. I also received an
advertisement for a calendar memorialising the 26 year anniversary of the Chernobyl
disaster containing photographs and artworks by children from the affected region
which gave an address in Shinjuku. For Odawara, the diversity of participants was
evidence that
the anti-nuke movement in Japan shows an unprecedented expansion, mostly, by the
people who throw themselves into social movement for the first time, by young
people and young women who have been previously keeping distance from it. As I
speak with the people in demos and in the tent, I am always struck by the large
diversity of their jobs and careers.714

Occupying such a visible location in the centre of the administrative district of
Kasumigaseki the Tent Plaza was frequently visited by activists and journalists from
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overseas who were looking to cover the anti-nuclear movement in Japan.715 At the
Global Conference for a Nuclear Power Free World in Yokohama, I assisted antinuclear activists from Australia with handing out material and collecting signatures
opposing uranium mining in Australia. I escorted a number of these activists to the
Tent Plaza where they were able to meet the women from Fukushima who were
staging a second, longer sit-in protest. I then wrote about this experience for an
activist newspaper in Australia.716
Activist Sugihara Kōji, writing in May 2012, felt that the Tent Plaza had established
its presence as ‘a base for transmission and intercourse’.717 Fuchigami, too, insisted
that, while the tent was established initially by the Committee to Prevent the
Revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, it had been supported by a wide variety of
people. ‘The tent has awakened the sympathies of many ordinary people and citizens
… it has become a place for collective debates, a plaza which is visited by people
with various positions’.718 Judith Butler points out that when movements occupy
public space the publicness of the space is not given. ‘Collective actions collect the
space itself’, she observes, ‘they gather the pavement, and animate and organize the
architecture’.719 People lay claim to the publicness of a space through the act of
occupation. The METI Tent Plaza was established on the grounds of the Ministry
building without authorisation. Participants nevertheless staked their claim to
legitimacy on the basis that METI and its officials are actually supposed to serve the
people. They transformed a small corner on the grounds of this powerful Ministry
into a hiroba where anti-nuclear activists from across Japan and around the world
could participate in the debate on nuclear power. In the next section I discuss how
Tent Plaza activists tried to extend the space of participatory democracy into the
METI building itself.
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Witnessing as a Democratic Praxis
In the background to the establishment of the Tent Plaza in September 2011 were
widely held concerns that the restart of nuclear reactors which had been shut down
for safety checks might be imminent.720 Activists were wary of the fact that Noda
had signalled his willingness to countenance nuclear reactor restarts and the signals
coming from METI indicated that such restarts were about to proceed. In early 2012,
the struggle against reactor restarts coalesced around the possible restart of two
nuclear reactors at the Ōi nuclear power plant in Fukui Prefecture.
Under the guidelines implemented by Prime Minister Kan prior to his resignation,
nuclear reactors which went offline for routine maintenance checks after 3.11 had to
pass new stress tests before they could be restarted. The results of these tests then
had to be reviewed by an expert committee before final approval for the restarts
could be given. On 18 January 2012 the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency
(NISA) held its first public hearing into the results of first stage stress tests
conducted by the Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) on the No 3 and No 4
reactors at the Ōi plant. The meeting, which was scheduled for 4 o’clock, was
delayed for several hours. A group of anti-nuclear protesters attended the public
hearing. On arrival at the METI building, however, they were not permitted to enter
the room where the hearing was to take place and were instead consigned to a
separate room connected via a video link. When they objected to being excluded
from the hearing room the police were called to eject the protesters. 721 Panel
members were led to a separate room where they approved the test results. Two of
the panel members, however, objecting to the exclusion of the public from the
hearing room, refused to take part in the panel.722 Protesters from the Tent Plaza
outside the METI building objected to the closed nature of the hearing and to the
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presence of a number of experts on the panel who were known to have received large
sums of money from Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. The company manufactures
nuclear reactors and had also conducted stress tests on behalf of the electric power
companies. The protesters regarded the hearing as a mere rubber stamp intended to
pave the way for the restarts at Ōi.723 Their suspicions were confirmed when the
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency approved the tests in February and submitted
its recommendation to restart reactors 3 and 4 at Ōi to the Nuclear Safety
Commission (NSC) of Japan, located in the Cabinet Office.724
The Tent Plaza protests were unable to stop the approval process but their actions did
shine a light on the shadowy world of the nuclear village. They bore witness to the
fact that several members of the committee charged with assessing the safety of
nuclear reactors were in fact receiving money from companies who stood to profit
from the nuclear power industry. The protests made public the collusive nature of the
nuclear village. The DPJ government could not entirely ignore the growing public
scrutiny. In April, for example, Chief Cabinet Secretary Edano Yukio publically
forbade former METI officials, including those in NISA and the Agency for Natural
Resources and Energy, from taking jobs in electric power companies upon
retirement.
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This pronouncement occurred in the context of widespread

condemnation of the practice of ‘amakudari’ (‘descent from heaven’) described in
Chapter One. In the case of METI, many former officials, including members of
NISA, had obtained jobs as advisors to the electric power companies.
Ending the widespread practice of amakudari was a key policy platform for the
Democratic Party of Japan government when they were elected in 2009. The promise
of ‘seiji yūsen’ (politics in command) was one of the campaign slogans the DPJ had
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used to contrast itself with the LDP which was seen as hopelessly entangled with the
bureaucracy and big business.726 Following the election victory in 2009, however,
incoming Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio locked horns with powerful bureaucrats
in the Defence Agency and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs over the issues of
American military bases in Okinawa. Hatoyama’s administration had promised to
review the terms of an earlier agreement with the United States to relocate the
Futenma air base, a major U.S. Marine Corps facility in Okinawa, to a less populated
part of Okinawa island. The DPJ insisted instead that the base be moved outside
Okinawa, which already bears the largest burden of United States military bases in
Japan. The United States government reacted angrily to the suggestion that the
agreement might be reviewed. 727 Enormous pressure was brought to bear on
Hatoyama’s government both from the United States and the ministries of defence
and foreign affairs. By June 2010 Hatoyama had resigned, citing as a reason his
inability to close the Futenma base and ensure its relocation outside of Okinawa.
Edano’s instructions to METI and other ministerial officials not to engage in
amakudari were a continuation of this struggle between the DPJ and the powerful
LDP-dominated ministries.
Commenting on the protests inside METI against the closure of the public hearings
on the stress tests Sugihara suggested that ‘witnessing is the last ‘safety net’ for
democracy’. He noted that the incident on 18 January had revealed the slipshod
approvals process for reactor restarts which was taking place at METI. The protests
also delayed the hearing for 20 days. While the number of citizens inside the
hearings may have been small, they had been able to confront the ‘nuclear village’ in
their own voices and the many people who had rushed to the METI building to
protest what was going on inside were also able to express their opinion.728
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Inside and Outside the Kantei
In October 2011 a group of activists from different anti-nuclear groups in the Tokyo
metropolitan area came together under the umbrella of the Metropolitan Coalition
Against Nukes (MCAN). The group was originally conceived as a clearing house for
the organisers of anti-nuclear demonstrations in the Tokyo region so that they could
avoid schedule clashes between different demonstrations on the same day and to
facilitate information sharing.729 That participants felt the need to establish such a
group gives some indication of the breadth of anti-nuclear organising which took
place in the metropolitan region in 2011. Kinoshita Chigaya tabulated the antinuclear demonstrations in Tokyo. He recorded ten separate anti-nuclear protest
actions in April, fifteen in May, five in June, eight in July, twelve in September,
eight in October, ten in November and twelve in December of 2011.730 As most of
these demonstrations took place on weekends to enable working people to participate
the potential for significant scheduling clashes is clearly apparent.
MCAN organised its first protest as part of the Global Conference for a Nuclear
Power Free World (Datsu genpatsu sekai kaigi) which had been organised by a
number of large non-governmental organisations such as Peaceboat and Greenpeace
Japan in Yokohama in January 2012.731 The march attracted an impressive 4500
people. The Kantei Mae actions began later in the year with a small protest of 300
people on Friday 29 March 2012. From then on the protests took place every Friday
evening between six and eight o’clock. The organising group asked citizens to gather
on the footpath, express their opposition to reactor restarts peacefully and demand an
end to nuclear power. The actions started out small but they continued to grow
during April and May. When the government’s decision to restart the Ōi reactor
seemed certain the numbers began to swell. Some 40,000 people gathered in protest
on 22 June.732
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Although the number of protesters who attended the Kantei Mae protests had already
swelled to the thousands by May, they did not attract significant attention from the
mainstream media until the numbers reached the hundreds of thousands. In the
absence of mainstream media coverage independent media played an important role
in communicating information about the protests. The helicopter from which Noda
Masaya’s photograph in Figure 9 was taken did not belong to a major news
organisation. It was hired with funds raised by a citizens’ campaign initiated by antinuclear activist Hirose Takeshi. The group hoped to compensate for the lack of
attention given to the growing protest movement by the mainstream media. 733
Independent media, in particular the Independent Web Journal edited by Iwakami
Yasumi, played an important role in spreading the word about the Kantei Mae
protests.734
In April 2012 Minister for Economy, Trade and Industry Edano Yukio conceded that
no nuclear reactor restarts would be possible prior to the 5 May shutdown of the
Tomari reactor. He began lobbying local politicians, including Fukui Prefectural
Governor Nishikawa Issei, to give their assent to the restarts at Ōi. The DPJ
government of Noda Yoshihiko faced stiff opposition to its plans from local leaders
in the Kansai region of western Japan. Governor Nishikawa demanded that Noda
‘gain the understanding’ of other Kansai leaders like Osaka Mayor Hashimoto Tōru
who had previously voiced their opposition to the restart.735
The Kansai leaders were organised into an alliance of nine local governments
including seven prefectures – Shiga, Osaka, Kyoto, Hyōgo, Wakayama, Tokushima
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and Tottori – and two cities – Osaka and Sakai. Under pressure from the regional
electric power utility Kansai Electric Power Company (KEPCO) and the Kansai
Economic Federation headed by KEPCO chairman Mori Shōsuke, however, by early
June the leaders had softened their opposition to the plan. KEPCO and the central
government had threatened that rolling blackouts would be implemented in the
Kansai region if the restarts were not approved. As the Japan Times reported, local
leaders were worried that they would be held responsible were this to occur. On 15
May the Ōi town assembly approved the restart of the reactors. With half of its
municipal budget dependent on nuclear power-related subsidies and tax revenues this
was more or less a foregone conclusion.736
The Governor of Fukui Prefecture requested that the prime minister justify his
decision to re-start the Ōi reactor to the nation. On 8 June Prime Minister Noda
Yoshihiko responded to this request in a televised speech from inside the Kantei in
which he defended his decision to authorise the restart of two reactors at the Ōi plant.
Noda assumed personal responsibility as prime minister for authorising the restart at
Ōi, justifying the decision by saying that he was ‘protecting the livelihood of the
people’ both by ensuring that safety standards at the plant were adequate and by
guaranteeing electricity supplies to the Kansai region. 737 While Noda gave his
speech some 2,000 to 4,000 people were lined up along the pavement outside the
Kantei chanting ‘Saikadō hantai’ (‘No Restarts’). The speech was meant to ‘explain’
Noda’s decision to the public but it had little effect in changing public opinion
concerning the restarts at Ōi. Polls showed a majority of people continued to oppose
the restarts even after his television appearance.738 Nevertheless, as the New York
Times reported, the speech was ‘seen as a victory for the still-powerful nuclear
industry and its backers in the business world, whose political support has been
crucial to the otherwise unpopular Mr. Noda’.739 Opposition to the restarts was
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accompanied by widespread condemnation of the prime minister himself and cries of
‘Noda yamero’ (‘Noda, Quit’) joined the repertoire of anti-nuclear slogans.
The Kantei Mae protest continued to grow throughout June 2012. On Friday 15 June,
organisers estimated that 12,000 people joined the protest outside the Kantei. On 16
June Noda’s government formally announced that it would order the restarts. The
plant’s operator, KEPCO announced on 25 June that they would restart reactors 3
and 4 at the Ōi plant on 1 July.740 The following day the government gave its official
approval to the restart of the Ōi reactors. Shirōto no Ran responded by organising a
‘Genpatsu Yamero, Noda Yamero’ protest in Shinjuku on 1 July. This was the first
Genpatsu Yamero protest organised by the group since the arrests in September
2011.741 The anti-nuclear mood, which under Kan had enjoyed a degree of support
from the political leadership, now took a distinctly anti-government turn.
Many participants were particularly concerned that Noda’s actions seemed to pay no
regard to the ‘will of the people’ (min’i). A 33 year old participant from western
Tokyo, for example, told the Tōkyō Shimbun ‘I want to show the Noda
administration, who aren’t looking at the people (kokumin), the will of the people
(min’i)’.742 The newspaper reported the organisers’ estimate of 7000 participants,
who marched from Shinjuku central park through heavy rain to the east exit of
Shinjuku station. On arrival the organisers held a ‘No Nukes Plaza’ action with
music, singing and dancing which lasted into the night. On 6 July, amid heavy rain,
more than one hundred thousand people returned to the Kantei Mae to protest the Ōi
restart. Once again the press of the crowd flowed out from the footpath and onto the
road in front of the Kantei, completely blocking it to passing traffic. The
demonstration continued along the footpath for hundreds of metres. A 44-year old
company employee from nearby Kanagawa prefecture told the Tōkyō Shimbun ‘I’m
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really shocked that the voices of so many people were not heard and the restart of the
Ōi nuclear plant went ahead’.743
Meanwhile, inside the Kantei, the Tōkyō Shimbun’s reporter noted that as Noda
walked across the grounds of the compound on 29 June he remarked to the Security
Police officer on duty ‘it’s a big noise isn’t it’ before heading into his residential
quarters. Earlier, on 25 June, he had remarked to the parliament that he ‘could hear
the chanting very clearly’ but the protests seemed to have little outward effect on the
prime minister’s stance. 744 On 6 July, however, he was forced to at least
acknowledge their impact. In response to a question from a journalist about the
protests Noda said ‘I’ve received many voices, all sorts of voices’. When asked
directly whether he had acknowledged the voices of protest he silently nodded. The
prime minister could not afford to be too cavalier in his disregard for the protesters.
Support for the anti-nuclear movement inside the Diet was growing.745 Earlier in the
week former DPJ leader Ozawa Ichirō had left the party. His resignation, which took
48 of his supporters with him, was primarily prompted by Noda’s passage of a
consumption tax increase. Ozawa also cited, however, the government’s support for
nuclear power as a reason for leaving the party. Along with 48 supporters he formed
a new party which cited opposition to nuclear power as one of its policy goals. On 6
July Ozawa added his name to a petition of 117 Diet members opposing nuclear
power. 746 As

the consensus between local and central politicians and the

bureaucracy which had been secured during the period of LDP-dominance began to
unravel, new spaces for dissent opened up both in the streets outside the official
government buildings but also within.
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Meeting Noda
On 22 August the voices of the Kantei Mae protesters were most certainly heard by
the prime minister when he met with 11 representatives from the Metropolitan
Coalition Against Nukes. Sociologist Oguma Eiji, though not an official member of
MCAN, facilitated the meeting along with former prime minister Kan Naoto.
Towards the end of July Oguma learnt that MCAN was trying to organise a meeting
with the prime minister with little success. Having met Kan while giving a lecture on
post-war Japanese history earlier that year Oguma offered to contact the former
prime minister and see if he could organise a meeting with Noda. Oguma later
explained how he had told the former prime minister that ‘it wouldn’t be good for
Japan’s democracy if there was no response from government to such an outpouring
of the voice of the people’. Kan agreed to use his remaining influence in the party to
insist that his successor meet with the protest group.747
While Noda made no specific promises to the MCAN representatives who met with
him at the Kantei, Oguma argued that the meeting was of great historical significance.
In his view the meeting established an important precedent for future citizens’
movements to be able to meet with the prime minister and other cabinet ministers.748
The meeting was not welcomed, however, by some in the conservative media
establishment. The weekly magazine Shūkan Bunshun (Weekly Bunshun) published
a sensationalist account of the meeting in which it targeted the MCAN
representatives with personal smears. 749 The weekly designated Misao Redwolf as
the ‘leader’ of MCAN, although the group has no official leader. It dwelt on the
activist’s colourful past traveling and working in the United States where, the
magazine alleged, she had spent some time as an exotic dancer. The weekly even
tracked down Redwolf’s family in Hiroshima, extracting poignant quotes from her
father who described his estranged daughter as ‘a bit of a strange child’. By lavishing
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attention on the details of Redwolf’s personal life the weekly article worked to
discredit the anti-nuclear movement. The article also tried to insinuate a connection
between the Kantei Mae protests and the violence of New Left protest in the 1960s
and 1970s. It did so by painting Oguma, who as an historical sociologist has written
extensively on the New Left,750 as an apologist for the violence of these movements.
Shūkan Bunshun's personal smearing of the MCAN representatives seemed to be
little more than cover for a broader attack on Noda himself. Beyond this immediate
political targeting of Noda, however, lay a deeper anxiety. The weekly carried an
opinion from sociologist Hashizume Daisaburō which compared the effect
demonstrations can have on politics with terrorism. In appealing to the prime
minister directly and circumventing the Diet, Hashizume compared the actions of the
Kantei Mae protesters with those of a group of young army officers who carried out a
number of assassinations of senior government officials during the 26 February
Incident on 1936 in an attempt to force the Emperor to assume direct command of
the government.751
Alongside the smear piece was a commentary by far-right conservative writer
Sakurai Yoshiko.752 As an historical revisionist, Sakurai was very conscious of the
parallels between the Kantei Mae protests and the 1960 Anpo struggle. The protests
held outside the prime minister's official residence and the National Diet in the
summer of 2012 consistently attracted tens of thousands of people. On at least three
occasions the crowd exceeded one hundred thousand. Demonstrations of this size
have not been seen in Japan since protests against the signing of the Anpo security
treaty with the United States in 1960.

Sakurai’s ultra-conservative vision of

democracy is worthy of analysis because it throws into relief the issues at stake in the
Kantei Mae protests. By meeting with the demonstrators, Sakurai argues, Noda
created ‘an enormous problem in terms of protecting the health of Japan’s
democratic government’. She makes a number of arguments to support this
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contention. Firstly, she questions ‘whether the 11 who entered the Prime Ministerial
residence really represent the will of the people (min’i)’. This argument raises an
important question about whether the amorphous ‘will of the people’ can in fact be
represented. Secondly, Sakurai argues that the prime minister, as Japan’s ‘supreme
power’ (saikō kenryokusha), should ‘always focus on the big picture and take the
course of action which will bring about the greatest benefit for the national interest,
to adjust oneself to the immediate pressure in front of you is absurd’. This argument
suggests that in a representative democracy political leaders should in fact ignore the
stated ‘will of the people’, however it is expressed, if it conflicts with a ‘national
interest’ which they are somehow uniquely able to determine. Finally Sakurai takes a
cheap shot at Noda for taking time to meet with demonstrators rather than dealing
with territorial disputes with China, Korea and Russia which she considers to be of
greater significance.753 While this third argument is not worthy of consideration here
the first two points raise important issues about the nature of democratic participation.
The basis of Sakurai’s understanding of the prime minister’s office as the ‘supreme
power’ (saikō kenryokusha) within the Japanese polity is at odds with Japan’s
constitution. The constitution makes no reference to an ‘ultimate power’ resting in
the prime minister. It does, however, refer to the notion of ‘sovereignty’ (shuken)
which, it states, resides not in the prime minister or even the emperor but in ‘the
people’ (kokumin). According to the constitution, a duly elected government derives
its authority (ken’i) from the people and the people’s representatives then exercise
that power (kenryoku). The only ‘power’ (kenryoku) mentioned is not a ‘supreme
power’ emanating from the leader of the executive government but a delegated
authority derived from the people.754
The real question, therefore, is how is the authority of ‘the people’ delegated to their
elected representatives. Sakurai argues that, as Japan has a representative democratic
system, the only appropriate place for people to show their displeasure with an
elected government is at the ballot box. To attempt to influence a duly elected
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government in between elections is, in this reading, a contravention of the principles
of democracy. The Kantei Mae protests, by contrast, clearly embodied a notion of
democracy in which citizens’ participate in decisions which affect them. These
contrasting views have been at the centre of struggles for democracy in Japan since
the end of the Asia-Pacific War in 1945 and the proclamation of the new constitution.
The most famous incident which tested the limits of citizen participation in
democratic government in post-war Japan was the Anpo struggle of 1960.
The Anpo struggle of 1960 brought hundreds of thousands of people into the streets
around Nagatachō and Kasumigaseki in protest at the LDP government’s attempt to
ratify the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty (Anpo). For many observers in 2012,
particularly those who were familiar with the history of the Anpo struggle of 1960,
scenes of hundreds of thousands gathering outside the prime ministerial residence
drew inevitable parallels. Nor were these comparisons lost on conservatives like
Sakurai. For many citizen protesters at the time, the Anpo struggle became a test of
Japan’s post-war democracy and its new constitution. Would a new democracy based
on citizen-participation in politics be possible or would the elites who had led Japan
into the Asia-Pacific War be able to continue to rule unchecked? When the
government of Kishi Nobusuke forced the Security Treaty through the Diet in
defiance of the mass protests and sustained opposition from the Socialist and
Communist parties within the Diet, many citizens felt that democracy had been
defeated. Kishi ignored the protesters and deployed riot police to control the
demonstrations, ultimately resulting in the death of one young demonstrator Kamba
Michiko. In an essay written at the time Maruyama Masao wrote:
up until now, in the post-war, the issues which came up separately and at different
times in the form of protecting the constitution, military bases, the teacher evaluation
problem, etcetera. Those issues which sporadically appeared as problems have now
cohered into one effort. Up until right this moment, all of the individual, fragmentary
ways in which the Kishi government has tried to trample on the constitution and
democracy appeared in a concentrated form on that night [the night that Anpo was
forced through the parliament].755
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In Sakurai’s revisionist historiography, however, the defeat of the citizen movement
during the Anpo struggle exemplifies the triumph of democracy. Sakurai compares
Kishi’s actions favourably with those of Noda. ‘Kishi did not do anything like meet
with the demonstrators’, she writes. Instead, he maintained that ‘everything is as
usual in the Ginza and at Kōrakuen Stadium. I can hear the ‘voice of the
voiceless’’.756
In regard to min’i, it is worth thinking about how the internal contradictions of the
Kantei Mae demonstrations actually play into these criticisms. Because they are
actually based on a similar understanding of min’i being something representable.
Demonstrators argued that their collective actions were representative of the true
min’i. Sakurai on the other hand, seemed to think she could divine the min’i of the
‘voiceless voices’, much like Kishi had claimed in 1960. The question remains,
however, as to whether the opinions of more than one hundred million people are
really ‘representable’ in any meaningful way, whether through demonstrations or
elections. Democracy requires participation precisely because representation is
impossible. The hiroba created in anti-nuclear protests in Tokyo were an example of
how democracy might look beyond representation when people engage directly in
the decisions which affect their lives.

A Hiroba in the Centre of the Government District
When Oguma attended the weekly Kantei Mae protests he noted that, although there
were some people at the demonstrations wearing suits, the uniform of full-time
Japanese ‘salarymen’, the majority wore a ‘free’ style of dress.757 He speculated that
the presence of a large numbers of casually dressed men and women in their 30s and
40s who appeared to be without children and were able to attend a demonstration at
six o’clock on a Friday evening indicates something about how Japanese society has
changed in the post-industrial period. This is the generation which embodies the
growth in single-person households, the ‘liberalisation’ of the labour market, Japan's
declining fertility rate and a tendency to put off marriage until later in life. For
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Oguma, the presence of this layer of Japanese society in the streets holds a
significance that goes beyond the issue of nuclear power itself. Their presence
indicates the composition of a social layer that is prepared to demonstrate.758
Oguma argues that the weekly protests held in the political centre of Japan created
the ‘most free ‘plaza’ (hiroba) in contemporary Japan’. While the number of
participants varied week to week, by maintaining the protests at a regular time and
place MCAN created a ‘receptacle’ (ukezara) where larger mobilisations could occur
when particular problems arose.759 In Chapter Four I discussed the way Genpatsu
Yamero organisers tried to create a hiroba by appropriating for political activity
those places in the city which were usually given over to consumption. Their strategy
was based on a vision of democracy in which people participate directly in politics
rather than electing representatives to make decisions affecting the polity on their
behalf. In some ways, the Kantei Mae protests embodied a more traditional
understanding of political power as located in the organs of government. By doing so,
however, they were able to bear witness to the undemocratic processes whereby the
restart of the Japanese nuclear industry was being planned and executed by the
administrative and executive branches of government. They highlighted the collusive
nature of the nuclear village with its connections between private electric power
utilities and the organs of representative government. Furthermore, by providing a
space in which people could gather, the protests created a kind of ‘people’s
parliament’ or assembly in which free discussion on the many issues of concern to
participants could take place.
Once the crush of the mass protests in June, July and August subsided, the weekly
gathering took on the shape of a village. MCAN organised a number of different
areas in which people could protest. On the footpath outside the Kantei, protesters
continued primarily to chant ‘No Restarts’ (saikadō hantai) and other slogans.
Designated speech and family areas were established in front of the Diet Building. A
group of drummers occupied a space downhill from the Diet Building’s main gate.
At the intersection of the Metropolitan Expressway between the Kantei and the
758
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METI building MCAN established a refreshments area where they provided coffee
and amazake760 and collected donations. Thus the geography of the protests was
defined by dividing the space outside METI, the Kantei and the National Diet into
particular areas which were designated for different activities. While MCAN took
primary responsibility for organising the protests, the permanent occupation camp
outside METI and the ongoing actions by protesters in front of the nearby TEPCO
headquarters in Shinbashi gave further definition to the physical geography of the
protests.
Next to the speech and family areas outside the main gate of the National Diet
building a number of independent groups established their own small protests. There
were groups singing songs and groups which laid out caricature artworks on the side
of the footpath. A number of cyclists decked out their bicycles with placards or
donned outrageous costumes and cycled around the Diet, extending the space of
protest to the road without having to apply for a formal permit. A drumming group
did the rounds of the ministerial and government office buildings stopping outside
each one to drum out their protest. A group of fans of the rock musician Imawano
Kiyoshirō set up photographs of the singer and played recordings of his music
through small speakers set up on the pavement. A small ‘guerrilla café’ served
sandwiches and hot drinks to passers-by for a small donation. Oguma describes the
café space as a place for participants who had come to recognise each other through
participating in the protests to talk and make jokes.761
The ‘free space’ which existed every Friday night in the government district was a
place where ‘anyone could easily realise whatever comes into his or her mind,
anyone could support that activity and conversations were possible even between
strangers. Introductions and being introduced were frequent. At the end of March
[2013] the cherry blossoms bloomed and everybody had a hanami party’.762

Amazake is a hot drink made from fermented rice which is often consumed in Japan during the colder
months.
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Beyond Representation
The Tōkyō Shimbun of Sunday 17 June made its opposition to the decision to restart
Ōi clear. The front page headline screamed ‘Min’i mushi okashii’ (‘Ignoring the Will
of the People is Strange’). Featured below the headlines were photographs and
interviews with activists who explained how they were working to assert their own
voices in politics. One such activist was Fukushima Yumiko from the group Project
99%. She explained to the Tōkyō Shimbun’s reporter that, in her view, ‘the decision
to restart the Ōi nuclear plant has been made in spite of the opposition of the majority
of the people (kokumin). Democracy is being overturned from its foundations. This is
dictatorship’.
The article went on to explain how Fukushima had formed the Project 99% network
with people she had met at anti-nuclear demonstrations since March that year. The
reference to 99% draws on the language of the Occupy Wall Street movement which
attempted to encapsulate the growing inequalities in contemporary society in terms
of an opposition between the ‘1%’ who own the majority of the world’s wealth and
the 99% who have little power and control. The group aims to support those
politicians who agree with the group’s core aims. By organising voters in support of
these politicians outside of traditional party political structures they hoped thereby to
overcome the disproportionate influence the nuclear village has over elected
politicians. The problem Fukushima’s group recognised certainly had a major impact
on how politicians acted on energy policy. Kan Naoto explained to Oguma Eiji how
the intervention of particular members of the Democratic Party of Japan who
depended on the electoral support of the electric power company workers’ unions
had scuppered the party’s plan to change energy policy to reduce Japan’s dependence
on nuclear power plants.763
A second interview published in the Tōkyō Shimbun on 17 June was with a group of
young people working to increase the participation of youth in politics by reforming
legislation which restricts online campaigning in national elections. Like Fukushima,
22 year-old university student Kita Nobusuke told the paper he was particularly
763 Oguma and Kan, ‘Kan Naoto interviewed by Oguma Eiji. Kantei no naka kara no shōgen [Testimony
from Inside the Kantei]’, 184.
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concerned that the decision to restart the Ōi plant was made despite a majority of
Japanese people being opposed to it.764 Both Fukushima and Kita expressed an
understanding of the failure of democracy based on the lack of accountability of
elected representatives. They lacked the radical perspective of participatory
democracy as an alternative to representative democracy which was more visible in
the Genpatsu Yamero demonstrations. Nevertheless, their critique recognised that the
way the system currently operates ultimately serves not the interests of people but
those of the powerful electric utility companies. For some organisers of the Kantei
Mae demonstrations, it was precisely this more ‘reasonable’ and mainstream
orientation which drove them to organise independently of Genpatsu Yamero and to
adopt a very different relationship with the police.
As Fukushima Yumiko’s group’s adoption of the slogan ‘99%’ indicates, the protests
taking place in June 2012 continued to display an awareness of the broader global
struggles of 2011. On 22 June the Friday protest reached 45,000 people and signs
appeared bearing the words ‘Hydrangea Revolution’. June is summer in Japan and
the time of year when the hydrangeas come into bloom. This nomenclature reflected
the desire of some participants to connect the popular ‘revolution’ taking place in
Japan with the Arab Spring which had begun with the Tunisian ‘Jasmine Revolution’
in late 2010.765 One contributor to LaborNet Japan, a web-based independent media
organisation, described the ‘hydrangea revolution’ as ‘a revolution that fully realises
the true will of the people, hopes not only to reverse the restarting of the [Ōi] reactors
but to develop up to the decommissioning of all nuclear reactors’.766
On 29 June, the day before the scheduled restart of the reactors at Ōi, an
unprecedented 200,000 people gathered outside the Kantei. They crammed into the
footpath in front of the residence for several blocks with the crowd stretching as far
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as the Ministry of Finance some 700 metres away. I attended the Kantei Mae protest
on that day. The atmosphere was electric. As the crowd grew people became more
and more impatient with being kept back from the Kantei and began to surge forward.
At some point the movement of people towards the Kantei reached a critical mass
and the barricades which had been erected by the police to keep people off the road
collapsed. A wave of humanity surged into the street.767 The front page of the
following day’s Tōkyō Shimbun described the scene.
There were company employees and students and women with children, a wide
range of ages. Among the crowd were people beating drums and people riding
bicycles decked out with anti-nuclear designs.

A female 41 year old marriage counsellor from Tokyo’s Edogawa ward, told the
Tōkyō Shimbun her reasons for joining the protest.
I’m dissatisfied that the members of parliament don’t understand the will of the
people (min’i) and so I started demonstrating last week. I used to think that
participating in demonstrations was bad. I thought that opposition was how conflict
started and that leads to war. But after the [3.11] accident I learned that politicians
had been able to do whatever they wanted because we were indifferent and I
repented. I was one of the ‘ignorant people’ (gumin). How do we stop them from
doing whatever they want? Clearly we have to take an interest and express our
feelings.768

This interviewee expressed her view of the Kantei Mae protests as a means of
‘expressing her feelings’ (ishi hyōshi) and exercising some control over the actions
of elected politicians. When the representative system is not expressing the ‘will of
the people’, she surmises, the people must participate directly in politics. A second
interviewee, a 34 year old company employee from Sumida ward also expressed this
sense that politicians do not express the popular will. ‘Prime Minister Noda, who
decided on the restarts, has a completely different point of view from the people
(kokumin)’.769
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The global wave of protests for democracy in 2010, 2011 and 2012 had mixed
outcomes in their diverse local contexts. Yet all of these struggles raised problems
with the existing structures of representation, particularly with the susceptibility of
these structures to subversion by the undemocratic power of money. Yet the crisis of
representation has, as yet, not produced any clear alternative forms via which people
might exercise democratic power directly. Participants in the Kantei Mae protests
seemed to be striving for alternative forms of democratic power. Situated in the
government districts of Nagatachō and Kasumigaseki the Kantei Mae protests do
engage in a dialogue with existing forms of power invested in the constitutional state.

Summary
In this chapter I have discussed the way the focus of the anti-nuclear movement
shifted to the government and administrative districts of Kasumigaseki and
Nagatachō in 2012. The change of leadership inside the ruling Democratic Party of
Japan shifted the relationship between anti-nuclear demonstrators and their elected
representatives. While Kan had indicated a degree of support for the objectives of the
anti-nuclear movement, Noda’s stance was much more clearly pro-nuclear.
Nevertheless, the continuing pressure which protests placed on politicians
exacerbated the splits inside the party and between central and local government
leaders. By targeting the Ministry with the greatest responsibility for nuclear power
issues, the METI Tent Plaza activists bore witness to the formal reactor restart
hearings and exposed the collusion between experts and companies which stood to
gain from nuclear power. By creating a hiroba outside METI, they created a place
where activists from all over Japan and around the world could gather to participate
in the debate on energy policy. When MCAN began to organise their weekly protest
actions outside the Kantei, the METI Tent Plaza became one node in the ‘most free
plaza in Japan’ where an ever larger number of people began to participate in and
develop their critiques of the political process. The protests caused many people to
ponder the nature of contemporary Japanese democracy. Both virulent opponents of
the anti-nuclear movement and participants themselves took part in debates on
democracy and the respective roles of representation and participation. The hiroba in
the Nagatachō and Kasumigaseki districts suggested the potential for a kind of
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citizen-led democracy which had been crushed during the Anpo protests of 1960 but
now seemed once more to offer an alternative to the increasingly moribund structures
of representative democracy in Japan.
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CONCLUSION

In this thesis I set out to examine the strategies and tactics of the anti-nuclear
movement in Tokyo after 3.11. I proposed that this would constitute a
contemporary version of the ‘workers’ inquiries’ carried out by intellectuals
associated with the perspective of autonomy. I argued that the anti-nuclear
movement had a significance which went beyond the nuclear issue itself to
encompass many of the contradictions of post-industrial Japan. Precarity and
anti-nuclear activist Amamiya Karin concurred with this understanding that the
anti-nuclear movement had taken on a broader, anti-systemic significance. In
September 2012 she wrote that
the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident have revealed the contradictions of a
society in which the population is aging, fleeing the regions, shopping streets are
being transformed into ‘shuttered cities’ as the neoliberal major chains law empties
the centre of rural towns and metropolitan centres concentrating consumption in
large chain stores located on major highways. This is a structure in which a very few
get rich while the rest are forced to settle for radioactive labours in the nuclear power
plants in order to guarantee a stable livelihood.
Nuclear power contains all of the contradictions of this country. It condenses
everything to do with the post-war Liberal Democratic Party government. It threw
up all of these enormous contradictions and many people rose up.770

The threat posed by climate change as well as broader environmental concerns are
quickly becoming the most important social issues of our times. Activist and author
Naomi Klein has argued that, as the environmental crisis deepens, it is increasingly
taking on the shape of a systemic crisis of the capitalist system.771 The example of
the anti-nuclear movement in Japan demonstrates the inseparability of environmental
issues from the broader political economy.
As I have demonstrated throughout this thesis, the activist response to the disaster
emerged out of existing strands of social activism. I have focused in particular on the
role of freeter activism and the way issues of social precarity were accentuated by the
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compound disaster. In Chapter Two, for example, I described the April 2011
Genpatsu Yamero demonstration. I showed how the Genpatsu Yamero movement
originated in the freeter activism which developed in Tokyo in the 1990s and 2000s.
Then in Chapter Three I discussed the role of the Nantoka Neighbourhood in the
anti-nuclear movement and its connection with the precarity movement. It is clear
that the strategies and tactics of freeter activism had a powerful influence on the
development of the anti-nuclear movement. The structural relationship between the
nuclear industry and the broader political economy of the Japanese archipelago was
echoed by the relationship between anti-nuclear activism and other political struggles
related to the broader process of post-industrialisation, including the precarisation of
work.
In this thesis I have brought the thought of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri and the
broader autonomist current in which they are situated into dialogue with the antinuclear movement. In doing so I have followed the example of numerous scholars
writing in Japanese but I have helped to fill a significant gap in the Anglophone
autonomist literature. The perspective of autonomy has helped me to trace the
connections between anti-nuclear activism in Japan and that ‘broad tendency’ which
Sabu Kohso has detected in the globally interconnected social movements he calls
the ‘new anarchism’. Significantly, the movements which have emerged in Japan
after 3.11 are closely connected with these broader global tendencies. Hardt and
Negri have suggested that it is the apparently contradictory synthesis of commonality
and singularity which characterises the ‘multitude’ of social movements which are
challenging contemporary forms of capitalist power. As I discussed in Chapters Two,
Three and Four in particular, activists have physically travelled to protest camps and
university lecture theatres to share their experiences and try to find commonality
with one another.
As a ‘workers’ inquiry’ this thesis describes the vibrant cultural life of the antinuclear movement in Japan after 3.11. I showed how festive street demonstrations,
activist spaces, square occupations, music, theatre and film were woven together as
movement participants sought to articulate their critique of the nuclear industry and
their desires for a nuclear free world. In Chapter Three I turned from the protests in
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the streets to the organisation of an autonomous community of resistance in the
network of underground cafes, bars and bookshops which participants refer to as the
Nantoka Neighbourhood. Members of the Neighbourhood were key organisers of
anti-nuclear protest after Fukushima. They made use of the existing infrastructure of
radical spaces which they had built up over varying periods of time for anti-nuclear
activism.
Throughout this thesis I have developed my discussion of the strategy and tactics of
the anti-nuclear movement in Tokyo with relation to the dimensions of space and
time. In Chapter One I discussed the way precarity tends to blur the distinction
between work and non-work time to create a generalised condition of uncertainty and
instability. In response, precarity activists have developed strategies of resistance
which prioritise the satisfaction of their immediate needs and desires over long-term
goals. As I discussed in Chapters Two, Three and Four, precarity activism is
characterised by prefigurative strategies whereby activists seek to realise in the here
and now the kinds of alternative spaces and times they desire. I discussed the politics
of ‘festive noise’ as a tactic which draws attention to the nuclear crisis and resists the
silencing of dissent. In joking that demonstrating ‘saves electricity’, Matsumoto
articulated his desire for the anti-nuclear protests to serve as a broader critique of the
consumerism for which Tokyo is so well known. The tactical deployment of festive
noise refused the instrumental rationality of consumer capitalism with a scream of
opposition which encompassed affects of both anger and joy. In Chapter Five I
discussed street theatre as a form of protest where activists literally ‘act out’ the
futures they desire. In Chapter Six, too, I discussed the role of a democratic hiroba in
providing a means of expression for people who felt their voices were not being
represented within the formal institutions of government.
My concern with the precarity of time also extended to the role of history and
memory in the contemporary anti-nuclear movement. I showed how strands of
freeter activism were woven together with still other, older activist cultures such as
the cultural history of the peasant ikki discussed in Chapter Two and the feminist and
anti-nuclear ‘new wave’ movement of the 1970s and 1980s discussed in Chapter
Five. I discussed the way Kunitachi’s city’s musical culture reflects the living
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legacies of the counter-culture. The memories of protest which are recorded in music
gave the Kunitachi demonstrators a repertoire from which to draw as they developed
their own anti-nuclear soundtrack. In Chapter Six I discussed the historical precedent
of the Anpo protests and how they both inspired contemporary activists and spooked
a conservative commentator. While activists at times sought to distance themselves
from the legacies of past activism they often drew on these histories for inspiration
and ideas which were transmitted through music, political thought, film and protest
style.
Urban space has also been a key concern in this thesis. The Genpatsu Yamero
protests made subversive use of the city. By holding their first Genpatsu Yamero
demonstration in Kōenji, Shirōto no Ran activists tapped into the networks they had
developed in seven years of activism in the region. After Fukushima, the activists
who located themselves in these radical spaces drew connections between the issues
which had concerned them previously and the issue of nuclear power. In Chapter
Three I discussed how members of the Nantoka Neighbourhood created ‘alternative
spaces’ so as to construct a kind of ‘asylum’ for the precariat who are often excluded
from the spaces of family life, work and education. By tactically locating activism
and everyday life in the same spaces they developed the ‘the place of everyday life’
(seikatsu no ba) as a place for politics.
In Chapter Four I followed the Genpatsu Yamero movement into the centre of the
city to explore the notion of hiroba as a spatial practice within the anti-nuclear
movement. Activists used longstanding conceptions of urban space as a site of
conviviality and democratic citizenship to carve out sites of encounter between antinuclear protesters at No Nukes Plaza. They created temporarily liberated zones in
places which are usually subject to heavy policing. Despite participants’ desires for
an open hiroba, however, they were challenged from within and without to define the
limits of the hiroba. The debates which erupted over the inclusion of right-wing antinuclear activists in the hiroba forced organisers to recognise that even protest spaces
are riven by hierarchies based on gender, ethnicity and class. The arrest of 11
participants at a Genpatsu Yamero demonstration in September 2011 further
complicated the creation of the hiroba but also united participants in defence of their
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rights to freedom and assembly. In this chapter I also discussed the globalised nature
of contemporary anti-nuclear protest. I showed how participants in No Nukes Plaza,
for example, engaged in dialogue with activists carrying out occupations in public
spaces in other parts of the world. I continued this discussion in Chapter Six where I
outlined the Kantei Mae protests in the centre of Japan’s government and
administrative district. I showed how the hundreds of thousands of people who
gathered outside official government buildings like the Prime Minister’s Residence
engaged in a kind of grand experiment in popular democracy which had a discernible
impact on the political process. Activists created a hiroba outside METI where
people from across Japan and around the world could participate in the debate on
nuclear power. The potential for participatory democracy to challenge the existing
parliamentary system worried conservatives and prompted debates on the limits of
representation. Yet most activists still preferred to work to reform the representative
system rather than calling for a radical overhaul. Activists used a range of tactics to
intervene in urban space. Taken collectively, these tactics suggest a broader strategic
vision of the city as a place for protest, participation and carnival.
During a symposium which I attended at Tokyo University of Foreign Studies in
2012, activist and writer Rebecca Solnit argued that, following disasters, ‘civil
society often succeeds where institutions fail in the first minutes, hours, and days,
and sometimes people find in that newly visible, powerful civil society a new sense
of identity, belonging and possibility. In this disasters can be a little like
revolutions—not in the consequences of the revolution, but in the moment of rupture
when nothing is certain and everything is possible’. Solnit’s studies of post-disaster
situations have led her to a profoundly optimistic vision.
What else I learned when I opened that door onto that great landscape of
insurrectionary human nature is that utopia and the revolution are not in the future.
They are all around us in a thousand ways, and when we invent that new language
we will name each one of those ways. For after all, the relationships between friends,
between parents and children, the myriad acts of generosity through non-profits,
NGOs, activism, religious and voluntary groups are not capitalism but the kindness
and generosity that counterbalance and clean up after capitalism. These are around
us all the time, another economy, an economy of altruism and love, an economy
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against money and capital, and this too I learned to see when I began to look at
disaster.772

The 3.11 disaster visited enormous tragedy on people in the Tōhoku region of Japan,
thousands of whom lost their lives in the earthquake and tsunami. By triggering a
major nuclear accident, the disaster may well have even more profound
consequences in the longer term. Nevertheless, in the midst of the post-disaster
situation people in Tokyo came together to support their neighbours in the northeast
and to protest the inadequate response of government and corporate leaders.
My contemporary ‘workers’ inquiry’ into the anti-nuclear movement in Tokyo has
painted a detailed picture of the grassroots response to the 3.11 disasters. By
examining the movement through the lens of autonomist thought I have identified
commonalities and connections between it and the globally connected social
movements of 2011 and 2012. By focusing on the dimensions of space and time I
have tried to bring out the everydayness of anti-nuclear protest culture. I have
suggested that the overall strategic direction of the movement goes beyond
instrumental demands to question more broadly the culture of capitalist
developmentalism which gave birth to the nuclear industry.
Activists use two slogans with slightly different meanings to refer to the struggle
against nuclear power. The first, ‘han genpatsu’ can be translated as ‘against nuclear
power’ or ‘no nuclear power’. This slogan seems to express the negative moment of
the movement, the rejection of nuclear technology and of the undemocratic power of
the nuclear village on which it depends. A second slogan, which is more widely used,
is ‘datsu genpatsu’, which is a little more difficult to translate. When used as a prefix,
the Chinese character ‘datsu’, corresponds to the English prefix ‘de-’ meaning to
reverse or remove. The character is also used in the verb ‘nugu’, for example, which
means ‘to take off’, as in ‘to take off one’s clothing’. ‘Datsu genpatsu’ might
therefore be taken to imply a more thoroughgoing process of ‘removing’ nuclear
power from Japanese society. A liberal translation might be to ‘de-nuclearise’

772 For the full text of Solnit’s speech, see Rebecca Solnit, ‘Shinsai ni mukatte, tobira o hiraku [Facing the
Disaster, Opening the Door]’, trans. Odawara Rin, At purasu [At Plus] 12 (May 2012): 76–87.
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Japanese society. In this thesis I have mapped some of the widespread and diverse
forms which the movements to ‘de-nuclearise’ Japan has assumed in Tokyo.
At the time of writing the future of the nuclear industry in the archipelago is unclear.
After three years doggedly pursuing the restart of Japan’s idled nuclear reactor fleet,
the Liberal Democratic Party government of Prime Minister Abe Shinzō recently
achieved the first step towards its declared objective of restarting the Japanese
nuclear industry. On 11 August 2015, two reactors at the Sendai nuclear power plant
in the south-western island of Kyushu went back online. Another 23 applications for
reactor restart are awaiting approval by the government. All face continuing
opposition from anti-nuclear activists.773 There can be little doubt that anti-nuclear
activism in Tokyo has played an important role in disrupting the nuclear village and
hindering the re-establishment of the Japanese nuclear industry. Whether further
restarts take place remains to be seen. Whatever the future may hold, the multitude of
strategies and tactics adopted by the anti-nuclear movement in Tokyo have created
the potential to ‘de-nuclearise’ time and space in a decaying post-industrial city.

773 ‘Japan Restarts First Nuclear Power Plant Since Fukushima’, BBC News Online, 11 August 2015,
accessed 26 August 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33858350.
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